Racism, Xenophobia and Ethnic Conflict

Edited by
Simon Bekker and David Carlton

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RISING TENSION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

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PREFACE

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All opinions expressed in the chapters of this book are of a purely personal nature and do not necessarily represent the offical view of either the organisers of the School or of the organisations to which the writers may be affiliated.

Carlo Schaerf
(President of ISODARCO and Director of the School)

List of Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
BC	Black Consciousness Movement
BPN	Burgerpartij Nederland
CDs	Centrumdemocraten
CP	Centrum Partij
CSMHI	Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction
DVU	Deutsche Volksunion
FN	Front National
Fs	Die Freiheitlichen
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GNU	Government of National Unity
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IRA	Irish Republican Army
NB	Nederlands Blok
NF	National Front
NIPO	Nederlandse Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie
NP	National Party
NPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
REPs	Die Republikaner
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
US	United States
VB	Vlaams Blok

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INTRODUCTION

Simon Bekker

After the Second World War, the globe became divided into two alternatives, capitalism and socialism, Washington and Moscow, the first and the second worlds. The idea of the Third World – developed in the early 1950s – offered a third alternative, a new way for the numerous newly-independent countries of the globe. General disillusionment with this third way developed rapidly as strategies of modernisation and economic development in developing countries failed to live up to their promise. A prime reason for this Third World failure was deemed to be ethnic conflict in these heterogeneous societies. Ethnic conflicts, accordingly, during this Cold War era, were perceived to be problems of the developing world.

With the end of the Cold War all this has changed. Nation-states react defensively as local politics and global politics increasingly lead to the articulation of similar demands, for human and cultural rights and for equity in access to resources. These demands act as incentives for emergent groups – no longer confined within either the Western or the Eastern bloc – to assert their differences, to assert the uniqueness they experience, often in contradistinction to other groups within the same society. Such processes are apparent in Eastern Europe and other parts of what used to be the Soviet empire, in Western Europe and the Middle East, in the former first, second and third worlds. These processes have become universal. Racism and ethnic conflict, accordingly, allied as they are to these processes, have become global problems today.

Part One of this book raises these issues at a general analytic level. Its four chapters select a number of ideas which underpin violent conflicts of this nature:

- identity
- territory
- language
- nation
- state
- intervention.

The authors apply these ideas to a number of carefully selected historical examples to show how and why they are key elements in analyses of racism, xenophobia and ethnic conflict. Subsequently, while sharing this common framework of ideas, each author develops a particular theme.

Håken Wiberg introduces his theme by beginning with the 'identity budget' of an individual. Items in this budget typically include belonging to a family, to wider kin relations, to a language and religious grouping, to a nationality, and to a state. These items, he insists, are neither fixed nor given but are social constructions. Accordingly, heterogeneous societies find themselves in great danger when one item of the identity budgets of their members becomes predominant, for example when nationalist or state ideologies take hold. The chapter concludes with an analysis of Western and Eastern European societies in such straits.

Klaus Gottstein addresses the same theme of ethnic conflicts in heterogeneous societies. His focus is on conditions for sustained conflict regulation and, in particular, on the environment within which ethnic protagonists face each other. Particular attention is given to the presence or absence of a common danger to both protagonists and the role that this common danger plays in conflict regulation. Numerous historical examples are cited as illustrations.

Carl Kaysen seeks to uncover relations between nation, state and economy; between culture, order, and production in a single society. Modern economies improve under conditions of unrestrained factor mobility, skilled labour, and stable markets. Accordingly, those states which have succeeded in improving transportation and organisation (through technological development) and education (through nation-building) within an environment of political stability have played a critical role in economic development. Today, currents of globalisation are diminishing the relative importance of the roles of states and nations in economic performance. Mobility, labour and markets are becoming increasingly international. It is today's modern nationalisms, therefore, that pose a threat to international economic development.

Since the end of the Cold War, major global powers have become particularly reluctant to become involved militarily beyond their national borders. This is the point of departure of George Rathjens' chapter on an assessment of the recent history of military intervention in ethnic conflicts. The role played by international agencies and the United States, and the distinction between peace-keeping and peace-making are fundamental to this assessment. The dangers of continued engagement beyond the planned intervention period are underlined.

Part Two of the book embraces a number of case studies. Generalisations about the nature of ethnic conflicts are often misleading since there are wide variations across examples in demography, economic circumstances, ethnic manipulation, political systems, and – probably most importantly – histories. Accordingly, depth analyses of three different examples offer specific sets of explanations for particular cases. The examples selected address

- security and the peace process in Northern Ireland,
- democratisation and conflict in contemporary South Africa, and
- the rise of racism in political parties of five Western European countries – Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands

The necessity to view policy on security as reflecting a relationship between the conflicting groups in Northern Ireland is a particularly important element in the first case study. After the first-ever universal general election in 1994 in South Africa, the continuation of conflict in the predominantly Zulu-speaking north-eastern province of that country is highlighted in the second case study. In the third case study, it is the professionalisation of the parties of the xenophobic extreme right that is identified as a new and threatening political development in the European Union.

The rise of a racist consciousness in Western European extreme right political parties which is addressed in Christopher Husbands' chapter in Part Two provides the bridge to Part Three of the book. Identities based on racial criteria are common in many societies of the modern world. Theories claiming that these identities are based upon biological and genetic factors are also common in these and other societies. Inferences are therefore drawn that these identities are fixed, immutable, and primordial in nature. Accordingly, it is argued, identities are not chosen but are inherited.

The two chapters in **Part Three** address and refute these theories and their inferences. The authors – Guido Barbujani and Guido Modiano – are both trained geneticists and demonstrate by using contemporary genetic theory and data that anthropological definitions of human races – while identifying visible differences of genetic origin – do not identify significant genetic variation among them. Variations within such groups exceed variations across them. The authors conclude that individual identities and their ethnic and racial dimensions are social constructions, choices made by individuals and by groups, and that causal links between these social constructions and significant genetic factors have not been demonstrated.

IDENTITY, ETHNICITY, CONFLICT

Håkan Wiberg

Introduction

Much polemical argument has raged over whether the conflicts in former Yugoslavia are 'ethnic', or are 'religious', or are something else. These arguments usually tell us more about the authors than about the former Yugoslavia, affirmation as well as rejection of such theses typically being used in political propaganda.

There is one sense, however, in which these conflicts have clearly been 'religious', but it concerns the world outside the former Yugoslavia. If we ask who won the propaganda war and where and when it was won, the picture is quite clear: the Croats (and the Slovenes) won the first round in 1991 in the Catholic world (together with its Protestant appendage), whereas the Serbs won it in the Orthodox world. During the second round, in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1992, these victories remained in place, whereas the Moslems succeeded, in the eyes of the Islamic world, in defeating its two protagonists.[1]

This, however, tells us more about which strings international public relations agencies of the different parties are able to pluck than about what is going on inside the former Yugoslavia.[2] I have no intention, in this chapter, of attempting to answer these questions. My more modest aim is to clarify them.

Identity

Let me take identity as my point of departure. The term has two divergent meanings: on the one hand, it refers to what makes an individual unique[3]; and, on the other hand, to what makes him or her belong to various kinds of communities. I shall focus on the second meaning.

In the 'identity budget' of an individual, several different dimensions normally appear, and several levels may be significant within a single dimension. To the individual, these dimensions and the distinction between categories within them may appear as 'natural' or 'given'. To the social scientist, their character as social constructions is revealed by the considerable variation found between different cultures, both with respect to which dimensions are seen as important and how categorisation takes place within single dimensions. Let me illustrate this by identifying and analysing a number of central dimensions.

Let me start with territory and neighbourhood. An individual is surrounded by a series of circles defined in physical or in cultural geography, such as the block or village, the municipality, county, province, state, region, continent and world. To which extent he or she considers such circles to be 'own territory' or 'own neighbourhood' depends strongly on time and space, as it does regarding the distribution of identification and of loyalty between these circles.[4]

Kinship as experienced by kinsfolk also varies strongly: consider the nuclear family, the extended family, the clan, and, moving up the scale, mythical conceptions of the nation (based, as these conceptions are, on the 'descendants' of some 'common' patriarch a long time ago). Race as a social construction also appears in different forms. In one of them, it is seen as an even wider kinship circle than (this sense of) nation. Exactly which 'races' are presumed to exist differs across different societies. This is also true for another construction of 'race', that based on skin colour and other physical characteristics. How many categories are presumed to exist, where the lines between them are drawn, and what lines are seen as most important, depends on which society we are considering.[5]

We also find strong variations regarding the extent to which identification, organisation and solidarity are based on market position.[6] The inner circle represents the community at a single work place; beyond that, we have guilds, unions, estates, castes and classes, moving (in one direction, at least) toward the 'global proletariat'.

Religion and language also have central roles in defining reality and therefore tend to have great potential for shaping identities and creating communities.[7] Here, too, the distinctions that are made often depend profoundly on social factors. We may draw several circles, for instance, around the tongue that is actually spoken in a single family: sociolects, dialects, dialect groups, languages, and language families. Where the line is drawn between what is seen as 'different dialects of the same language' and what is seen as 'different languages' may often appear arbitrary or even nonsensical to a professional linguist - but the drawing of these lines will often have great symbolic

importance to those drawing them. At a more macro level, states or political units often consider linguistic homogenisation as an important strategy aimed at 'nation-building', and, for ethnonationalists, it is important to have a language that is their 'very own', not a dialect of 'somebody else's' - in the extreme, in fact, this view requires a policy of linguistic purism and proposes the shedding of all 'borrowed' words.[8]

With regard to religions, moreover, no uniformity regarding similarities and differences in faith occur across societies. Classifications into 'Protestant', 'Catholic' or 'Orthodox', for example, are sometimes experienced as bitterly opposed and adversarial, and sometimes as having 'Christianity' in common. Islam sees itself as belonging to an even wider community, the 'peoples of the Book', which includes other monotheistic religions, whose believers are assigned a special position in contrast to other infidels.

Let me repeat the basic message: none of these categorisations are 'natural' or 'given'. They are all social constructions, and often originally the products, more than the causes, of social conflict - which does not mean that they cannot have powerful causal effects once they are established.[9] We should therefore look with scepticism at different kinds of primordialism, but with equal scepticism at seeing different categorisations merely as vehicles of political manipulation. Manipulation there may be; but it is not in the hands of those attempting it to decide whether it will be successful or not, nor what its results will be, nor to decide whether to reverse or undo its consequences, and perhaps not even to decide whether or not to engage in such manipulation.

One important difference between the dimensions of the 'identity budget' concerns the possibility of a community creating a self-reproducing society, or being large enough to be able to constitute a state. For biological reasons, gender or age-specific communities are excluded.[10] A community with a specific market position is also excluded as long as division of labour occurs. The classless society can only appear among hunters and gatherers, if even there. The fact that a political ideology may have this as an ideal is another matter. A state may actually manage to reduce some differences in privileges in their society - or even proclaim that a classless society has been created. A class may be able to seize power in a society. Nonetheless, a class cannot form a classless society, that is, a society with one class only.

On the other hand, it is quite possible to imagine a society, or even a state, where everybody speaks the same language (as they define 'same language'), count themselves to belong to the same nation or race, or regard themselves as belonging to the same religion. Such homogeneous states tend to be strongly authoritarian, though there are exceptions. They often display a history of ethnocide, of mass expulsion, or even of genocide, though, again,

this is not necessarily the case. And they are often highly parochial and lack creativity, though this, too, is no natural law. The quarter of a million Icelandic Protestants provide a counter-example on all three counts above.

Once upon a time - or so we tend to believe - the typical 'identity budget' had few dimensions. Most weight was given to those circles immediately around the individual and family, and most positions within dimensions were inherited, or - at least - were what sociologists call ascribed (particularly by gender and age).[11] In increasing areas of the globe, this is now history. Various forms of mobility (geographical, social, ideological) have increased. Since the 19th century, different political movements have devoted great amounts of energy designed to influence and change people's identity budgets. Let me illustrate these changes by identifying a number of ideal types.[12]

Ideas about kinship may still be given great weight. The modern racist demands identification high up on this dimension. (His antithesis, what anthropologists call the amoral familist, goes to the opposite extreme, but typically does not formulate any missionising ideology - it's all in the family!)

Religions sometimes demand that faith be accepted as the primary dimension, as in the Christian formulation about neither man nor woman, neither Jew nor Greek, or in the Islamic concept of Umma. More extreme versions of this are found in some sects.

The extreme nationalist view comes in two versions, which we may call 'state nationalist' and 'ethnonationalist'. They both have a clear view on what dimension should be given priority: gender or class, for instance, should be seen as secondary or even irrelevant in relation to the national community or the political state. There is also coincidence in their preferences regarding where on the preferred dimension people ought to identify themselves: distinctions beneath the nation or state should be assigned less importance (so as not to 'divide the nation') and the same holds true for communities above them.[13] The difference between these two types of nationalists has to do with the fact that though the state is relatively unambiguously defined, in particular, in territorial terms, 'the people' may be conceptualised in several different ways: in terms of descent, or language, or religion, or different combinations of these.[14] To the extent that state nationalism (based, as it is, on territorial integrity in the first place) is really successful, it also manages to define the people in this way, and we get a 'double nationalism': state nationalism and ethnonationalism rolled into one.

Extreme class thinking, as, for example, in vulgar Marxist versions, is equally one-dimensional: an emphasis on dimensions other than class is seen as a sign of 'false consciousness'. Within this dimension, the desired identification tends to lie higher than that of the nationalist. The entire working class (however defined) or even the global proletariat are cases in point.

These one-dimensional ideologies rarely succeed completely. Human beings normally have multidimensional identity budgets. They tend to distribute their identification, moreover, between different levels on the same dimension. They see no contradiction, for instance, in being Catalan and European. Simultaneously, they are active in their church and their political party, their women's group and their trade union. To them, time pressures are regarded as the only reason for having to make choices between these activities.

In some cases, however, - and most of them are historically horrifying - one of the monopolistic ideologies has been victorious and has created a real monster. There are three ideal types in this regard: class ideology, national ideology and state ideology. Combinations are also possible. Let us have a closer look at the relations between the three potential monsters.

States are able to take on a variety of forms, and a variety of allied systems of legitimation. There are acephalous cultures with nothing resembling a state machinery in the traditional European understanding of the term. Other forms of political organisation have some features in common with the modern state, but do not constitute such a state. The modern territorially-bound state displays a set of monopolies: on the legitimate use of violence, on some aspects of defining reality, and on many kinds of decision-making. We also find variety, among democracies and among other state forms, regarding the extent to which states display centralised powers. These range from extremely centralist states to highly decentralised confederations.

State power may be legitimised by direct reference to God or to a ruler or a dynasty reigning *gratia Dei*. Alternatively, the current ruler may be considered to have charismatic features. In a third case, state power may define itself as being 'by the people' and serving the people, whether or not this people are actually given the opportunity to express their opinions through the franchise. In all three cases, the social meaning of such legitimation procedures may vary greatly.

In the third case, the crucial issue is simply who the people are? There are two major traditions of thought on this issue, even though they have gradually become hybridised. In the thinking of the French Enlightenment, it is the state, and more specifically the citizens' state, that defines the nation (*patrie*). German Romanticism takes the converse view: it is the nation (*Volk*) that enjoys a primordial existence by virtue of being a cultural community. If this nation does not already have a state, it is calling for one.[15]

An allied question may be posed as follows: To whom does the state belong? Different constitutions give different answers to this question. Some remain

completely silent. Others, now increasingly rare, contain phrases like 'to the workers and peasants', or ' to the people', implying an answer couched in class terms. Several constitutions, often adopted after 1989, contain formulas like 'Ruritania is the state of the Ruritanian people', or, in slightly more liberal versions, 'Ruritania is the state of the Ruritanian people and the Slobbovian minority'. In the first case, it is unclear whether the people are defined in state terms, rendering the clause purely circular, or in national terms, meaning in practice that one of the nations in the state claims a privileged or monopolistic position. Such a claim for a privileged position may of course also exist in the second case, but there the existence of the claim is at least an empirical question.

In optimal cases, it is possible to have state, class, and nation 'tamed' so as to enable them to co-exist relatively peacefully. Parliamentary democracy, where really functioning, has proven useful as an arena where class conflict can be acted out through organisation, the franchise, and horse trading. In such cases, as well in several other states, the traditional protagonists of alternative methods of struggle have gradually tended to adopt the view that democratic methods are the only ones that carry some prospect of progress.

Such democracies are also peaceful in another sense. Although they do not differ markedly from other states regarding their participation in wars (and there is no solid support for the view that they are predominantly defensive in these cases), it has been clearly established that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war against each other.[16]

These arguments, however, do not imply that this form of democracy is the ultimate solution to modern state government. In the cradle of parliamentary democracy - Western Europe and North America - class conflict and class identity have been strong in the popular consciousness and have eventually become regulated by this form of democratic government. In many parts of the world, other cleavages govern people's primary perceptions and actions, no matter what sociologists may have to say about the fundamental causes of these perceptions and actions. In these societies, democratic institutions have, at best, survived 'on the surface'; and, at worst, have simply become channels for ethnonational clashes of interests. In the very worst cases, they have stimulated rather than mitigated such clashes.

To illustrate the different roles such 'democratic institutions' may play, I now turn to post-war European history and to what sociologists call a natural experiment.

Ethnonational movements in west and east Europe

The last but one resurgence of ethnonational movements in Europe took place between the two World Wars. After 1945, they seemed to have disappeared, and obituaries started appearing in the 1960s. Marxists tended to diagnose the cause of death as increasing class consciousness since petty-bourgeois nationalism had been revealed as false consciousness. Liberals, on the other hand, often concluded that European integration had succeeded in transcending traditional and parochial ethnonationalism. The corpse, however, soon began to move and hindsight wisdom indicates that we should have been looking for ephemeral sedatives rather than causes of death.

I have two proposals in this respect. First, collaboration with the likes of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini had ruined the legitimacy of many nationalist movements, as, for example, those among Croats, Slovaks, Ukrainians, the Flemish, Bretons, Albanians, and Hungarians - not to speak of Germans and Italians. It took a long time for them or their spiritual descendants to find their feet again, to launch credible movements again. Secondly, after 1945, European states were initially highly nervous about this subject, displaying little tolerance for anything that might lead to ethnic separatism. While referenda were frequently used for drawing new boundaries after 1918, they were virtually absent after 1945. The drawing of boundaries was viewed either as a matter of restoring the *status quo ante* (as in the cases of Western and, largely, South-Eastern Europe), or as the decree of the victor (in the cases of the new boundaries of the Soviet Union and Poland), or as political bargaining (in the case of Trieste). Once these 'sedatives' began to lose their powers, the 'natural experiment' started. The crucial question that I shall try to address on the basis of this 'experiment' is, 'How are the forms and effects of ethnonational movements affected by the character of the societies they appear in?'

A re-awakening occurred first in Western Europe, where ethnonationalism started reappearing in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There were three important experimental conditions. First, there was economic affluence and growth, even if the latter was reduced after the first 'oil crisis' in 1973. Secondly, with the exception of the death throes of the Iberian dictatorships, there were not only democratic constitutions but also, and more importantly, old and rooted democratic cultures within which, critically, conflicts were handled by peaceful rather than violent political means. Thirdly, the integration process, especially in the Nordic countries and in what is today the European Union, rendered state boundaries less and less meaningful.

Under these conditions, a series of ethnonational movements appeared. Their normal behaviour was to create organisations, make propaganda,

demonstrate, form parties, take part in elections and referenda, look for alliance partners, and use log rolling and horse trading, all in good democratic fashion, to find solutions that were acceptable to all parties. This was not always done with great enthusiasm, and, in some cases, it appears that action on divisive issues was postponed, but this behaviour does appear normal under the conditions pertaining in Western Europe at this time. In fact, this is what has happened in Belgium (Flemish, Germans), Great Britain (Scots, Welsh), Spain (Catalans, Galicians, Basques), Italy (Friulians, Germans, Sardinians), Switzerland (the division of Jura), Denmark (Germans, Faroites, Innuit), Austria (Croats, Slovenes), Norway (Sami), Sweden (Sami, Finns) and France (several groups). A more detailed analysis would certainly produce more cases. In a few cases, violence was used as a means of struggle by minorities within minorities, such as with the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, with the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in the Basque lands and with a small group in Corsica. There have also been isolated cases of violence in Switzerland (Jura) and Italy (South Tirolia).

In Central and Eastern Europe, ethnonational movements only became clearly visible in the 1980s (though there were harbingers in Kosovo in 1968 and in Croatia in 1971). These movements emerged under very different conditions. First, economic levels of living were far lower than those in Western Europe, and were followed by full-blown economic crises comprising increasing unemployment and inflation, on the one hand, and falling Gross Domestic Product and general standards of living, on the other.[17] These circumstances create a well-known breeding ground for political radicalism, whether of a Right, Left, Nationalist, or Populist variety, or of a combination of these. Secondly, vital democratic traditions were rare. In several states they had never existed, and in others it was only very old people that could recall them in action.[18] Political ambitions and brand new constitutions were not sufficient substitutes. Thirdly, previously integrative organisations - such as the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, their grave shortcomings notwithstanding - were dissolved and not replaced by organisations that functioned better. Accordingly, state boundaries, symbols of (re)gained sovereignty, increased in salience. The prognosis was therefore very much worse than in Western Europe.

As a consequence, it is more than possible to imagine any of the three potential ideological monsters developing into full strength. The first condition - economic stagnation and crisis - does not tell us what kind of radicalism we should expect. The second condition - the absence of democratic traditions - suggests that the potential to regulate such radicalism was weak. It is interesting to note however that general historical experience does seem to indicate that fledgling democracies are better at handling class than nation or state ideological issues. The third condition points in the same

direction: boundaries tend to mean much more for states and nations than for classes.

Another important issue needs to be raised. Radical mobilisation on a class basis needs a political language as a vehicle; and the traditional language for this was so eroded and had lost so much credibility after decades of (ab)use from Communist propaganda that this political language was of little use, at least over the short term.[19]

The most threatening monsters were therefore the ideologies of nation and state, in the latter case, of two types: that of the 'outward state' (pointing to irredentism, expansionism) and of the 'inward state' (characterised by the leaderships' greed for societal power). By way of illustration, there have been a continuing series of boundary disputes, even if we limit ourselves to that part of Europe that lies East of the Italy-Austria-Germany-Finland-Norway line.[20] The only boundaries between what are now sovereign states that have not been moved, once or repeatedly, in our century are the Norwegian/Russian, the Estonian/Latvian, the Latvian/Lithuanian, and the Romanian/Yugoslav borders.

Accordingly, we might well have expected a reawakening of the 'outward state' as an active monster and it is remarkable that this, by and large, has not happened. Some states have indeed been talking about boundary revision, but apparently most often as a bargaining tactic rather than as a serious claim. Other states have supported the demands of their co-nationals in other states for autonomy, by means which range from political declarations to arms smuggling, but they have not sent people in their state's uniforms across these boundaries. All Russian (and other ex-Soviet) troops have returned home, except for a handful in Latvia that are treaty-bound to do so soon. The armed forces of Yugoslavia have withdrawn from Slovenia after a faked war, and from Macedonia without even that. After recognition of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina by the great powers, they also pulled out, leaving the fighting to the local Serbs; and when there was international criticism of Croatia's military presence, it was legitimised by a formal alliance with the Sarajevo government. Russia has had its new military presence in some crisis areas approved by the respective governments and legitimised by the Commonwealth of Independent States or even the United Nations to a sufficient degree to avoid international criticism.[21]

Regarding 'outward state' ideologies and movements, therefore, the challenge is to explain, in Sherlock Holmes' terms, why the dog didn't bark. In some cases, explanations may be found at local level. Trying to realise claims for boundary revisions with Russia by armed force would have been suicidal for Estonia and Latvia.[22] In other cases, a war implied very debatable prospects, as, for example, between the nuclear-weapon powers of Russia and Ukraine.

In several cases, however, local explanations do not suffice for we would have had fewer wars in the world, had this kind of uncertainty been a generally deterring factor. An important part of the explanation, accordingly, needs to be sought at the European level.

We may begin with the prohibition in the Helsinki Agreement against seeking boundary revisions by use of threats of armed force. This prohibition has been strengthened by direct support from predominantly Western institutions, in particular, by the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Rarely, however, if ever, has the chief motive to maintain a low profile on such issues flowed from fear of Western military sanctions. The motive for desisting from open disobedience is rather to be found in the desire (whether realistic or not) of many governments to 'get into the West' (EU, NATO, etc.) and the belief that playing by Western rules improves the chances for that.

The remaining monster candidates are then the nation and the 'inward state', and clashes between these two forms of movement. Statistics of violent conflict indicate, in fact, that these two monsters account for far more violence than the others. Let us consider them in more detail.

Nation and state

There are many examples of different nations living peacefully together in one state. Sometimes one of them is so predominant that the others do not even try to assert themselves; and sometimes they have eventually been able to fine-tune political institutions to the point where all parties accept them, or even like them. Yet, several historical analyses show that multinational states run higher risks of civil war than others and that these risks seem to be particularly great where both Christians and Moslems form large groups, no matter which of them is the biggest one.[23] Since the average state in Central/Eastern Europe is more nationally heterogeneous than in Western Europe, this gives an additional argument for its having a worse prognosis than West European states.

The percentage figure for the biggest national group in a state is a very crude indicator indeed but it nonetheless seems to have considerable predictive power regarding serious domestic problems, at least in Central and Eastern Europe.[24] *The Statesman's Yearbook*, supplemented with a few estimates, offers us the following rank ordering in groups of ten from worst to best prognosis, on the assumption that greater heterogeneity results in greater problems. The figures are often several years old, but demographic changes are very slow and the ordering will accordingly not have been affected much

by such changes.[25] The brackets give percentages of the second (and occasionally third) largest group in the given state.

Ex-Yugoslavia:	36 (Serbs, 20 Croats)
Bosnia-Hercegovina:	40 (Moslems, 32 Serbs)
Kazakhstan:	41 (Russians, 36 Kazakhs)
Kyrgyzstan:	49 (Kirgyzians, 26 Russians)
USSR:	52 (Russians, 16 Ukrainians)
Latvia:	54 (Latvians, 33 Russians)
Tajikistan:	59 (Tajikhs, 23 Uzbeks)
Moldova:	64 (Moldovians, 14 Ukrainians, 12 Russians)
Czechoslovakia:	64 (Czechs, 32 Slovaks)
Estonia:	65 (Estonians, 28 Russians)
.....	
Macedonia:	67 (Macedonians, 22 Albanians)
F.R.Yugoslavia:	67 (Serbs/Montenegrins, 16 Albanians)
Turkomenistan:	68 (Turkomens, 13 Russians)
Uzbekistan:	69 (Uzbeks, 11 Russians)
Georgia:	69 (Georgians, 9 Armenians)
Ukraine:	74 (Ukrainians, 21 Russians)
Croatia:	75 (Croats, 12 Serbs)
Azerbaijan:	79 (Azeri, 8 Russians, 8 Armenians)
Belarus:	79 (Byelorussians, 12 Russians)
.....	
Lithuania:	80 (Lithuanians, 9 Russians, 8 Poles)
Russia:	83 (Russians, 4 Ukrainians)
Bulgaria:	80-85 (Bulgarians, 13 Turks)
Slovakia:	80-85 (Slovaks, some 10 Hungarians)
Romania:	85-90 (Romanians, 8-10 Hungarians)
Armenia:	90 (Armenians, then Azeri)
Slovenia:	91 (Slovenes, several small groups)
Albania:	above 90 (Albanians, then Greeks)
Czech Rep.:	above 90 (Czechs, then Slovaks)
Poland:	c. 95 (Poles, then Germans)
Hungary:	97 (Hungarians)

Out of the ten most heterogeneous states, including Estonia, three have been dissolved, in the case of ex-Yugoslavia by war. In Bosnia-Hercegovina and Moldova, two or three parts have declared themselves independent and remain beyond the control of central government authority after years of armed conflict. Tajikistan has experienced a major civil war since 1992. The remaining four: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Estonia and Latvia, are the most Russian states outside Russia itself, and each displays considerable or strong ethnic tensions.

None of the following ten states - Macedonia through Belarus - has been formally dissolved, but Georgia, Croatia and Azerbaijan, after major wars, are de facto divided states. There have been clashes between ethnic groups in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and there are strong internal tensions in most of the others. Declarations of independence, in one form or another, have been proclaimed by the Albanians in Macedonia[26] and in Yugoslavia[27], and by the Russians in the Crimea.[28] The only state in which these kinds of problems appear absent is Belarus, which now seems to be headed for closer integration with Russia.

The group of relatively homogeneous states, from Lithuania downwards, appears better off in several respects. No formal dissolution has taken place. Various declarations of independence in parts of the Russian Federation[29] have been recognised by nobody other than the minority concerned. The only clear bid for de facto dissolution is the main cause of the war in Chechnya, the only war located in this lower section of the list of states given above. The 1989 power-shift in Romania had little background of this kind, and Armenia's support for the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh has remained unofficial.

Domestic tensions within these states have not been entirely absent, as witnessed by past periods of forced Bulgarisation of Turks in Bulgaria, open discrimination against Hungarians in Romania and difficult Slovak-Hungarian relations. As a matter of fact, we have to descend in the list to the second half of the third group to find states which experience few inter-group problems and this conclusion may not be accepted by some Greeks in Albania, some non-Slovenes in Slovenia or some Jews in Poland and Hungary.

Peace among the monsters?

Let us now turn to the category of states that are heterogeneous in some 'ethnic' respect, such as regarding language, religion, customs, or historical traditions and myths. Across time and space, we find a great variety of dimensions which have served as the basis for human beings to think of themselves as belonging to 'different peoples' or to 'different nations'.[30] In Belgium, for example, it is a matter of language, in Northern Ireland religion, in Canada and Cyprus, the main basis has gradually moved from religion to language, in Scotland it is primarily a matter of historical traditions, and in Somalia and Rwanda of perceptions and traditions of kinship among people who speak the same language and where religion is not a dividing line.

The extent to which heterogeneity is perceived to be a problem by actors in a state also varies. Accordingly, it is possible by using historical example to

list options or strategies that have been attempted by actors to 'solve' the potential or actual problem. I list seven of the most important below:

(1) State-organised genocide. Several nations disappeared altogether or were reduced to tiny minorities during the 19th century by the United States and by European colonial powers in Africa.[31]

(2) Ridding the state of as many of the minority populations as possible, so as to create 'ethnically clean' areas. Among the methods are state-organised deportation, usually with a high death rate[32]; terror, with various kinds of relationships between the central government and different militias or gangs[33]; and other kinds of mass expulsion in more legal forms, such as those based on formal citizenship[34], or limited to strong encouragement to leave the state concerned.[35]

(3) 'Neutralising' the minorities politically by using citizenship or voting legislation to make it difficult or impossible for them to get the same status as the 'state-carrying' group. This method is widely used against first or second generation immigrants, but also by colonial powers against autochtonous populations[36] and by several post-colonial states against their aboriginal populations.

(4) Retaining (partially or largely) different social orders for different groups, like the old Turkish millet system, where the state recognised separate systems of family (and wider areas of civil) law for different monotheistic religious groups.

(5) Having two or more official languages and/or a high degree of local autonomy concerning the choice of official languages.[37]

(6) Creating 'trans-ethnic' identities. Among the relatively successful cases, we find 'American', 'British' (except Irish Catholics), 'Finlander' and 'Swiss'. There are also many failures.

(7) Using sticks or carrots to assimilate linguistic, religious, and other minorities into the majority group. Modern examples include the systematic Frenchification of France since the early nineteenth century and, in more extreme forms, the attempts to make Russians or Germans out of the Poles, and Japanese out of the Koreans.

Some of these methods have resulted in, and even created, far worse conflicts than those that they were supposed to solve. Today, a number violate international law to the extent that they carry risks of international sanctions which range from military intervention to being kept in the waiting room of the Council of Europe. This is true for options (1), most versions of (2), and some variations of (3).

Whatever merits (4) may have, this option is difficult to combine with the formal requirements of equality before the law in modern states.[38] Where we find versions of (4) in European history, these options tended to be medieval cases of conquest or migration relating, for example, to English/Celts, to Germans/Slavs, or to Christians, Moslems and Jews in the Iberian peninsula and southern Italy. They always proved to be unstable, leading after a few generations to the system of the strongest group prevailing.[39]

Some of the other methods, especially some variants of (3) and (7), tend to engender resistance which may in turn lead to armed conflict, launched by either minority groups or by the central government. Often, what the predominant group sees as 'law and order' is seen as intentional discrimination by others and what the former sees as peaceful assimilation may look like planned ethnocide in the eyes of others.

If judged by history, options (5) and (6) seem to have the best prospects for conflict management but they also have their problems. One main problem with (5) is hinted at by the formulation 'and/or' above: autonomy and multilingualism may be combined in different ways. We have the maximal version of bilingualism, where the official languages of the state are also the official ones at all political and administrative levels, with numerous consequent issues concerning language ability of government staff, financing of school systems, and so forth.[40] These issues may result in resistance within the majority group, where people may ask themselves why they have to learn the minority language in school at the expense of other and more useful languages. On the other hand, maximal autonomy is often accompanied by minimal multilingualism, where the central government is the only multilingual institution and each language remains exclusive to the territorial unit within which it is dominant.[41]

One version of (6) is what we may call the 'citizen state', within which identification and solidarity with the state is greater than with the nation (to the extent that they collide), and also greater than with class or any other category with which the citizens may identify themselves. In any case, the existence of such a super-identity seems to be a necessary condition for such a citizen state. Among the cases lying relatively close to this ideal type of a modern multi-ethnic citizen state, we find the United States and some West European states, such as Finland and France (regarding language); Germany and The Netherlands (regarding religion); and Switzerland (regarding both). Several other states have officially proclaimed this type of state as a political ideal, or as an achievement but there are normally good grounds for scepticism on both counts.

These examples also suggest that insofar as a state has progressed sufficiently in this direction, it will simultaneously stabilise as a state,

whatever other grudges its citizens may harbour. This observation raises two further questions: How much is 'sufficient', and how does one get there? A major problem with method (6) is that it is rarely feasible to create such a super-identity by dictates from above. Until recently in Italy, for example, an Italian politician's 1870 proclamation - 'Now we have created Italy; it only remains to create Italians!' - appeared to have succeeded but the emergence of Lega Lombarda, later Lega Nord, has questioned his assertion. British super-identity moreover has not been able to prevent a majority of Scots from voting for devolution in the referendum in the 1970s.[42] A Spanish state was created centuries ago, but a Spanish super-identity never really developed, even though General Francisco Franco was able to prevent too public an expression of other identities over a lengthy period.

By contrasting successes with a number of failures, we may derive some tentative hypotheses about the emergence of 'sufficient' super-identities. Long duration as a state (or at least as a political entity) helps, but does not seem to be sufficient.[43] An origin as a voluntary association (as, for example, in Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United States) is useful, but does not seem to be necessary. As for religion, the Catholic/Protestant cleavage has in most cases eventually been possible to neutralise, often by not having any state religion.

No immediate conclusions can be made concerning linguistic issues, Finland and France lying close to the opposite extremes.[44] Still another dimension is hinted at by Ernest Gellner's classical quip that a nation is a group with a common enemy and a common misunderstanding of history.

These observations may give some guidelines for further research on 'how much is sufficient', but they do not tell us how a state may achieve this sufficiency. To what extent does that depend on what the state is doing and to what extent on the dynamics of civil society?

Though it is only in recent decades that 'nation-building' has become an analytical term, the phenomenon is far older. Several states, with France as the classical example, have systematically devoted themselves to creating a super-identity, although with widely varying degrees of success. All multinational empires have collapsed - if we count the Soviet Union among them, it obviously never succeeded in creating a real 'Soviet' identity transcending national ones. In fact, governmental attempts to create such a super-identity from above seem to have failed more often than to have succeeded, possibly because ambitious nation-builders have often missed the point that it is easier to create a single nation when it is not defined in opposition to national identities. After 1945, by way of illustration, Yugoslavia tried for a period to create a Yugoslav identity in competition with existing national identities, only to admit defeat in 1964.[45]

To what extent is it possible to replicate successful cases in today's world, in particular, in Europe? The United States obviously cannot be copied. It is today clearly impossible to create a state by exterminating the population of a large area and replace it with predominantly voluntary, or even enthusiastic, immigrants. The principle of voluntary association is not very helpful in those parts of Europe where the main problem is that large population groups do not want to belong to a recently-created state containing a different ethnic majority.

To the extent that religion has a strong role in the definition of identity, the roads described in the histories of Germany and the Netherlands are not very encouraging either. In the former case, there was the Thirty Years' War which killed off about half the population; in the latter case, there was eighty years of liberation war against a common enemy.

Finally, let us consider France and Finland. The difference between these cases hints at a classical dilemma for regimes in multinational states. Should one give more (primarily cultural) autonomy to the nations and run the risk of escalating claims for territorial autonomy, or state dissolution through secession? Or should one rather resolutely oppose all such demands, and risk that the demands frustrated by this very opposition grow stronger and eventually speed up the collapse of the state?

Finland appears easier to copy than France, for the French (in the sense of mother tongue French-speakers) have grown from being a minority at the beginning of the last century to being five-sixths today, surrounded by half a dozen minorities in different corners of the country. Frenchification was largely carried out before the combination of lengthy formal education, modern communication technology, and the self-consciousness of civil society had rendered this project well nigh impossible.

The contrast is Finland after its independence in 1917, where very generous language policies of the state have contributed to avoiding contradictions between a Swedish cultural identity and a 'Finlandish' (rather than Finnish) political identity. Method (5), accordingly, has been an important precondition for the application of method (6).

Copying, however, is rarely simple. First, Finland has a leading position among multilingual European states, almost every citizen being able to use his or her mother tongue in school and in communication with authorities. Since this position is shared by both Switzerland and ex-Yugoslavia, it is obviously not enough. Secondly, it is going to be very difficult for several states to copy Finland in this respect. They are now engaged in building up their state identities, which usually means linking this identity strongly to the (majority) nation and contrasting themselves as strongly as possibly from

the states from which they have just seceded. In this situation, the Finnish model tends to be less attractive than the French and the governments concerned attempt Latvianisation, Slovakisation, Croatisation, Macedonisation, and so on. Though there are members of the ethnic majority that criticise these tendencies as unwise or even unjust, they are usually too few to have much political influence now, and there is a real risk that they will not succeed in building such influence until it is too late.

It appears then that the best hypothesis is that method (5), with the cautious striking of balances it must include, is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the success of method (6) and the creation of an identity that permits the state to enjoy priority above nation, class, and so on. There is a second necessary condition: in a citizen-state, the citizens must have influence, and it was on this point that ex-Yugoslavia failed. When the elections in 1990 manifested at least the superficial attributes of a multi-party state, the political atmosphere was already poisoned by ethnonational mobilisation. 'Yugoslavism' of type (6) never had a chance: its traditional version was too interwoven with Communist doctrine and rhetoric to be able to survive as a legitimising ideology, and the liberal versions that had started to emerge were too fledgling to be able to compete with the Serb, Croat and several other versions of extreme nationalism.

In order to avoid catastrophes, it may be necessary for the state to acquire priority with respect to identification and solidarity. It is not sufficient, however, since such a state may well develop from a potential to a real monster, where the suppression of class conflict is legitimised by corporatist or other authoritarian ideologies, and the suppression of ethnic contradictions by the same or other 'harmony ideologies', equating any form of ethnic mobilisation with treason and terrorism. History is replete with cases of a fledgling democracy collapsing under the influence of such tendencies, or at least degenerating into sheer symbolism within a strongly authoritarian state.

To tame the state, one has to make it relatively unimportant. To put it more cautiously, a number of identity dimensions other than state identity are required to counter-balance state power, Furthermore, not only ought not the state to have a monopoly within its own dimension, but ought to be balanced by 'lower' identities in one direction and a measure of regionalism or even globalism in the other.

With so many difficult equations facing governments finding themselves in situations that are also serious in other respects, there might paradoxically be grounds for a certain optimism regarding the future. This optimism is based on the view that what is remarkable is not so much that there have been so many wars and conflicts, but that in so many states there has been

sufficient creativity and wisdom among the parties involved to have enabled states to manage and regulate conflict in spite of grim prognoses based on theoretical and empirical grounds. This implies that we should not let research focus too much on states where things went seriously wrong[46] but also on those states where things did not go as badly as expected.

NOTES

1. Complexity was then added when the Croat-Moslem war escalated in spring 1993 to the extent that it could no longer remain invisible, not to speak about the Moslem-Moslem war in the Bihac area since September 1993.
2. See Peter Brock 'Dateline Yugoslavia: The Partisan Press', *Foreign Policy* no.93, Winter 1993-94 and Jacques Merlino *Les Vérités Yougoslaves ne sont pas toutes bonnes à dire* (Paris, 1993).
3. Sometimes also called 'personality'.
4. Territory and territoriality have been the subject of quite a bit of ideological literature. There are, however, also important scholarly analyses, such as Torsten Malmberg *Human Territoriality* (The Hague, 1980).
5. For the social construction of 'race', see the penetrating analysis in Michael Banton *Racial Minorities* (London, 1972). Its general logic is also applicable to other social constructs of this type, such as 'nation'.
6. I am using this Weberian term to avoid getting into a discussion in the present chapter of the competing conceptualisations of 'class'. In short, class is obviously often an important basis for social organisation and mobilisation, but has to be thorougly conceptualised in order to be analytically helpful in this respect; even then, it is not the only significant categorisation of the 'market position' type.
7. A central work on social constructions and their roles in identity formation is Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York, 1967).
8. Not that this can succeed very far: throwing out what has been borrowed in the last thousand years would leave very little of most European languages.
9. There is an important sociological tradition that sees the creation and stabilisation of identity as central functions of social conflict. The classic is Georg Simmel *Der Streit* (1908) which appears in English together with another essay as *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations* (Glencoe, 1955), critically followed up by Lewis Coser *The functions of social conflict* (Glencoe, 1964).
10. The monachic republic of Athos was entirely dependent on immigration. Age groups may indeed form an important basis for social organisation in some societies, but cannot constitute one.
11. In general, an ascribed position is one which it is beyond the control of an individual to affect, whereas an achieved position is based on some effort, such as education, (often) profession, income, and so on.
12. Here and later, I am using the Weberian term 'ideal type' to refer to a simplifying construction, not to express any normative opinion.
13. Slavenka Drakulic expresses this very well in her book *Balkan Ekspres* (Copenhagen,1993 - *Balkan Express: Fragments from the other side of the war*, in the English version): "This is what the war does to us - reduces us to one dimension: the nation. But the problem with this nationalism is that whereas I was previously defined by my education, my work, my thoughts, my personality - and, yes, also by my nationality - I now feel deprived of all that. I am nothing, no longer a person. I am one out of 4.5 million Croats" (my translation from the Danish edition, p.48).

14. For details, see Håkan Wiberg 'Divided Nations and Divided States' in Jörg Callie and Bernhard Moltmann (eds) *Weltsystem und Weltpolitik jenseits der Bipolarität II* (Rehburg-Loccum, 1992), pp.457-477 and Håkan Wiberg 'Societal Security and the Explosion of Yugoslavia' in OleWæver: Barry Buzan: Morten Kelstrup & Pierre Lemaitre *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London, 1993), pp.93-109. For a more general presentation of various social constructions of 'nation', see Benedict Anderson *Imagined communities* (London, 1983).
15. It is another matter that it tends to take intellectuals who stand to profit from its being made to formulate this and disseminate this call. On the role of mass media inside Ex-Yugoslavia, see Marjan Malesic (ed.) *The Role of Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict*. Rapport No.164 (Stockholm, 1993) and Mark Thompson *Forging War. The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina*. Article 19 (London, 1994).
16. See several articles in the special issue of *Journal of Peace Research*, no.4, 1992.
17. For a detailed study of Ex-Yugoslavia from this point of view, see Carl-Ulrik Schierup *Migration, Socialism and the International Division of Labour: The Yugoslav Case* (Aldershot, 1990).
18. After the First World War, democratic regimes were indeed toppled in some West European countries (Italy 1922, Portugal 1928, Germany 1933, Spain 1936-39), but survived in all the others until the German occupation of some of them, after which they were restored in 1945. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, the only parliamentary democracies that had survived as such were Finland (where it had been touch and go in the early 1930s) and Czechoslovakia, which was eventually torn apart by ethnic cleavages engineered by Hitler.
19. The electoral swings in Estonia, Lithuania, Belarus, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria - and elsewhere - indicate that the 'suppression' of class in favour of nation may not be very long-lived.
20. By my count, at least 23 boundaries in this area have been changed once or more in the 20th century. Macedonia appears to keep the record by entirely or partly changing rulers in 1912, 1913, 1915, 1918, 1941, 1945 and 1991.
21. The case of Chechnya belongs to another category, and international governmental criticism has been carefully limiting itself to the way of fighting the war, while giving no support to Chechenian independence claims.
22. And it is anyhow difficult to imagine their governments interested in having more Russians than now in Estonia or Latvia, so the demands must have some other background.
23. This is the conclusion, for the period 1820-1949, in Lewis Fry Richardson's *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Chicago, 1960). There is also little ground for optimism today, given that the main cases combining a majority of one with a big, or locally predominant, minority of the other include the Philippines, Lebanon, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Hercegovina, FR Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Albania and Bulgaria, plus several African states, the worst cases being the Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Uganda.
24. In the list below, we count the old states as well as the first generation of successor states.
25. Recent refugee floods from and between former Soviet or Yugoslav republics have changed some demographic compositions more drastically; but since we are looking at relations between an earlier composition and later severe conflicts, this is irrelevant to the question of predictive power.
26. After a referendum in 1991, however, the bigger Albanian parties opted for trying to work within the political system.
27. Where the Kosovo Albanians are boycotting the Yugoslav institutions, including parliament elections, and are building up their own institutions, but have opted for nonviolent resistance.
28. This has lead to an alternation between confrontations and compromises between the local Crimean and central Ukrainian governments.
29. Some of these are ethnically related, others merely regional; some of them merely call for greater economic and other autonomy, whereas others have proclaimed full independence.

30. This remains equally true if we limit ourselves to the particularly strong definition of the term 'nation' that also presupposes some political project on separate status, autonomy or even secession.
31. Among the main cases of attempted genocide in our century are the Ottoman Empire (Armenians), Hitler Germany (Jews and Gypsies, plus decimation of Poles and others) and Ante Pavelic's Croatia (Jews, Serbs, Gypsies); the entire list of mass killing based mainly or entirely on ethnicity is much longer. It gets longer still if we add the cases where there is no indication of state organisation of the killings, such as the million victims of the division of British India.
32. Such as Joseph Stalin against Volga Germans, Crimean Tartars, Chechens, and so on, plus sizeable parts of the Baltic peoples; or several East European states expelling altogether about ten million Germans.
33. For instance, against the Palestinians in 1948 or between different peoples in Former Yugoslavia.
34. For instance, Indians in East Africa and several cases of mutual expulsion of expatriates in West Africa.
35. Among the targets are Russians in Estonia and Latvia and immigrant workers in Western Europe.
36. Apartheid survived longest among the formal institutions of this kind.
37. Different combinations can be found in, for example, Belgium, Canada, Finland, India, Israel, Spain, Switzerland and Ex-Yugoslavia.
38. India provided a good illustration of this in the1980s when its Supreme Court had to make a decision as to whether Indian law was to override Sharia concerning alimony to divorced Moslem women, or vice versa.
39. See Robert Bartlett *The making of Europe. Conquest, colonization and cultural change 950-1350* (Harmondsworth, 1994).
40. In the case of religion, problems can be solved by having no state religion; but the state cannot be mute, nor can it handle addressing issues in any language that some citizens may count as mother tongue.
41. The UN Commission for Human Rights recently prohibited Canada from allowing Quebec to prohibit and fine public announcements in any other language than French.
42. Since the rules had been made in Westminster, that majority still lost, not being more than 40 per cent of those entitled to vote.
43. A methodological problem is that there are very few states outside (mainly Western) Europe that can claim high age as a state.
44. It might even be that a state will have to choose between these opposite extremes and is more likely to get problems by attempting to compromise between them; but it would be premature to offer this as a hypothesis.
45. The number of self-proclaimed 'Yugoslavs' was never much beyond ten per cent in the censuses, falling to six per cent in 1981 and three in 1991. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, furthermore, self-declared 'Bosnians' have never been more than a fraction of one per cent, the very great majority defining themselves as 'Serbs', 'Croats', 'Moslems' and 'Yugoslavs'. The Moslem leadership in Sarajevo has now changed its name to 'Bosnjak', which was traditionally pejorative, but it remains unclear exactly whom, beyond the Moslems, the Sarajevo government claims to fall in that category.
46. International attempts at intervention may lead to even worse outcomes, irrespective of the proclaimed aims of these attempts. The case of Ex-Yugoslavia is analysed from this point of view in Håkan Wiberg 'Yugoslavia and conflict resolution: problems and lessons' in Dusan Janjic (ed.) *Religion and War* (Belgrade, 1994), pp.104-124.

VIOLENT AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS

Some Theses on the Determinants

Klaus Gottstein

Since ancient times, the history of mankind has been full of violent ethnic conflicts. The Bible tells us of the murderous wars that occurred in the Near East between 3000 and 2000 years ago. The tales of written or oral history and the legends and mythologies that survived from other parts of the world likewise describe wars and bloodshed between different groups and peoples. Of course, there have also been peaceful settlements and friendly cohabitation. These are mentioned less frequently, probably because they are less conspicuous and do not offer similar material to poets and historians for the description of human heroism and human passion, as tragic conflicts do. There is no doubt, however, that both peace and war are possible within and between human societies. Neither one is inevitable, as numerous historical examples prove. Nevertheless, there is still controversy as to the conditions and actions which are likely to lead to either war or peace when a crisis situation arises, in spite of the fact that quite a bit is known in this respect.[1]

Psychologists, historians and behavioural scientists have studied the ways individuals, groups and populations behave in situations of stress, excitement, exuberance, depression and despair and have developed theories with respect to the gradual or sudden emergence of enemy images, as a consequence, for instance, of traumatic experiences which may have occurred in the distant past to members of the group under investigation.

> *"Psychoanalysts and students of human behaviour have shown that the insticts of aggression and destruction, just as well as the instincts of love and cooperation, are deeply seated in human nature. They are the result of a struggle for survival in a hostile environment through thousands of generations. In its course man learned how advantageous it was – in hunting, in agriculture, in war – to cooperate with other members of the tribe. A division of labour, a*

coordination of efforts led to much better results. Now jobs could be done, tasks could be tackled which were completely out of reach of the individual or a smalll group. The larger a cooperating group was, the greater was its power, given equal levels of cultural development. but in order to keep peace within the group, taboos had to be set up and aggressive instincts suppressed. As Sigmund Freud tells us, this suppression leads to recurring eruptions of aggression towards those not belonging to the group, such as minorities and neighbouring groups. It is therefore not surprising that in the history of human development, from the beginning of our days, wars and violence are permanent phenomena. As groups grew larger and reached the size of nations and alliances of nations, and as technology became more and more advanced, wars became more and more devastating. Today mankind has acquired the technical capability to annihilate itself just by pressing a few buttons."[2]

Since human beings depend on co-operation, they live in groups. They are co-operative in the sense that members of a group assist one another in joint undertakings. They are ready to defend themselves against competing groups. Attack is often considered to be the best defence. Sometimes aggressive behaviour is motivated by fear, sometimes it derives from a feeling of superiority, from the 'right of the stronger group'. This is the law of the jungle. When humans became sedentary, their units grew larger. In order to preserve peace internally and organise co-operation and defence, it became necessary to formulate and observe laws, to supervise their observance and to enforce sanctions against law-breakers. A leader, king or judge had the monopoly of passing judgement and, on behalf of the community, applying force. The individual was no longer allowed to take the law into his own hands. States developed, and, as long as they were stable, internal law and order ruled, more or less. But in dealing with each other the states have not overcome another law of the jungle. In modern times, primitive law has been curbed, though quite inadequately, by international law. The bloody wars of the 20th century are proof of this inadequacy. Nevertheless, the United Nations exists. With their 'Blue Helmets' and with the International Court of Justice some small first steps have been taken towards a political organisation which is meant to comprise all of humanity. When it will have been completed foreign policy will be replaced by world-wide domestic policy ('*Weltinnenpolitik*' according to C.F.von Weizsäcker). The use of force will then be the monopoly of the Security Council or some equivalent body which will see to it that all conflicts are settled peacefully, if necessary by the rulings of an International Court, and the execution of these rulings will be enforced in agreement with world law.

We all know that we are still far removed from this state of affairs. But it is important to know that this is the long-range goal which should be

approached step by step. Meanwhile, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Cold War, old historical animosities which had almost been forgotten and considered resolved long ago, came to the surface again. Of course, old friendships were also renewed: between the peoples of Eastern Europe and Western Europe, for instance, and between East Germans and West Germans. But this renewal of old friendships sometimes led to disappointments, because it did not always fulfil the material expectations associated with this renewal.

With all the knowledge available on the psychological, historical, economic, and political origins of conflicts it is regrettable that there is little evidence that *this* knowledge is used by political decision-makers for the avoidance of armed conflicts. Indeed, we do not have to study ancient history in order to find examples of horrible wars and of massacres among the civilian populations, including old people, women and children, belonging to the parties fighting each other. These outrages happen in our present days, can be watched on TV, and are more cruel and bloody then ever due to the existence of modern weapons and technologies. But we need also to be fair in our judgement. There are also examples of the peaceful settlement of difficult political problems in our days. We shall come to that later.

Obviously, we cannot put up with the present state of affairs when ruthless leaders are allowed to pursue their political objectives by brute force, taking civilian populations as hostages and subjecting them in a most cruel and inhumane way to months and years of continuous shelling and to deprivation of food and medical supplies. Moreover, while doing this these leaders do not have to fear any sanctions. In a conflict of this kind there should have been intervention by superior police forces of the United Nations. Theoretically, the best solution for conflicts threatening to get out of control and turn violent would be, of course, to remove enemy images on which the original feud leading to the conflict was based. Can this be done? These enemy images might have their origin in a variety of genuine or merely perceived conflicts of interest, or in racial prejudices, in traditional antagonisms between neighbouring competing tribes or groups, in imagined irreconcilable religious differences, and so on.

What is known about enemy images and the methods that could prevent their appearance and growth? Is it possible to 'cure' enemy images, and, if so, what are the prerequisites for doing this? What can be said regarding the available methods of crisis management and conflict resolution when violent eruptions between groups are to be avoided, when peaceful settlements are to be reached? Under which conditions do social and political changes of the type observable in former Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Union lead to aggression against minorities, to racism, ethnic cleansing, extreme nationalism, or civil war? What role does the weakening or disappearance of

central authority play in this respect? What is the origin of enemy images which underlie armed conflicts between populations which have lived together reasonably peacefully so long as a strong central authority existed in their territory? Which psychological tools are available to replace by co-operative behaviour such enemy images and associated racism, chauvinism, and xenophobia?

It would be worthwhile to take stock of existing answers to these questions. Though this cannot be done in a comprehensive way in this chapter, the writer will offer some suggestions based on practical experience gained during four decades of work in international relations, both within the academic community and during official assignments in scientific, technological and political co-operation between 'East and West' as well as between 'North and South', during the Cold War era. During this period, many conflicts of varying intensity took place, and an attentive observer had the opportunity to note the conditions under which they ran their course. Historical analysis supplied further examples. The author has learned much moreover through discussions with psychologists, and by reading publications in the field of conflict research.

Vamik Volkan and his colleagues at the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI) of the University of Virginia have argued convincingly that the emotional core of conflicts between groups can often be found in 'chosen traumas' and 'chosen glories' of opposing sides. Chosen traumas refer to the shared mental representations of humiliating events during which losses which could not be mourned effectively, occurred. Chosen glories recount the shared mental representations of events of success or triumph. Both are often mythologized and passed from generation to generation, although historical grievances are stronger markers of a group's identity than the mental representations of past glories. Losses associated with chosen traumas cannot be mourned and the humiliation and hurt cannot be resolved. Therefore such traumas are handed down in the 'hope' that they can be mourned, resolved, or avenged in the future. This handing down, however, serves to perpetuate feelings of victimisation, entitlement, and the desire for revenge rather than successful mourning and resolution. Traumas experienced many centuries in the past are still active in the identities of some groups. It is as if time collapses and feelings about ancient events are condensed and intertwined with current events.[3]

Volkan and his colleagues at the CSMHI have developed a kind of group intervention process in which leading representatives of the two opposing sides in a conflict meet with a neutral group of experts in psychoanalysis and in the history of the area in question. While the representatives of the two opposing sides attack each other verbally, voicing the accusations underlying the conflict, the neutral observers listen. Later on, they identify and

communicate to the two sides the traumas and glories which, on a conscious and obvious level, make them think the way they are thinking. A discussion follows. The two sides learn to view the situation not only through their own eyes, but also through neutral eyes, and through the eyes of the opposing side. They learn to understand the 'hidden transcripts' of the power situation between them.[4] Tolerance is promoted, mourning is allowed. Symbolic acts in this regard are of great emotional importance. (Examples include Willy Brandt going down on his knees before the Warsaw ghetto memorial; François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl visiting the Verdun battlefield and its soldiers' cemetery together.) So is the building of joint institutions.

Of course, before this can be done, a desire for co-operation is required. For instance, Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina had joint institutions before their country disintegrated. As long as a strong central authority existed, they lived together peacefully in one country. When the state disintegrated, they started fighting each other because there was no longer an enforceable legal way which enabled them to settle their differences peacefully. The disintegration of Czechoslovakia was peaceful because it was based on negotiations and on treaties recognised by both sides and all neighbours. At all times both sides had governments recognising each other. Similarly, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Baltic States separated essentially peacefully. The unification of Germany was also the result of agreements between legally elected governments of East and West Germany with the consent of their neighbours and of the great powers. There was no bloodshed even though the two Germanies had been loyal members of two adversarial blocs confronting each other during the Cold War.

It seems that one can draw the following conclusions from these examples and from a study of history and of human psychology in general: groups of people, neighbouring villages, ethnic tribes, city states, nations or blocs of nations will develop different interests because people are different and have different ideas, philosophies and religious faiths, and are competing with each other economically, ideologically and politically. If there is a strong central authority monopolising the use of force, and a functioning legal and administrative system, these conflicts of interests will be settled peacefully by arbitration and litigation. If a strong central authority, a functioning legal system and an effective police are missing, fist fighting, murder, Mafia rule, civil war and war will start. The type of violence depends on the size and quality of armaments available to competing groups. Violence will only stop if and when one of the following events occurs:

- complete victory for one side
- complete exhaustion on both sides
- appearance of a great common danger to both sides, forcing them to make peace and unite forces to meet the new challenge.

In the absence of an overpowering central force, conflicts will lead to continuous fighting unless or until one of these three conditions applies. In the world of today a strong central authority is missing, and many wars are flaring up in various parts of our globe. To stop them, we have to look for the third solution because it is certainly preferable to the others. History offers many examples of the effectiveness of the third solution. A few of them may be cited:

- In the Middle Ages, the inhabitants of a castle ended their feuds and concluded a truce when the castle was beleaguered by an enemy force, and the life and freedom of all was at stake.
- Though Bavaria and Prussia fought each other in the German War of 1866, they became allies against France in 1870, united in the German Reich and never took up arms against each other again.
- For centuries France and Germany waged war against each other. They became friends when both felt threatened by the Soviet Union. Both joined the European Union, and now have joint army units.
- Western Europe, for centuries the site of numerous wars, united during the second half of the 20th century because it perceived a threat to all emanating from the Soviet Union.
- Eastern Europe was united under the leadership of the Soviet Union and under the auspices of communism against the threat perceived, genuinely or allegedly, from western capitalism.
- President Ronald Reagan, at the height of the Cold War, mentioned that, if the Martians would attack the Earth from outer space, the United States and the Soviet Union would certainly bury their quarrels and would jointly defend human life and values against the invaders.

By implication, we need to find some sort of replacement for the fictitious Martians if we want peace among the inhabitants of this planet. Let us first consider a short list of great dangers threatening all of humanity:

- The population explosion, hunger, deforestation, the extinction of species, illiteracy in the presence of high technology, drugs and diseases;
- Mental disturbances and instabilities created by fundamentalism and national chauvinism;
- Social consequences of mass unemployment and of the increasing gap between poverty and wealth, both within individual nations and between different nations;
- The vulnerability of our modern scientific-technological society to ignorance and unethical behaviour;

- General pollution of the ozone layer, the atmosphere, of lakes, rivers and oceans, and of the soil; the dying of forests and the spreading of deserts;
- Risks connected with the storage and dismantling of nuclear and chemical weapons, with the illicit production of biological weapons, with nuclear proliferation, with the malfunction of nuclear power stations and with wreckages of supertankers carrying oil.

Mastering these problems will require the co-operation of the leadership of all peoples. It is an enormous task which needs the goodwill, the intelligence, and the hard work of people all over the world. It will require the construction of efficient mechanisms for the discussion of the available options for mediation and decision-making, and for the enforcement of decisions by an international court of justice.

Politicians are usually too busy for long-term planning and the weighing up of options. They have to deal with the requirements of the day, trying to stay in power by winning the next elections or by eliminating competitors in other ways. Moreover, complicated assessments may be involved which require the knowledge of scientific details and of complex interrelations. This is a matter for the international scientific and scholarly community, its established institutions in particular. They have access to numerous sources of reliable knowledge, and their members do not depend on re-election and therefore can afford more easily to think in terms of long-range solutions, and to publish unpopular results. Therefore, the institutions of science and scholarship should be ready to serve humanity by setting up expert committees for the preparation of options and the checking of proposed solutions for their feasibility, compatibility and their various consequences. Each option offered should be accompanied by a full analysis of the possible consequences, including those to be expected in neighbouring fields. All risks and benefits should be given, if possible, with the probability of their occurrence. The discussion of goals should include ethical aspects, and how to prevent misunderstandings and misperceptions.

The prevention of armed conflicts could be based on a combination of Volkan's three-group method with a definition of urgent joint goals. Meanwhile, long-range efforts should be devoted to the creation of international institutions of arbitration and peace enforcement which would be universally accepted and respected, except by a few trespassers who would have to be induced to accept them.

The following theses may summarise the conclusions of this chapter:

- Independent groups of people develop independent ideas which, in time, lead to conflicts of interest.

- If there is no superior authority to which quarrelling parties can appeal and whose judgement is accepted and enforceable, people will feel entitled to use force. They will fight unless there is mutual deterrence of the kind that implies that continued fighting leads to mutual self-annihilation. This is as true for individuals as for ethnic groups or nations. It is the fundamental cause of war.
- Former enemies can become friends and allies when they perceive a common enemy threatening both of them.
- The fading of enemy images can be greatly assisted by studying the chosen traumas and glories of opposing parties and by making each side understand them. Both sides must learn to see the situation through the eyes of the other side.
- People of different races and different languages can live together peacefully in one state if they do not feel oppressed and if they respect the institutions of their nation or state. Brazil and Switzerland are examples.
- Peoples who have lived together peacefully under common rule – as in the cases of the peoples of the Ottoman, Habsburg and Romanov empires – can become enemies when central rule crumbles.
- If there is to be a dissolution of joint institutions peace can be preserved if a new, stable power structure is set in place before the old one is abolished, and if transition takes place under pre-arranged agreements. Czechoslovakia's dissolution is an example.
- In order to prevent further wars the establishment of strong mediation, peace keeping, and peace enforcement authorities should have high priority. Whether these can be developed by the United Nations independently, or with the assistance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union or new organisations, is an open question which requires further study.
- In the past, joint tasks like hunting a mammoth, defending a castle or building and defending an empire, have motivated people of different origins to join forces and forget their differences. Today, there are global problems threatening the health and life of all humankind. People should be made aware of the fact that these problems can only be solved by world-wide co-operation and that all local and national causes for war are minor issues which should be set aside in the interest of joint action for the protection of life on our planet.
- Peace and stability in a multi-ethnic society – and all our societies will become multi-ethnic in the 21st century due to world-wide migration – can only be maintained if education relating to tolerance and ethical

behaviour starts at an early age and continues throughout life, through the school system, the churches, the media, the law system, the trade unions, and so on. Without general consensus on a number of basic rules and principles of behaviour, a peaceful and stable society is not possible. People must be constantly reminded of these rules and principles. Prominent among them rank the following: honesty; readiness to help others in distress; law enforcement solely by the central authority thereby excluding the private use of force; recognition that even a noble purpose does not justify unethical means.

Hans Küng[5] called attention to the fact that there can be no world order without world ethics. In the international conferences of religious leaders organised by him the representatives of the great world religions found that there is a consensus among them on a core of ethics which may be expressed by the Christian commandment 'Love your neighbour as yourself'. People must come to understand that the highest goal of human life cannot be mere consumption and entertainment (*panem et circenses*). In our fragile world the avoidance, if at all possible, of human and natural catastrophes, and – after they have happened – unselfish assistance to all those who have been affected by them remain be the highest goal.

NOTES

1. I am obliged to Dr. Maurice Apprey (CSMHI) for a critical reading of an earlier version of this paper.
2. This paragraph is reprinted from K. Gottstein 'Psychological obstacles to arms reduction and possibilities for creating mutual trust', *International Journal of Group Tensions* vol.16, nos 1-4, 1986, p.105.
3. *Methodology for Reduction of Ethnic Tension, and Promotion of Democratization and Institution Building*, Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction, University of Virginia, 1995.
4. Max Harris 'Reading the Mask: Hidden Transcripts and Human Interaction', Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction, University of Virginia, 1995.
5. Hans Küng *Projekt Weltethos* (Munich, 1990).

ARE NATIONS NATURAL ECONOMIC UNITS?

Carl Kaysen

We are accustomed to think of economies in national terms: the Italian economy, the American economy, and so on. Gross National Product (GNP or, in slightly modified form, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (of a nation) is the most widely used all-purpose measure of economic activity, and, of course, it is defined in national terms and measured on the basis of statistics collected, maintained, and published by nations. The 'nations' to which GNP refers are political units, that is, states. The term 'nation' also has another referent, a cultural unit. We sometimes emphasise this point by referring to the 'nation-state', and think particularly in these terms of the 'old' nations of Europe and North America. The state or polity is the subject of a discourse in political science and political history; the nation, a discourse in political sociology/anthropology; the economy, a discourse in economics. What are the possible/necessary connections between these discourses?

Another way of stating the question to be explored in this chapter is to ask what kind of social organisation is necessary to support or make possible a modern economy, and what is the relation of that organisation to the social organisation termed a nation. As we shall see the relation is an indirect one: the economy relates more directly to the polity; the polity, in turn to the nation.

A subsistence or near subsistence economy requires little in the way of a political framework to make its continued functioning possible. In a hunting and gathering economy, the density of human population in relation to the resources of flora and fauna is typically low enough to occasion little conflict over resources, and correspondingly, little social machinery for resolving and/or containing them. The same is true of societies based on subsistence agriculture. More advanced economies are based on more division of labour, specialisation, and exchange. The more advanced the economy – in terms of productive capacity, best captured in a single summary measure of

productivity per head – the more elaborate the division of labour, the greater the extent of specialisation, and the larger the role of exchange.

To function with reasonable efficiency, a 'national' economy must allow the relatively free movement of goods, labour, capital, and information within an area large enough in terms of population to sustain a reasonably efficient scale of economic activity. Since the Industrial Revolution, the development of new technologies and new methods of organisation has on the whole increased the minimum efficient scale of most productive activities. Thus the minimum size of what might be termed an 'economic nation' has tended to increase. From an abstract economic point of view the 'freedom' of these movements should be conceived in terms of results rather than in terms of the intentions and desires of the human agents involved. For example, the 'free movement of labour' means that if the demand for the output of industry A located in region a is declining, and that for the output of industry B in region b is increasing, labour in fact leaves A/a and moves to B/b, whether that result is reached by voluntary movements of individuals responding to declining job opportunities/wages in A/a and the opposite in B/b or by a well-informed central labour allocation mechanism with command authority that sends labour from A/a to B/b. The question of whether a command system can be designed and realised that in fact achieves the appropriate results, or whether any command system will be inferior to a system that relies on the voluntary responses of the human agents to the incentives/signals created by the shifts in demand – that is, the market as organiser of economic activity – is a separate question. But at the present time, the overwhelming consensus of social scientists in general and economists in particular is that market systems are superior to command systems as modes of organising and guiding economic activity. Accordingly most of the rest of the discussion is framed in terms of a market economy, although we will note possible alternatives briefly at the close of the lecture.

The essence of a market economy is its reliance on markets and prices as the co-ordinators of economic decisions made by individual actors – households and business firms – acting in their own interests to organise production and exchange. For a market system to function effectively, the economic nation in which it operates must possess an appropriate legal system. The central feature of such a system is a definition of property rights and the means of transferring them that permits the creation of incentives for productive activity. Further there has to be enough 'law and order' so that the incentives are real: property rights have to have substance. The ownership of, say, a building, gives owners the power to charge tenants rent for its use and excludes others from it. Finally, the explicit or implicit contracts that underlie all economic exchange have to be enforceable: machinery must exist to interpret them in cases of conflict and assess and enforce penalties for non-compliance with the interpretation. Providing the

machinery for interpreting and enforcing contracts, and providing the 'law and order' on which the working of the machinery depends is, of course, the function of the political nation, that is, the state. For a modern economy to function, the polity has to be sufficiently stable so that economic activity can go forward on a continuing basis with a time horizon long enough to permit investments with a long-term pay off: long-lived capital goods such as pipelines or electric power plants, or research and development of new products or production processes.

The political nation must pay the costs for providing law and order, a working legal system, and much else soon to be discussed. This requires that the political nation – the state – must be able to collect taxes in the necessary amounts. The usual political science text book's definition of the state focuses on its monopoly of legitimate coercive force in the area over which it is sovereign: the state's power to assure the collection of the taxes it levies, or obedience to the decrees of its courts. Both the legitimacy of the state's monopoly of coercion and its efficacy must rest on the consent of its population, in the sense that if all taxes had to be collected and all court orders enforced at gun point, neither polity nor economy would function. Rather, in order to function the polity must constitute a community of consent, a moral community with a shared ethos. At the most general level, the shared ethos is produced by the process of socialisation undergone by the members of the population as they grow up in the political nation. One binding theme in this process is nationalism, the sense in each individual of membership in the political nation as an essential ingredient in his/her own sense of identity. Before exploring further just what this socialisation process involves in a modern polity, and its relation to the economic nation, let us step back a moment to look at other essential functions of the state.

The first and perhaps primary function of the state in terms of the resources it demands and its historical function in the development of the state is the provision of external security – defence against potential aggression by other states. In the period from the 14th through the 19th centuries, as states were evolving from kingdoms and principalities and developing organisational structures and institutions which were distinct from the personal households and courts of rulers, organising and paying for war was the most important force driving the process. But the close relation between war and national identification was yet to come. It was first displayed in the *levee en masse* and the ideological mobilisation of the French population in the wars of the French Revolution. Before that soldiers were either mercenaries, or impressed peasants who had little or no identification with the nobles and kings on whose behalf they fought. Many officers, including those of highest rank, were also mercenaries, or professionals, available to the rulers who could afford to pay them and pay the armies they led.

For the modern state, the provision of education is an equally essential and even more expensive task. In the modern urban industrial societies of the developed world, the state provides primary education for essentially the whole relevant population, secondary education for from half to four-fifths, and the same form of higher education for a tenth to a third. In the United States, where a higher share of government expenditures go to both defence and education than in almost all other industrialised nations, expenditures on education were 20 per cent higher than on defence in 1993, a representative recent year.

Education is the central link that ties the state to the nation in modern industrial societies, as well as providing an input indispensable to a modern economy, an educated work force. Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* provided an extensive and persuasive analysis of this link; brutally compressed in what follows. Pre-modern societies were highly segmented: status and class differences marked every aspect of life. The peasants who formed the overwhelming majority of their populations were typically immobile, tied to the locality and region in which they were born. In most of Europe, their regional dialects were often mutually incomprehensible, and sufficiently different from the written language of high culture to make interclass communication difficult. Only the small elites of nobility, clergy, higher state functionaries – usually one or the other of the former – and the small urban elites of merchants, professionals, and some craftsmen commanded the written language and enjoyed wide mobility, including significant international mobility. Identity for the vast majority was tied to locality and its kinship networks.

Industrialisation and urbanisation changed all that. Cities grew by drawing former peasants from the countryside – the immobile became mobile. The development of railroads further increased their possibilities of mobility. The new city dwellers lost their ties to the kinship networks of their former villages. During the same period, around the middle of the 19th century, the public provision of schooling started to increase. The uniform written language of high culture began to replace the variety of local dialects, and literacy grew rapidly. More and more, a national identification embodied in the common language and common schooling began to replace the local identities of the earlier agricultural society. In the impersonal, mobile, urban society, it became a central ingredient in the sense of self of the ordinary person.

Here is Gellner's own summary of the end result of the transformation.[1]

> Let us recapitulate the general and central features of industrial society. Universal literacy and a high level of numerical, technical and general sophistication are among its functional prerequisites. Its members are,

and must be mobile, and ready to shift from one activity to another, and must possess that generic training which enables them to follow the manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation. In the course of their work they must constantly communicate with a large number of other men, with whom they frequently have no previous association, and with whom communication must consequently be explicit, rather than relying on context. They must also be able to communicate by means of written, impersonal, context-free, to-whom-it-may-concern type messages. Hence these communications must be in the same shared and standardized linguistic medium and script. The educational system which guarantees this social achievement becomes large and is indispensable, but at the same time it no longer possesses monopoly of access to the written word: its clientele is co-extensive with the society at large, and the replaceability of individuals within the system by others applies to the educational machine at least as much as to any other segment of society, and perhaps more so. Some very great teachers and researchers may perhaps be unique and irreplaceable, but the average professor and schoolmaster can be replaced from outside the teaching profession with the greatest of ease and often with little, if any, loss.

What are the implications of all this for the society and for its members? The employability, dignity, security and self-respect of individuals, typically, and for the majority of men now hinges on their *education*; and the limits of the culture within which they were educated are also the limits of the world within which they can, morally and professionally, breathe. A man's education is by far his most precious investment, and in effect confers his identity on him. Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture. And he is, generally speaking, gelded. The Mamluk condition has become universal. No important links bind him to a kin group; nor do they stand between him and a wide, anonymous community of culture. The obverse of the fact that a school-transmitted culture, not a folk-transmitted one, alone confers his usability and dignity and self-respect on industrial man, is the fact that nothing else can do it for him to any comparable extent. It would be idle to pretend that ancestry, wealth or connections are unimportant in modern society, and that they are not on occasion even sources of pride to their beneficiaries; all the same, advantages secured in these ways are often explained away and are viewed at best ambivalently. It is interesting to ask whether the pervasive work ethic has helped to produce this state of affairs, or whether, on the contrary, it is a reflection of it. Drones and rentiers persist, of course, but they are not very conspicuous, and this in itself is highly significant. It is an important fact that such privilege and idleness as survive are now discreet, tending to prefer obscurity to display, and needing to be uncovered by eager researchers bent on unmasking the inequality which lurks underneath the surface.

It was not so in the past, when idle privilege was proud and brazen, as it persists in being in some surviving agrarian societies, or in societies which continue to uphold the ethos of pre-industrial life. Curiously enough, the notion of conspicuous waste was coined by a work-oriented member of a work-addicted society, Thorsten Veblen, scandalized by what he saw as the survivals from a pre-industrial, predatory age. The egalitarian, work- and career- oriented surface of industrial society is as significant as its inegalitarian hidden depths. Life, after all, is lived largely on the surface, even if important decisions are on occasion made deep down.

The teacher class is now in a sense more important – it is indispensable – and in another sense much less so, having lost its monopoly of access to the cultural wisdom enshrined in scripture. In a society in which everyone is gelded by identification with his professional post and his training, and hardly anyone derives much or any security and support from whatever kin links he may have, the teaching clerics no longer possess any privileged access to administrative posts. When everyone has become a Mamluk, no special mamluk class predominates in the bureaucracy. At long last the bureaucracy can recruit from the population at large, without needing to fear the arrival of dozens of cousins as unwanted attachments of each single new entrant.

Exo-socialization, education proper, is now the virtually universal norm. Men acquire the skills and sensibilities which make them acceptable to their fellows, which fit them to assume places in society, and which make them 'what they are', by being handed over by their kin groups (normally nowadays, of course, their nuclear family) to an educational machine which alone is capable of providing the wide range of training required for the generic cultural base. This educational infrastructure is large, indispensable and expensive. Its maintenance seems to be quite beyond the financial powers of even the biggest and richest organizations within society, such as the big industrial corporations. These often provide their personnel with housing, sports and leisure clubs, and so forth; they do not, except marginally and in special circumstances, provide schooling. (They may subsidize school bills, but that is another matter.) The organization man works and plays with his organization, but his children still go to state or independent schools.

So, on the one hand, this educational infrastructure is too large and costly for any organization other than the biggest one of all, the state. But at the same time, though only the state can sustain so large a burden, only the state is also strong enough to control so important and crucial a function. Culture is no longer merely the adornment, confirmation and legitimation of a social order which was also sustained by harsher and coercive constraints; culture is now the necessary shared medium, the life-blood or perhaps rather the minimal shared atmosphere, within which alone the members of the society

can breathe and survive and produce. For a given society, it must be one in which they can *all* breathe and speak and produce; so it must be the *same* culture. Moreover, it must now be a great or high (literate, training-sustained) culture, and it can no longer be a diversified, locality-tied, illiterate little culture or tradition.

But some organism must ensure that this literate and unified culture is indeed being effectively produced, that the educational product is not shoddy and sub-standard. Only the state can do this, and, even in countries in which important parts of the educational machine are in private hands or those of religious organizations, the state does take over quality control in this most important of industries, the manufacture of viable and usable human beings. That shadow-state dating back to the time when European states were not merely fragmented but socially weak – the centralized Church – did put up a fight for the control of education, but it was in the end ineffectual, unless the Church fought on behalf of an inclusive high culture and thereby indirectly on behalf of a new nationalist state.

Time was when education was a cottage industry, when men could be made by a village or clan. That time has now gone, and gone forever. (In education, small can now be beautiful only if it is covertly parasitic on the big.) Exo-socialization, the production and reproduction of men outside the local intimate unit, is now the norm, and must be so. The imperative of exo-socialization is the main clue to why state and culture *must* now be linked, whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, varied, loose, and often minimal. Now it is unavoidable. That is what nationalism is about, and why we live in an age of nationalism.[2]

Eugen Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen 1870-1914* offered a classic account of the transformation of France from a still agricultural and segmented society to a modern industrial nation.[3] There universal military service added a further element in creating a single national identity. In each particular country, the process took a course shaped by the country's history. In general, it moved through Europe from Northwest to Southeast, following the course of industrialisation. In the United States, the process had the somewhat different character given to it by the creation of a new country and a new nation through immigration. Also, geographic and social mobility were high from the country's earliest days. But despite these differences, the fundamental forces involved were the same.

Publicly-provided formal education teaches more than literacy in a common language. It helps create and transmit the myths and symbols through which individuals participated in the sense of nationhood: the text-book history with its heroes, the national anthem and the national flag. The author can still remember the pledge of 'allegiance to the flag and the nation for which

it stands' which began one school day each week in the assembly of all the students in his junior high school.

Literacy in the common language of high culture is as necessary to making the economic nation as to forming the moral community that underlies the polity. Individuals without it have no possibility of full participation in economic life. At all but the lowest level of casual labour, the ability to learn by reading is indispensable to securing a job. Moreover, formal processes of recruitment, involving tests and credentials, have increasingly displaced the informal ties of kinship and neighbourhood in the process of channelling into jobs new entrants into the labour force.

Further, the levels of formal education required for higher level jobs in the economy has moved up steadily in the last several decades especially but not only in the 'old' industrial countries. With the shift from manufacturing to service industries in many of which processing information rather than materials plays an increasing part, the demand for more formal training grows stronger. The mobility of information as well as the mobility of labour in the economic nation depends on the near universal literacy which the state provides.

One vital aspect of the provision of education in the modern economy is the supply of technically-trained people in engineering and science, and the complementary support of scientific research that is required for the highest levels of technical and scientific training. Here again, the state is called on to supply an ingredient necessary for the effective functioning of a modern economy. However, it must be recognised that education at these levels is less tied to the particular nation state than at the primary and secondary levels. There is a wide international trade in higher education, especially in the sciences, engineering, and business administration. Students leave their own countries for education elsewhere, to return, remain, or migrate to third countries.

Let us summarise the bare bones of the argument so far. A modern economy needs a certain framework of institutions provided by the polity in order to function: law and order, and the enforcement of contracts, a certain degree of political stability, the widespread provision of education. The polity in turn must rest on the consent of a moral community that ties together its members and specifically enables the polity to pay for its activities and enforce its laws. In the modern polity, nationalism, in the sense of a strong identification as a member of a national community forms an important element in the creation and maintenance of this community by making identification with the nation an important part of the self identity of the representative member of the urban, mobile, mass society. Nationalism in turn is carried by the education in literacy in the national language of high culture and the associated inculcation of the myths, images, and symbols of the nation.

Let us return now to consider in more detail the fundamental requisites of a modern economy and their relation to states and nations. First, it is worth emphasising that all these conditions are matters of more and less, not black and white absolutes, absent or present. Consider, for example, the question of contract enforcement. If the courts can be counted on to read a contract that covers transactions over a long period in terms closely similar to those that the two sets of lawyers who drafted it do, and to enforce, let us say, penalty provisions it contains for specified failures of performance, it will be easy to make the kind of transactions it embodies. To the extent that this reliance is less justified, the parties may ask for higher prices and more safeguards, with the result that fewer transactions may be made. If there is simply no mechanism for enforcement, long-term contracts may simply disappear as viable modes of doing business, and only spot transactions survive, which clearly has a wide variety of negative efficiency implications.

Similarly, the public provision of education is a question of degree: what kind, how much, to whom. If the polity provides less and less broadly, business firms will adapt to some degree by making up in firm-supported training. But in a mobile labour market, (with no Statute of Apprentices), firms will limit their investments in providing education and training, since some of the benefits of it can be captured by other firms when individuals change jobs.

Public support of scientific research offers an even stronger example. Business firms tend to invest in applied research closely connected with the creation of new or improved products and new or improved production processes. Except in unusual circumstances, they are unlikely to invest much in basic science, the applications of which are usually both distant in time and difficult to foresee. So diminution of public support for basic research will be made up only in small part, if at all, by an increase in business support.

This question is further complicated, however, by the fact that the pool of scientific knowledge is an international pool, which can be drawn on by anyone in any economy competent to use it, independently of his contribution to the pool. The question of the competence of any country to draw on the pool is, of course, not independent of the level of technical and scientific training in that country, which in turn is connected with the level and kind of research it supports.

One element of an effective legal/political system very important for the functioning of a modern economy is the maintenance of a reasonably stable monetary and credit mechanism. This involves two somewhat disparate elements. The first is a set of institutional and legal controls on banks and other credit mechanisms that makes failures rare, and contains their consequences when they occur. The second is some constraint on the

capacity of the sovereign/polity to 'debauch the currency' in the old-fashioned phrase for government's resolving their political problems through inflation. Experience shows that market systems have a high capacity for tolerating bursts of inflation. This capacity is not, however, an unlimited one: hyper-inflation clearly has strong negative consequences for economy and society.

An interesting and puzzling question is that of the minimum scale, in terms of both population and area, at which a modern economy can function. The city-state can apparently be an efficient economic unit; witness Singapore and Hong Kong with populations of 3 and 5.5 million, respectively. The prosperous Italian city-states of an earlier era all had substantial areas of dependent country which they dominated; perhaps they would not have been viable without it. The small nations of modern Europe – Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, ranging in population from 4.3 million (Norway) to 8.8 million (Sweden), are all highly prosperous. Their per capita GDP's were of the order of 75 per cent (Sweden) to 98 per cent (Switzerland) of that of the United States and except at the top covered about the same range as those of France, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain. Hong Kong and Singapore fell in the same range of per capita GDP. Luxembourg, a mini city-state with fewer than a half-million people, was as prosperous as Switzerland and thus markedly more so than the large industrial nations of Western Europe.

Are Luxembourg, Singapore, Hong Kong, independent polities? Luxembourg is tightly enmeshed in the Benelux arrangements with Belgium and the Netherlands. Hong Kong is in transition from being a crown colony of Great Britain, with a substantial degree of autonomy under a British appointed governor, chosen from the political and higher civil servant class in Great Britain to an as yet unknown status in relation to China. Singapore is a fully independent state. All of them are far short of viable scale in terms of security in the anarchistic world of international politics as understood by 'realist' theorists of international relations. In this view, they are dependent on some larger state or group of larger states for their continued existence; Hong Kong on Great Britain, soon on China; Luxembourg on Belgium and the Netherlands, and more broadly, NATO; and Singapore on whom?

In such a world, the other small prosperous countries are also too small to provide for their own security, and are dependent on some combination of larger patrons, alliances, and the balance of power. In the ideal world of a genuine system of the rule of law in international relations, and the collective provision of security, such as the United Nations (UN) Charter and the various UN Declarations on Human Rights provide in theory, the problem would not exist. In the real world, as opposed to the world of the 'realists,' the mixture of imperfectly-observed norms of international law such as those set out in the UN Charter, and power balances, provides, if always imperfectly, for the security of many small states that are not included in alliance systems.

security considerations played a major role in the evolution of modern nation-states. The consolidation of small principalities into ever larger kingdoms that characterised the political evolution of Europe from the 13th through the 19th centuries, starting first in the British Isles, France, and Spain, and moving east and south was strongly driven by the competitive efforts of powerful princes to enlarge their kingdoms and make themselves and their houses more powerful and wealthier by absorbing smaller principalities through marriage and conquest and preventing their neighbours from doing the same. Military and political power grew with size: larger kingdoms able to extract larger absolute surpluses from their subject peasants and urban merchants and craftsman could provide larger armies, overbear and/or buy off their aristocracies more effectively and thus present a more powerful and unified force to their rivals. By the end of the process in the 19th century more narrowly economic criteria of efficient scale played a larger role. The *Zollverein* preceded rather than followed the imperial unification of the German states and principalities.

To what extent, then, are small polities viable economic nations? In the first instance, the answer to this question depends, of course, on the international context in which they function. Hong Kong and Singapore are dependent on an environment of relatively free international trade; in its absence neither could survive. Luxembourg is in a similar situation, with its prosperity deriving almost entirely from its international banking business. Unlike the other two, its much smaller population could probably provide for itself – at a much lower level – with its pre-1939 mixture of farming and some export-oriented heavy industry.

The more barriers to international trade, the larger an economic nation has to be in order to be able to capture the major part of the economics scale available to modern methods of organization, production, distribution, and marketing. Between the end of the 19th century and the onset of the Great Depression of the 1930s, when barriers to international trade in terms of transport costs, difficulties of speedy and reliable transmission of information, risks, and tariffs and other government-imposed obstacles were relatively high, the large size of the unconstrained internal market of the United States was a significant factor in stimulating rapid US economic growth. The lowering of both administrative and cost barriers to international trade has made the size of the unconstrained internal market less important, but by no means abolished its significance. Market size remains important in respect to the provision of new technologies and also their basis in new scientific knowledge. At the bottom of the ladder from new science to new technologies to new products and processes, both a large population size and a large education sector are required to find the perhaps 1-2 per cent of the population with the capability of and inclination for doing serious work in science, recruiting and training them, and producing enough scientists in

enough fields to sustain a serious scientific establishment. A population size of 5 million might be adequate for this purpose provided the educational system and the tradition of scientific research were in place, and the international context was one of free communication and high mobility of scientists and engineers. The examples of Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland, each with 5-7 million population and each with a strong scientific and technical establishment, bear out this speculative calculation.

The underlying sense of moral community that sustains the political nation at a macro-level, and thus, indirectly, the economic nation, also has a more direct economic reflection at the micro-level. There must be enough interpersonal trust to create the expectation that promises will be kept, that representations made in the course of business are reasonably accurate, and so on, to facilitate a continuous flow of transactions without the necessity for either elaborate investigation or elaborate sureties for each proposed transaction. This is particularly relevant to transactions at the retail level between households and those who provide them with goods and services. The typical transaction is small in money terms, not necessarily regularly repeated between the same buyer-supplier pair, and often impersonal and anonymous. In these circumstances, the sense of communal identification that the nation provides can help reassure the participants: the buyer that the goods or service he is acquiring is what it appears to be; the seller that the credit card will not prove stolen or fraudulent, or that the cheque will not bounce. It is the common experience that travellers abroad are more suspicious and readier to feel cheated than they are at home.

Two historical examples that exemplify the importance of trust are worth mentioning. In 18th and early 19th century Great Britain, Quakers were particularly successful as merchants and shopkeepers because they did not believe in haggling, then common at all levels of trade, and they had a wide reputation for honesty. Thus their single price, fair price policy was trusted. The other example dates back to the world of medieval Islam, where Jews played a major role as long-distance traders. Their success depended on their dispersion through the Islamic world from Morocco in the West to India in the East. One Jewish merchant trusted another in matters of credit, and promised delivery, because of their ethno/religious tie. This was often expressed in the fact that a pair of merchants from even the most distant parts could often find a common kin connection.

Finally, and again at the macro-level, the sense of identity that makes a nation a moral community is an indispensable support for another vital economic function of the polity, income redistribution. This is especially important in democratic societies; no modern democratic nation relies on the undirected results of the market to distribute the output of the economy. None would find it politically tolerable. A wide variety of public policies and activities have

income redistribution as their function and serve to make the available real incomes of the wealthy less than their market earnings, and those of the poorest segment of the population substantially more. These results are achieved by a complex and usually not entirely consistent set of policies of taxation and provision of subsidies in cash or kind. Their detail varies greatly from country to country, but in the typical Western democracy the largest part of the national budget is concerned with social welfare provisions: old age pensions, provisions or subsidisation of health care, disability pensions, child allowances, food subsidies, and housing subsidies.

A politically important distinction is made between social insurance and income security programmes (in US terminology). The first include primarily old age pensions and health care and are available to the whole population. They are not explicitly aimed at redistributing income from the wealthier to the poorer members of the population. But they do in fact have redistribution effects. The second are means-tested programmes directly aimed at helping the poor. The first set of programmes is always large relative to the second. In 1990, these programmes together ranged in size from about 11 per cent of GDP in Japan and the United States to 13 or 14 per cent in Canada and Great Britain, around 19 or 20 per cent in Italy, Germany and Sweden, and nearly 24 per cent in France.

In addition to these social welfare programs governments maintain a large variety of subsidies that go to producers, rather than households. Payments to farmers and other agricultural producers are most widespread and most important. The whole spectrum of these activities, together with the structure of the tax system, determines how much net income redistribution there is, a magnitude quite difficult to estimate. We can, for the United States measure two aspects of these redistributive activities. The first is the degree to which they move those who on a market-income basis are poor out of poverty. In 1992, just under a quarter of the population had market-incomes below the officially defined poverty line. Adding government transfer payments under social insurance programmes lowered this percentage to 16 per cent; adding non-cash transfers and subtracting taxes lowered it to 12 per cent. In other words, government transfers reduced the proportion of the population in poverty by half.

The other aspect compares the overall distribution of income before and after all taxes and transfers. Table 1 compares the pre-tax-and-transfer distribution of income with the post-tax-and-transfer distribution of the United States in 1990. It shows the shares of total income received by the quintiles of the population ranked by pre-tax-and-transfer income, and also by the top 10, 5, and 1 per cent of the income recipients. The table shows that there was a net transfer mainly from the top quintile, that went to the bottom two. More than half of 'loss' of the top quintile came from the top 5

Table 1

N – tile	Share of pre-tax-and-transfer income	Share of post-tax-and transfer income	
1st quintile	1.8	5.5	+3.7
2nd	8.3	9.9	+1.6
3rd	14.1	14.5	+0.4
4th	22.0	21.2	-0.8
5th	54.3	49.5	-4.8
top 10 per cent	38.4	34.7	-3.7
5 per cent	27.7	24.9	-2.8
1 per cent	14.1	12.5	-1.6

per cent of the income distribution but amounted to some 10 per cent of their incomes in aggregate. The gain to the bottom quintile multiplied their share of income by three.

What we have so far described in relation to a modern economic nation is the ideal type of modern industrial nation-state, the essence of which is the coextensiveness of the polity – the territorial state – and the cultural nation, with the universal membership of the whole population in both as citizens of the polity and sharers in the national identity. We have not claimed that the idea of a 'nation' did not exist in pre-industrial society, but rather that it did not then have the same inclusiveness and the same identification with the political state. Indeed the idea of an in-group distinct from other out-groups, and in-group membership as a major constituent of self-identification goes back to the dawn of human life. The groups were very small, typically from a few hundred to a few thousand members, and their definition strongly kin-based.[4]

As we move from pre-history – reconstructed from the archaeological record and the observation and traditions of surviving pre-literate societies – to history, communities of common culture whose members identify themselves as such appear from earliest times, and persist through history. Anthony D. Smith has surveyed the processes by which what he terms *ethnie* evolve into states. He finds the process creating nations in England, France, Spain, Holland, and perhaps Japan well before the industrial revolution. But they are states of the aristocracy and urban elites, not states of the masses. In Henry V, William Shakespeare puts two contrasting speeches in the King's mouth that exemplify the limits of the contemporary community. The first Henry makes in prose to three common soldiers when he is walking about the English camp incognito at dawn before the battle of Agincourt; the second the gorgeous poetry he speaks to his noble fellow warriors, including his two brothers and an uncle. To the soldiers, he underlines their duty to

the King; to the nobles, their membership in a 'band of brothers.' This of course is the sensibility of Renaissance England at the end of the 16th century, though the action takes place in still medieval England and France nearly two centuries earlier.

Few if any modern states conform to the ideal type, a national state coterminous with a cultural nation. Perhaps Japan comes closest. The small Nordic states are also nearly culturally homogeneous, though Norway and Sweden have their tiny Lapp minorities. Germany today is homogeneous culturally, but the polity is not quite coterminous with the German cultural nation, though the consequences of the Second World War greatly shrunk the gap. France and Great Britain, the modern states with the longest histories of unified polities and separation of the state as an institutional structure from the personal household of the monarch, both have a relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity. Corsicans and Bretons, the most culturally distinct groups in France, together constitute less than 3 per cent of the French population. The communities of Scotland and Wales, numbering 10 and 5 percent, of the total population of Great Britain are relatively much larger.

More typically, national states have a substantial degree of cultural heterogeneity, usually marked by linguistic and/or religious diversity. Canada, with its quarter Francophone population, mostly in Quebec, Switzerland, with three major and one remnant minor language groups or Belgium, divided about 40-60 between French-speaking Walloons and Flemish-speaking Flammands, are nothing to the linguistic and cultural variety of Russia, India and China. India and China, of course, are only in some part modern urban-industrialised societies; in terms of population, the majority in each still live in agricultural villages, with a connection (more in China than in India) to a national and international market.

What is the probable future evolution of the connection between nation-state and economy? The nation as a purely economic unit is diminishing in relative importance in many ways. The growing international mobility of financial instruments, information, investment, and some kinds of elite labour has reduced the degree of control an individual nation can exercise over its own economy. So in a different way has the development of international economic organizations, both formal, such as the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now succeeded by World Trade Organisation) or informal, such as the Group of Seven. Within the European Union, regions inside member nations are given special treatment at the Union level.

On the side of politics the potential disintegrative force of cultural diversity within the nation state is growing. Political life is increasingly shaped by the

use made of the information media by political leaders and would-be leaders in both democratic and non-democratic polities. The exploitation of ethnic and cultural differences within a nation, especially when they overlap or appear to overlap with significant differences in economic status and opportunity, has proved to be an effective route to political power. The result may well be political fission: peaceful as in the division of Czechoslovakia into two nations, or violently explosive, as in the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.

But economic counterforces remain. Scale economics are still important and, though the importance of national boundaries as mobility barriers has diminished, it has not vanished. It is significant that the drive of the Parti Quebecois to separate Quebec from the rest of Canada has not so far commanded the support of a voting majority in Quebec. Fear of the consequences of the loss of the connection with the prosperous provinces to the West surely is an important part of the reason.

Earlier, we speculated on the minimum size for a viable national economy. Is there an optimum size of a nation from an economic point of view? This involves the question of when all available economies of scale are exhausted and whether there are diseconomies of scale as well. On the side of production, there seem to be no reasons for diseconomies of scale, since efficient size units can simply be replicated to reach the appropriate size of output. In terms of distribution, the issue of market density becomes significant, and the relation between population and area might create diseconomies; Canada might exemplify this situation. The most likely activity in which diseconomies of large scale might arise is governance. Even under the assumption of a national educational system which imparts the same or equivalent literate culture to all citizens, the larger a country, the more likely that regional differences will exist that complicate the tasks of political management. And to the extent that regional differences are intertwined with significant differences in culture, the problems would be multiplied. Homogenous Japan of nearly 130 million might be easier to govern than bifurcated Belgium, less than one-tenth its size.

One narrowly economic function in which large size in geographic terms may produce diseconomies is labour mobility. If long-distance moves are less easily undertaken, labour markets will function less effectively. Here again, the problem may be compounded by marked regional differences in culture.

Two areas in which scale economics on a national level remain important are the provision of highly trained scientific and technical personnel and the related support of science, and the provision of national defence and security. To the degree that the world in fact moves to a more effective system of international law and collective security, the importance of both these

elements may diminish. A more peaceful world will both allow and promote an even greater international mobility of elite labour. More directly, it will diminish the importance of the national provision of defence and security, and thus the significance of the advantages of scale in that domain. Such a world would create the potentiality for a somewhat closer alignment of political and national-cultural demarcations in a peaceful and therefore an economic way. On the opposite path, towards which the world now seems to be moving, the probability of explosive nationalisms appears alarmingly high.

A world in which the salience of nationalism was on the increase might well be one in which the hitherto rapid growth of the internationalisation and globalization of the economy would be slowed, or even reversed. One consequence of stronger nationalism might well be an increasing desire by political leaders to reassert more control over their national economies. This implies constraints on market forces and greater separation of national economies from the international economy. The same impulses that lead to a move toward autarky have in the past produced a move in the direction of economic planning more generally, and less willingness to let the market rule supreme over the national economy as well as internationally. These possibilities, so contrary to the experience of the last several decades as to seem remote, are nevertheless implicated in the current choices of how the world of nations responds to the forces of nationalism, as they are used and played out in the political spheres of internal politics within many states, and internationally.

NOTES

1. Ernest Gellner *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983).
2. *Ibid.*, pp.35-38.
3. Eugen Weber *Peasants into Frenchmen, 1870-1914* (London, 1976).
4. For brief synthetic descriptions, see the Foundations of Anthropology series: Eric Wolf *Peasants* (Engelwood Cliffs, 1966); Marshall Sahlins *Tribesmen* (Engelwood Cliffs, 1968); Elman Service *The Hunters* (2nd edn, Engelwood Cliffs, 1977).
5. Anthony D. Smith *The Ethnic Origin of Nations* (Oxford, 1986).

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

George W. Rathjens

Introduction

For most of the world the major threat to peace during the forty years following the Second World War lay in the possibility of major war involving the two superpowers and their allies, and, at least from the perspective of this period, the quite likely use of nuclear weapons. These were the prime considerations in the development of the military establishments of the world's major powers, those of India and Pakistan excepted. To a large degree, these same considerations dominated their approaches to international relations. Thus, in their world-wide competition for influence, the United States and the Soviet Union intervened extensively in the affairs of other nations, sometimes supporting favoured warring factions in civil wars and regional conflicts; at other times discouraging conflict deemed inimical to their interests.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire all is changed: the military postures and alliance structures of the Cold War period seem anachronistic and command little popular support; there is great resistance in the polities of the major powers to military involvement abroad, France being perhaps a partial exception; and the forces of nationalism and ethnic conflict, in many instances long suppressed, are now increasingly manifest. As has been demonstrated in the last several years – perhaps most notably in Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda – the response of the major powers, and of the United Nations, to intrastate conflict has left much to be desired.

Two problems dominate all others. In many instances of conflict, few, if any, outside states see immediate threats to their national interests that appear to be sufficient to justify military – or often, even just political/economic – intervention if the costs seem likely to be large. This is particularly evident

in instances of intrastate conflict where human rights are at issue. There have been exceptions, for example the US intervention in Haiti, when the prospect of an influx of refugees led to sufficient concern in the south-eastern United States that the Bill Clinton Administration was moved to act. We can probably expect more such interventions in other instances where refugee problems threaten the interests of strong neighbouring states. But, even then, there is likely to be reluctance to try to deal with the causative bases for refugee problems. Secondly, there is the widespread predisposition against interference by outsiders in the internal affairs of sovereign states, a matter of particular sensitivity to smaller, weaker states, notable those recently emerged from colonialism. In commenting on these problems and more generally about intervention the writer will focus here particularly on operations conducted under UN mandates, not because the UN is necessarily the only instrument for peace operations but because so much of our recent experience has been with it and because, notwithstanding great erosion in its credibility, it would still seem, in general, to be the option of first choice.

While one might have thought that the aforementioned problems could be substantially mitigated by having the burdens of intervention shared under its auspices, the structure and character of the UN, and the great disparities in the strength – and histories – of its member states, have been major impediments to its effectiveness. The sovereignty problem has been a particularly difficult one for the UN, and this is reflected in its Charter. Paragraph 7 of Article 2 states that 'Nothing in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter'; but it then goes on to state that 'this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII', Articles 39 and 42 of which provide a basis for the Security Council's authorising forceful action in the event of just such 'threats to the peace'. To justify forceful intervention when gross violations of human rights have been at issue the Security Council has claimed, on some occasions with a very liberal interpretation, that they pose a threat to international peace, hardly a very satisfactory way of dealing with the sovereignty-human rights conundrum.

Another impediment to the UN's taking responsibility for decision-making about forceful intervention arises because of the five permanent members of the Security Council having veto rights with respect to its actions. This made it almost unthinkable that the UN could have been instrumental in dealing with important security problems all through the Cold War. The likelihood of at least one of the permanent five members exercising a veto seemed just too high. Although this changed with the end of the Cold War, exemplified in the passage of resolutions mandating forceful action against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait, there have been indications in Russian reluctance to

go along with forceful opposition to aggressive behaviour by the Bosnian Serbs that the veto problem is likely to continue to be troublesome.

With infringements on sovereignty not at issue in peace-keeping, as distinct from peace-making/enforcement (see below), it is not surprising that the UN's involvement in military intervention all through the Cold War period was largely limited to the former. There were only two significant exceptions, the Korean War and the war in the Congo, where securing mandates for more forceful operations was possible for rather special reasons: in the first case, because the Soviet Union was boycotting Security Council deliberations at the time and because Taiwan then held the China seat; and in the second case, because, in a misjudgement about how conflict would develop and about how Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold would respond, the Soviet Union joined the United States in July 1960 in support of the original 'weak' mandate, (the other three permanent members abstaining), and then, after opposing the continuation of the operation, again joining the United States in November, 1961, with Great Britain and France abstaining, in support of a 'strong' mandate, one calling for expulsion of Belgian military personnel and advisors and for crushing, by force if necessary, efforts of the province of Katanga to secede. But in the last half dozen years internal conflict has become more frequent and manifest, especially in states around the periphery of Russia and in Africa, where national boundaries, established during the era of colonialism, have borne little relation to tribal or ethnic divisions. And, even though the impetus for the major powers to intervene militarily in other states on the grounds of narrow self-interest is much reduced, the conflicts have commanded more attention on a world-scale because of reportage on television – the CNN effect – and because of feelings, wide-spread in at least developed countries, and supported by the Genocide and Human Rights Conventions, that the world community should act in support of self-determination and other human rights, feelings that could be more easily repressed during the years when so many unsavoury actions – and inactions – of governments could be in some measure justified, or at least rationalised, by claims of need to compete effectively in the Cold War and/or to reduce the likelihood of its turning hot.

Partitioning the Problem

Regrettably for expository purposes there is no generally accepted terminology for distinguishing between different scales and intensities of military interventionary activity. The UN has a Department of Peace-keeping Operations to deal with the problems from its perspective, the British Army a field manual on 'Wider Peace-keeping,' and the US Army an analogous manual for 'Peace Operations'.[1] Yet, they all deal with the same range of

activities. At one extreme, the issue is intervention with at least the acquiescence if not the active support of the parties to a controversy and with there being a clear understanding that intervening forces must behave in a disinterested way, using weapons, if at all – in some missions they have been unarmed – only for self-defence. At the other, there is the possibility of interventionary forces being charged with imposing and enforcing a peace on one or more resistant parties to a conflict. Although the Gulf war did not involve intrastate or ethnic conflict, the foci of this paper, Desert Storm illustrates in an extreme form the latter kind of use of military force. Given that it involved a half-million men, combined-arms attack against the whole of Iraq's military establishment there is some irony in the fact that its link with the UN would presumably have been through the UN peace-keeping directorate had that office existed at the time!

Here, the terms 'peace-keeping' and 'peace-making/enforcement' will be used respectively in referring to the two aforementioned kinds of operations. Clearly, the criteria for intervention and the requirements for it differ markedly in the two cases, and this is widely recognised, notwithstanding the ambiguity about terms. The division is reflected in the UN Charter, peace-keeping having its basis in one chapter, VI, and peace-making and enforcement in another, VII. In practice though, the dichotomy is not as sharp as the foregoing discussion suggests, and this is reflected in the use of the terms 'chapter six and a half' and even 'chapter six and three-quarters' to apply to some operations. But still, it seems useful to begin at least by considering the extreme cases.

Before doing so, it is perhaps worth noting that the approaches to peace operations of West European governments, especially that of Great Britain, reflect much greater emphasis on the dichotomy between peace-keeping, narrowly defined, and peace-making/enforcement than is the case for the United States. The differences are apparent in official writings, training of forces, and in operations.

Peace-keeping

Peace-keeping commonly involves two antagonists who, having agreed to an armistice, see advantage in a third party, that is a peace-keeper, accepting responsibility for monitoring and supervising compliance with it while the antagonists try to resolve outstanding differences, with or without help of the third party or other outsiders. Depending on their mandate, peace-keeping forces may also be charged with such tasks as disarmament and the cantonment of forces, the supervision of elections, and assuring the safety of displaced persons and non-interference with the delivery of humanitarian

relief. In their various missions peace-keepers can play a stabilising, confidence-building role, deterring outbreaks of violence and perhaps facilitating negotiations.

For peace-keeping missions the need will be for relatively small numbers of men. Experience in the Congo, Somalia, and Cambodia suggests an upper limit of perhaps 25 000, but there have been other examples where the numbers have been as few as a hundred, or even less. The troops will be lightly armed and supported by modest communications, observational, and in-theatre transport capabilities; they will be expected to sustain few, if any, casualties; and, as noted earlier, they will be expected to use their arms rarely, if at all, and to maintain postures of impartiality vis-á-vis contesting parties.

It is easy to specify essential conditions for peace-keeping in addition to those just mentioned. Mandates must be reasonably clear to all involved and ideally the contesting parties should play a facilitating role in the peace-keepers' carrying out of their mandates. At least there should not be interference with their doing so. It must be possible to raise the required peace-keeping forces, and to cover the costs of deploying and sustaining them. Raising those required for UN operations has generally not been particularly difficult, in part because for some poorer nations making forces available for such operations has brought with it significant financial return. Unfortunately, some of those forces have been inadequately trained and ill-disciplined, and many have been poorly equipped. Ideally, a peace-keeping operation will be judged of sufficient value to antagonists that they are willing to pay for it. This has happened, for example in the case of the deployment in 1962-63 of the United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea, the costs of which were shared equally by the Netherlands and Indonesia, but this was a rare example, and in many cases there have been problems, some very serious, in covering costs. Relatedly, there have been concerns that some operations have dragged on for extended periods, with the adversaries bearing little, if any, of the considerable costs – and displaying little will to reach a settlement of their differences. As an extreme example, the UN Cyprus operation still continues after more than thirty years, with the total cost now over $700 million. It has also resulted in the loss, as of 1990, of 149 lives.[2]

Finally, whatever the initial understandings with respect to the mandate for a peace-keeping operation, differences may arise during implementation. If they cannot be resolved in the field, peace-keeping forces must be prepared to withdraw – unless agreement can be reached on appropriate changes in their mandate – and they must be able to do so safely and expeditiously, a consideration of great importance, as developments in Yugoslavia are now making painfully evident.

While a number of UN peace-keeping operations have pretty well conformed to the pattern just described, in others there have been major problems, in addition to financing, problems that must be expected to recur. For example, time may run out on the peace-keepers because one – at least – of the antagonists decides that resumption or expansion of active conflict is in its interest. Events in Croatia are illustrative. After the initiation of hostilities in 1991, and while attempts were being made to broker a cease-fire and to negotiate an agreement for the introduction of peace-keepers, the Serbs moved so quickly to seize most of the Krajina that by the time the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peace-keepers were actually introduced they were confronted with monitoring and supervising a cease-fire that, though acceptable to both the Serbs and the Croats in the short term, could not be expected to be acceptable to the latter as a basis for a lasting peace. As Croat military capabilities improved and as it became increasingly clear that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was not going to give the Croatian Serbs unqualified support, a counter-offensive to regain lost territory became increasingly attractive to Croatia. Hence, its ultimatum, subsequently withdrawn, that it would no longer accept the presence of UNPROFOR after March of 1995; the offensive against the Croatian Serbs in Slavonia, UNPROFOR notwithstanding; and the recapture of the Krajina.

Yugoslavia also provides examples of a second kind of major problem with peace-keeping: the possibility that a party to agreements to accept peace-keepers may be unable, or unwilling, to persuade or coerce forces or factions, nominally under its control or with which it is associated, to comply with the agreements relating to peace-keeping. This has been most demonstrably evident in Bosnia, where it has become apparent that the local Serbs have been little influenced and certainly not controlled by Belgrade. The problem is more likely to surface in instances of ethnic or tribal conflict than in cases of clear interstate war; and, for better or worse, the former would seem to be the wave of the future. Somalia and, in the early 1960s, the Congo were extreme examples. They illustrated how hard it is to carry out peace-keeping of the idealised kind discussed above in the absence of political authorities who can make agreements relating to the responsibilities and immunities of peace-keepers and who have capacity and interest in seeing such agreements complied with. Although one can envisage negotiating separate peace-keeping agreements with a number of factions, each capable of interfering with the mandated activities of peace-keepers, it is likely, considering the interests and limited authority of the various faction leaders, to be a frustrating business in situations such as obtained in the Congo and Somalia. Moreover, if even just one faction decides to interfere significantly with the implementation of the peace-keepers' mandate, the choice will have to be made between termination of the mission or expanding the mandate to include peace-enforcement.

Before turning to the latter option it may be worth taking note of one other kind of peace operation, preventive deployment. This is exemplified in the present stationing, under UN auspices, of American and Scandinavian forces in Macedonia. This differs from traditional peace-keeping really only in that it involves deployment before potential conflict rather than after a truce or armistice and requires the consent of only one rather than of two or more parties. The costs and difficulties ought logically to be lower and the payoff in deterrence of hostilities perhaps even higher than in idealised peace-keeping.

Peace-Making/Enforcement

Criteria, force requirements, and rules of engagement for peace-making and enforcement will in general be totally different from those for peace-keeping, points made particularly in British doctrine and in American practice. In contrast to peace-keeping, peace-making/enforcement involves clearly taking sides, and this may imply substantial, sustained opposition, not only from organised forces but from civilian elements as well. Interventionary force requirements will be at least an order of magnitude larger than for peace-keeping operations – Yugoslav partisans tied down more than twenty German, Bulgarian and Hungarian divisions, totalling over 250,000 men, during the Second World War – and casualty rates for 'peace-making' forces may be relatively high.[3] Given the great aversion in the polities of most of the major powers to their military forces' taking such casualties, particularly in operations judged to be of no great immediate interest to them, there is likely to be very great pressure, particularly in the case of the United States, to try to achieve interventionary objectives by using air power alone.

If, however, this appears not to be possible, as will generally be the case, the choice may be between doing nothing or using considerable force. In the case of at least American military planners there is likely to be a strong predilection to do so in an overwhelming way in combined operations. Witness Panama, Haiti, and, particularly, Desert Storm. But these particular operations were hardly unqualified successes. Although Iraqi forces were quickly defeated and driven out of Kuwait, other important American objectives of Desert Storm were not realised. Saddam Hussein is still in power and, without the establishment of a democratic government, we can hardly be assured that we will not see the renaissance of an Iraqi nuclear weapons programme; and while General Manuel Antonio Noriega was captured in Panama, Operation Just Cause has not seemed to have made much difference to that country's serving as an important conduit for drugs, nor in any transition to democracy. To achieve these objectives much more would have been required. As for Haiti, it remains to be seen whether the

US/UN intervention will, in the long term, make much more of a contribution to 'nation building' than intervention by the United States which lasted from 1915 to 1934.

We are led to the questions of objectives in peace-making/enforcement operations, particularly in intrastate/ethnic conflict situations. There have been two major examples of such interventions involving UN forces, one in the Congo and the other in Somalia, both of which began as peace-keeping (chapter VI) actions, but which then developed, with expanded mandates in what has become known as 'mission creep,' to involve peace-making/enforcement. The first, the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), ultimately involved the UN's taking sides, as noted earlier, against Katanga, which was attempting, with help from abroad, to secede from the Congo. In the second, the UN authorised chapter VII operations to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia and to effect disarmament of troublesome clan elements. In both countries the interventionary forces were arguably responsible for saving hundreds of thousands of lives and, in the case of ONUC, successful in expelling the Belgian and other foreign officers supporting Katanga and in preventing it from seceding.[4] It was, in fact, the only war the UN ever 'won,' (putting aside Desert Storm, which was really an American show, with the UN role being only to provide window-dressing.) But both the Congo and Somalia can now be reasonably characterised as 'failed states.' It is, however, hardly fair to charge this sorry state of affairs to ONUC and the three UN operations in Somalia, UNOSOM I (the first United Nation Operation in Somalia), UNITAF (that of the Unified Task Force, basically a US Marine Corps operation) and UNOSOM II: their mandates did not provide for their making substantial long-term nation-building efforts. But it is not unfair to ask whether the Congo, now Zaire, would be in any worse shape today than it is if nothing had been done to prevent Katanga's secession, nor whether in both cases it was morally reasonable for the UN to become as involved as it did in peace-enforcement without having an intent and plans for taking some responsibility for longer-term developments in those countries. And, in the same vein, it may be reasonable to ask whether the UN, and particularly the United States, is not morally culpable for having left Saddam Hussein in power and the people of Iraq to their own devices, considering the damage inflicted on them, and from which they continue to suffer.

Although the UN intervention in Cambodia, first with the United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia and then with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) did not have a chapter VII mandate and, although no 'chapter six and a half' operations were involved, the mission was very broad, having more of a commitment to 'nation-building' than perhaps any other UN operation. It has been partially successful, perhaps more so than should have been expected, in organising and

supervising a reasonably free election and in facilitating the repatriation of several hundred thousand displaced persons. However, with the Khmer Rouge not co-operating, it has not fulfilled its mandate as regards cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of armed forces within the country, nor in assuring basic human rights and an effective rule of law and order. It is, moreover, clear at this writing that a great deal more will have to be done if Cambodia is ever to develop a democratic government having the kind of legitimacy that is deemed acceptable in the West. (Whether or not the realisation of such a system of governance should be a reasonable objective of outside intervention in Cambodia's affairs is another question. Many would argue that to suggest that it should be is a reflection of Western hubris.)

Objectives of Peace Operations

In considering what interventionary objectives make sense we will find that further emphasis on the dichotomy between peace-keeping on the one hand and peace-making/enforcement on the other may not be totally appropriate. Drawing a sharp line is useful in thinking about force requirements, training and the conduct of military operations; perhaps less so in discussion of mandates and objectives.There would seem to be little objection to the UN's – or individual states or regional groupings of states – taking on responsibilities for the simple monitoring of elections and/or of compliance by antagonists with cease-fire arrangements, assuming the aforementioned conditions are met. It is tasks that go beyond these that may invite mission creep, sometimes leading to peace-making/enforcement measures with concomitant costs which may be unacceptable. Attempting to generalise about whether these other kinds of missions should be undertaken by the UN – or other potential intervening entities – turns out to be a frustrating business. A brief discussion of some kinds of justifications for intervention will illustrate the point.

Probably 75 to 95 per cent of states, and of the world population, would agree that genocide is so reprehensible as to, in principle, justify active opposition by the world community, even at the cost of infringement on state sovereignty. It is unlikely, however, that many, if any, other objectives of forceful intervention would command as high a level of approbation. But the expulsion of people from their homes – ethnic cleansing, including inducing them to leave by denying them basic rights, particularly a realistic means of livelihood – would probably in principle, at least, rank almost as high on a scale of morally indefensible behaviour. Consideration, however, of specific cases suggests that there would be much disagreement about this. Consider the expulsion of Germans from Silesia following the Second World War, discriminatory practices against Arabs in some parts of what was Palestine

and against Jews in other parts of the Middle East, and efforts in the Baltic States, now that those states are again independent, to induce Russians to leave, bearing in mind that the problems there had their genesis in the displacement of the Balts from their homes by Russians in the early 1940s. Relatedly, interference with the provision of humanitarian relief to distressed populations will be seen as morally objectionable to many, but it may be seen by others as just another instrument, perhaps even a relatively benign one, to be used in instances of conflict to effect ethnic cleansing or to deny opposition the means to sustain itself and continue fighting.

Here are some other examples where there may be great variation in views about intervention. Attitudes about actions to try to prevent or stop civil war will depend strongly, as exemplified in the Congo and Yugoslavia, on feelings about the merits of the positions of the parties in conflict and about the prospects for the peaceful resolution or accommodation of their differences. And, while there is a widespread tendency to pay obeisance to democracy and self-determination as desiderata of governance, support can be expected to erode with clarification of just what is meant by 'democracy' and about to whom self-determination is to apply: to nations, to tribes, to ethnically-related groups, to those professing a common religion, or to those living in a clearly-defined geographic area? Attitudes about self-determination will also be affected by the possibility of domino effects. This was the basis for widespread concern in international circles about Slovenia's otherwise unobjectionable declaration of independence in 1991. There was the fear that it would make similar action more likely in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina where, in contrast to the situation in Slovenia, the presence of large Serb minorities would make civil war all but inevitable.

Most especially difficult is judgement about the acceptability of intervention, forceful or otherwise, based on 'nation-building' rationales. UNTAC's role in Cambodia is an example. How does one judge what is 'good' for a particular nation or group of people? What kinds of trade-offs are desirable; which undesirable: equity versus efficiency in an economy, reflection of minority interests in political representation in government, emphasis on individual rights versus consensual behaviour, the separation of church and state? Dealing with such questions is likely to be particularly troublesome if there is a considerable gulf between the cultural values of those making the judgements and those likely to be affected by them. This suggests that those contemplating peace operations, for example the UN Security Council, should be particularly careful about supporting mandates that have as their objective – or where there is even much likelihood of an unintended consequence – of affecting significantly the long-term development of social, political and economic institutions. Given that in the real world, decisions about UN – and other – interventions are likely to be especially reflective of the values of the advanced, industrial countries, there is some merit, Boutros

Boutros-Ghali notwithstanding, in the UN being a bit more humble about making decisions relating to intervention in Africa, or Cambodia, that may have such effects than about those relating to, say, Yugoslavia.

But even in the event of a broad consensus on the desirability, perhaps even a moral obligation, of forceful intervention in particular instances of affronts to the conscience of the world, or, for that matter, to the clearly-identifiable interests of some states, other conditions for undertaking intervention have to be met. There must be, as Catholic just-war criteria would have it, not only right intent but a reasonable prospect of success. Most informed people throughout the world have deplored Russian behaviour in Chechnya, and that of China in Tibet, but few would take seriously any suggestion that the UN should intervene militarily to deal with these problems. The certainties of vetoes aside, the costs of success would be unacceptable, if success could be realised at all.

In other cases, the most prominent at this time being that in Bosnia, peace-making and enforcement may prove effective and, though costly, affordable for the world community – perhaps no more costly than Desert Storm, at least in terms of force requirements and dollar costs. Many countries – certainly most Muslim states and most of the advanced industrial countries – would see benefit in forcing the Bosnian Serbs to desist from ethnic cleansing efforts against the Muslims. But it seems that the Americans, the British and the French will have to bear the main burden. If so, we would have an example of the classic commons/free rider problem: the cause of world-order would be well served if the Bosnian Serbs could be dealt with effectively; and, with that, most states would benefit, but the preferred solution for each is that others pay the price while they get a free ride.

There have been and will be other instances of conflict where the costs of peace-making/enforcement will be less and where, therefore, it may be easier to get the necessary agreement on an effective UN – or other collective – response, but the record is discouraging, the experience in Rwanda particularly so. There, the pursuit of genocide was even more blatant than in Bosnia, and one might, therefore, have expected even broader world-wide revulsion, but even in this case it proved impossible to mobilise an effective collective response through the UN or otherwise on a timely basis. France intervened with the UN's blessing and with the other major powers cautiously applauding but unwilling to do much.

Can anything be done to improve the likelihood of effective response where forceful intervention for humanitarian reasons seems called for? One possibility comes to mind: the establishment of a UN volunteer force. Much discussion of the concept is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is perhaps worth noting that such a force could conceptually, at least, deal to an extent

with three of the most evident and troublesome problems that have plagued UN interventionary efforts.

First, there is the extreme reluctance of most governments to put troops in harm's way: to accept the political risks of significant casualties being taken in instances where the intervention might be effective but where immediately important national interests do not seem to be at stake. While a volunteer UN force suffering casualties would be no less tragic, the political consequences for national governments would likely be far less severe than if the casualties fell on seconded national forces.

Secondly, difficulties in the effective use of national forces have arisen because unit commanders have often felt obligated to check with home governments before carrying out orders given them by field commanders, and all too often, they have been instructed not to obey such orders. Or, forces may be withdrawn by governments dissatisfied with the way a mandate is being interpreted and implemented, as happened in the Congo at a critical point in 1961 when African countries withdrew about a third of the UN troops then in the country.[5] These problems in command and control would not arise with a UN-legion type force (except possibly to the extent that the UN might be dependent on national forces for air and other support.)

Thirdly and most importantly, in some instances, the effectiveness may be higher, and the costs lower, if deployment of interventionary forces could be effected more quickly than has been possible under past and existing arrangements. Rwanda is the most recent major example. With a UN force, this would probably often be possible.

At present, there is little disposition on the part of the UN member-states to establish a UN force and to pay for it. But even if it were available there would remain the questions of when to employ it and to what purposes.

Two summary statements can be made as regarding the matters raised in this chapter. First, decision should, in general, be straightforward if the objective is simply monitoring and supervising compliance with cease-fire agreements, provided certain well-defined conditions can be met, including, notably, provision of adequate financing and having confidence that responsible political leaders can and will exercise firm control over belligerent forces. Supervising and monitoring elections, and perhaps some other well-defined tasks, may also fall in this category. Secondly, when objectives are more far-reaching, for example to the protection of safe-havens, or where there is likelihood that potentially troublesome elements may not be responsive to control by the political authorities that are parties to the agreements on which the deployment of peace-keepers has been based, there is the potential for mission-creep, leading to peace-making/enforcement. In

such cases, or when it is even more immediately apparent that peace-making/enforcement will be required, deciding on intervention will, in general, be very much more difficult. This is because adversary response, and therefore costs, may be quite unpredictable; and benefits perhaps even more so, particularly if 'nation-building' objectives are involved. While challenges will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, one generalisation may be in order. Before getting involved in such operations, there must be a clear understanding about what responsibilities should be accepted by the intervenors for developments that may extend beyond the completion of immediate military operations and about the likely costs of meeting these responsibilities. For UN or other multilateral interventionary activities, getting consensus on these points is likely to be absolutely critical, difficult as it may be.

NOTES

1. [British] 'Army Field Manual, Wider Peacekeeping', 4th Draft; and FM 100-23, Peace Operations Headquarters, Department of the Army (Washington, D.C., December 1994).
2. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (2nd edition, New York, 1990), p.439.
3. Ahmet Donlagic, Zarko Atanackovic, and Dusan Plenca *Yugoslavia in the Second World War* (Belgrade, 1967), pp.126-127, 151.
4. Chester A. Crocker 'The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong', *Foreign Affairs vol.74, no.1, May/June 1995, p.3; and The Blue Helmets*, p.254.
5. William J. Durch, 'The UN Operation in the Congo' in William J. Durch (ed.) *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York, 1993), p.327; and The Blue Helmets*, p.232.

SECURITY, IDENTITY AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Bill McSweeney

Introduction

The visitor to Belfast in the twenty-four hours following the Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire on 31 August 1994 would have been puzzled. The republican movement had finally abandoned the bullet for the ballot-box, but the reaction on the street pointed to a dissonant interpretation. In the Falls Road centre of republicanism, there was jubilation, flag-waving, all the symbols of victory. In the unionist quarter on the Shankill Road there was dejection, anger, the sense of betrayal. The cessation of IRA violence, which Ulster unionists had demanded for decades, was now greeted by the street theorists as a betrayal of unionism, a triumph for republicanism. The British Government was now committed to negotiating the future of Northern Ireland with all parties, including Sinn Fein (the political wing of the IRA), but Ulster unionists had a cast-iron guarantee that their two-to-one majority could veto any constitutional change in the province. What did these street theorists know that was not on the record for the observer?

This chapter is an attempt to interpret the peace process by situating it in the context of the changing identities and interests of the principal actors, rather than in the traditional security-policy framework of much of the literature. The peace process is seen as a security policy designed to alter the allegiances and identities which underlie the military and paramilitary acts of violence which express the Northern Ireland conflict.

The Facts of the Peace Process

What is termed 'the peace process' in Northern Ireland is usually dated from the ceasefire declaration of 31 August 1994. But the first recognition of the

need for new structures to replace those which governed the province since 1921, and the active search to achieve an agreed basis for their construction began in 1973 with a major British initiative (the Sunningdale Agreement) to replace the Stormont Parliament with a power-sharing executive in 1973. The collapse of this experiment in the aftermath of unionist resistance, and the escalation of violence and sectarian murder which followed, led to the setting up in the Republic of Ireland of the New Ireland Forum in 1983.[1] This was an attempt to rethink nationalist attitudes in the light of unionist concerns, and to develop a more pluralist agenda for all-party negotiation on the basis of alternative resolutions of the problem, rather than the unitary state hallowed by the irredentist republican tradition.

It was given political urgency by the need to deflect Northern nationalists away from the growing attraction of Sinn Fein, in the wake of the uncompromising policies of the Thatcher government, and to back John Hume's constitutionalist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP).[2] International pressure on the British Government, particularly from the United States, softened British attitudes in favour of a negotiated settlement with the active involvement of the Republic, and helped to bring about the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. This treaty established the southern Irish government as a consultative partner in the search for a new political structure in Northern Ireland and, in return, embodied the acceptance in the Republic of the principle of consensus in Northern Ireland as the basis for constitutional change. The refusal of the unionist parties to participate in the negotiations prior to, and following, the Agreement limited its effectiveness. But the fact that such resistance could no longer force the abandonment by Westminster of this stage of the peace process allows us to mark the Anglo-Irish Agreement as its formal beginning.

The second stage began with the so-called 'Downing Street Declaration' signed by Prime Ministers John Major and Albert Reynolds on 15 December 1993. In return for 'a permanent end' to violence, the Major government offered Sinn Fein direct involvement in negotiations on future structures within the context of a commitment to the democratic process. The informal preparation for this dramatic announcement took the form of secret negotiations between the leaders of the SDLP and Sinn Fein during the eight months prior to the Declaration. The full text of their private agreement has never been published, but its gestation gave rise to considerable speculation in the media about the extent of IRA willingness to compromise on its historic demand for national unity.

The brief statement contained in the Hume- Gerry Adams Document formally presented to Irish Prime Minister or Taoiseach Albert Reynolds in September 1993, implies a new commitment on the part of the IRA to respect the different traditions in Ireland and to accept the democratic process as

the only means of achieving agreement on constitutional change. This was widely taken to signal the fundamental change necessary to enable the Major government to initiate the second stage of the peace process. Significantly, and for the first time, both sovereign governments and the IRA had now accepted the idea of self-determination for the people of Ireland, North and South. No less important for understanding the peace process is the acknowledgment in the Declaration that Britain entertains 'no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland'.

Immediately following the Downing Street Declaration, Reynolds announced the convening of a successor to the New Ireland Forum under the title of Forum for Peace and Reconciliation. This official examination of the political and religious culture demanded by the peace process differs from its 1983 predecessor in inviting submissions from Sinn Fein and the unionist paramilitaries. The principle of self-determination was strengthened by the acceptance in Dublin that this is incompatible with the retention in the Irish Constitution of Articles 2 and 3, which define the jurisdiction of the southern state over the whole island of Ireland. The removal of these Articles, together with British agreement that the Dublin government should have a formal role in the creation of political structures affecting nationalists in Northern Ireland, are contained in the agenda for all-party negotiations on the peace process – the Framework Document – published in February 1995. This Document also provides for a new legislative Assembly giving Dublin ministers a role in government, the creation of new cross-border institutions and the guarantee of a referendum to decide future constitutional change in Northern Ireland. It has been repeatedly emphasised to unionists that these ideas are proposals for all-party discussions, not a declaration of intent by Westminster; that no change is possible without the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland; and that the British Government is, and will remain, a neutral facilitator of the process. But unionists remain profoundly skeptical of such assurances. Having demonstrated for a century their abhorrence of Home Rule and their unshakeable commitment to the maintenance of the union within the United Kingdom, they are now invited to enter negotiations on institutional changes with Sinn Fein, the contemporary champions of Home Rule, and expected to trust that their two-to-one majority will not be eroded by the designs of the process of change on the part of Westminster.

The Ceasefire Puzzle

The ceasefire and its attendant events immediately raised the puzzle: why should the IRA, in an act of apparent surrender, now abandon the instrument of violence by which, for 25 years and more, they have single-mindedly pursued their goal of British withdrawal? And having done so, why should

they and their republican supporters have interpreted it as a triumph while unionists have regarded it with deep suspicion?

The facts recounted above are susceptible of a range of interpretations. British security policy, traditionally focused on the goal of military victory, has finally succeeded in weakening the IRA – materially in its capacity for violence, politically in terms of its legitimacy with the nationalist population, and organisationally in terms of its internal coherence. In effect, this explanation points to an IRA surrender. It is the final vindication of the verge-of-collapse theory, rehearsed at regular intervals since 1969 by British security spokespersons, only to be repeatedly rebutted by an IRA very much alive and active. An alternative version of this theory points to the United States rather than the United Kingdom as the source of the collapse. Without continued US support, directly and through political pressure on London, the IRA cannot sustain its military activity. Given the evidence of increasing American concern to find a solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland since the mid-1980s, it is inferred that US pressure was exercised in favour of a solution coinciding with the demands of the British government for a military victory.

Both these explanations are weakened by lack of supporting evidence and by their failure to make sense of the known facts – most obviously, the dissonant reaction of republican and unionist supporters to the alleged capitulation of the IRA. The present writer believes that a more persuasive case can be made to support the view that the ceasefire was announced in the context of the continuing strength and capacity of the IRA, of increasing US pressure on the British government for a radical shift of policy, and of a weakening of British resolve arising from a new awareness of British interests in the province. The British may well have entertained the hope of weakening the efficiency and solidarity of the IRA by appealing to a general desire for peace over its head. But it would depend crucially on British success in achieving the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons prior to negotiations, which was never realistic and which has been brusquely dismissed by the IRA as a 'ludicrous demand for a surrender' and 'an absolute barrier to progress'.[3]

That the IRA would at this stage risk a ceasefire and place its historic mission in the hands of the people, two-thirds of whom are traditional supporters of the Union, makes little sense, unless we assume that the organisation was in a state of imminent collapse. But there is no evidence of a weakened IRA negotiating an end to violence under the duress of organisational collapse or threat of unionist paramilitary action. In the period preceding the ceasefire, its capacity to continue its armed struggle indefinitely both at home and in mainland Britain was manifest in the continued high level of British security in the province and on the British mainland.

The military confrontation in Northern Ireland since 1969 has been essentially a battle between two forces: the British army and the IRA. Loyalist paramilitaries, notwithstanding the rhetoric of 'no surrender' and the threats of a bloodbath if their interests are ignored, are parasitic on the continued presence of the British, both politically and militarily, and on the continued violence of the IRA which legitimises their sectarianism domestically. However unjustified, international support is overwhelmingly weighed against them and in favour of the republicanism of the IRA. The evidence of increased sectarian violence on their part in recent years posed a new security problem to Catholics within the province; it does not measure against the security threat directly posed to British interests by the IRA.

As to American pressure on the IRA to move to a political resolution of the conflict, this has undoubtedly been a significant factor since the early 1980s. Since the beginning of the Bill Clinton Administration in 1992, US influence has been exercised under the tutelage of the nationalist Irish Government as part of a twin strategy of pressure on the IRA to compromise on its dogma of Irish unity in return for pressure on the British to compromise, in turn, on its dogma of refusal to negotiate the future of Northern Ireland with armed paramilitaries. This is now, in effect, the American solution, and one which is perceived in Washington as offering a major fillip to the re-election of Clinton.[4] Far from weakening the IRA, increased American involvement has helped to educate it to the political opportunities available to achieve a place in the negotiations in the context of a phased British withdrawal. Implicit American support for the IRA refusal to decommission its military capacity as a pre-condition for such negotiations to commence is witness to this.[5]

Seen from the Westminster viewpoint, it is clear that British interests cannot be neutral as to the outcome of the negotiation process. The declaration that there is 'no selfish strategic or economic interest' involved cannot disguise the fact that there may be considerable 'selfish' interest in detaching Northern Ireland from the British identity map – of which Northern Ireland was always an ambivalent offshore element – and in playing the role of active persuader to ensure such an outcome in the interest of long-term political stability. Several factors have contributed to persuading the government of John Major that now is the time for a decisive break. They can be listed summarily under six heads: the declining strategic importance of Northern Ireland since the end of the Second World War; the escalating costs of the Westminster subvention required to support the Northern Ireland economy and security apparatus; the increasing export of IRA violence to the British mainland since the early 1980s, in particular the shift of target from civilian to political and financial; growing support of British public opinion for withdrawal from the province and detachment from the British mainland; the evidence of a new political culture in the Republic of Ireland, more amenable to negotiation on the terms of a peace process; and the pressure of successive US governments

and, particularly, the new aggressiveness of the Clinton Administration aimed at settling the Irish question in favour of what is perceived to be Irish-American nationalist opinion.

While each of these influences may be seen as playing an independent part in educating British political opinion as to the 'real' interests involved in Northern Ireland, the fourth factor relating to British public opinion – and to a lesser extent the fifth – plays a pivotal role in defining the realism of the others. One has simply to ask how such real material and political pressures as those listed would be interpreted if the region at issue was not Northern Ireland but Somerset. The 'selfish' interest of the British government in Somerset is not merely strategic and economic, but pertains to a fundamental level of meaning and identity which gives strategic and economic interests their purchase on politics.

Since 1922, and more explicitly since the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, the people of Northern Ireland have lived a conditional existence as part of the people identified with the British crown – conditional, one could say, on the tolerance of public opinion in the British heartland. Opinion polls in the past few years make depressing reading for any unionists still inclined to believe the rhetoric of the Union. While 72 per cent of the people of Northern Ireland preferred to remain part of the United Kingdom in 1992, only 30 per cent of the British people saw the identity of Northern Ireland in the same light. In a different poll two years later, 70 per cent of the British people opted for some form of detachment of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom, either through independence or unity with the Republic of Ireland, while British support for the Union remained at 30 per cent.[6] These polls reflect the political reality of an offshore region, geographically and constitutionally set apart from the core nation since its inception, with its identification with the crown thus exposed to the test of its performance on economic, political and strategic indicators in a manner which would be unthinkable for Somerset or Cornwall.

If this interpretation of changing interests on the part of the principal actors is correct, then there is clearly more to the 'peace process' than the facts available on the public record. The British Government, the IRA, and the US Administration have redefined their interests in relation to the future of Northern Ireland. The Republic of Ireland, too, shows a readiness to break with its monoculturalist past and to seize the political and economic advantages offered by the convergence of interest on the part of the other main actors. Only one significant group continues to assert its interests in terms of symbolic meaning and historic identity: the unionist majority in Northern Ireland, who interpret the peace process as a British-led conspiracy to undermine their formal veto over constitutional change. Like their republican opponents, they infer a hidden agenda behind the observable facts.

and a new interest underlying the apparent 'neutrality' of a disinterested Westminster.[7]

If the peace process was interest-driven, as argued, it was nonetheless always clear to its architects that the interests of unionists were not so malleable, separable from their identity. Northern Ireland unionists placed a premium on symbolic meaning over instrumentalist ends in their public affirmation of identity, and saw the constitutional *status quo* as its guarantor. It is plausible, then, to infer that a deal of some kind preceded the IRA ceasefire. To conclude otherwise – that the process offered in return for the ceasefire was no more than a place at the negotiation table, with a demilitarised IRA resting its historic mission on democratic discussion with unionists and with London playing the evenhanded role of disinterested facilitator – this is to fly in the face of the evidence and of political intuition. It is to take the rhetoric of the Declaration and Framework documents too literally, as Gerard Delanty appears to do when he concludes: 'The people of Northern Ireland must decide their own future for themselves. Britain will not force secession on a reluctant majority.... Anything else would be unthinkable in a democracy.'[8]

What, then, is the nature of the peace process, the deal which persuaded the IRA (and other actors) that their interests were best served by engaging in it? Before discussing this, it is necessary to address some aspects of the concept of security, in particular its relation to collective identity and interests.

Security, Identity and Interests

Security is not a property of the instruments used to attain it, such as weapons, dogs, insurance policies.[9] Nor is it a property of the group requiring it. It is essentially a quality of a relationship between groups which takes its character from the identity of Self and Other by which they are distinguished as groups. A security policy understood in this elemental sense is a policy designed to reconstruct, not just the institutions and behaviour of conflicting groups, but the group identities from which the conflictual behaviour flows and which, in turn, are sharpened by these conflictual practices. A security policy, in other words, is a peace process. Its link to the concept of identity follows from its relational quality, from its character as an orientation to the Other.[10]

A moral choice, not a factual discovery, is central to the achievement of a collective identity. The question 'Who am I?' clearly does not rest simply on empirical evidence, though the factual, historical data collected in our passport, our diary and our past experiences are very relevant. Neither can it be decided exclusively in terms of subjective perception. We routinely

'correct' identity claims, not only of others, but of ourselves. It rests also on the contrast and balance between a normative view of human nature and the facts of personal biography. It entails an element of decision as well as self-observation.

Similarly, the collective question: 'Who are we?' cannot be answered simply by reference to opinion polls, ancient myths, folk music or other measures of collective history. It too entails a decision based on a theory which selects and relates some of the countless biographical facts of our collective past and present to a view of who we want to be. 'We are who we choose to be', overstates our freedom in the matter, but it makes the point forcefully that collective identity is a choice made by people, not a property of society which transcends their agency.[11] This is clearly opposed to the view that a community or society 'has' an identity by definition, which people do not choose, but discover, recognise, belong to.

Collective identity is not out there, waiting to be discovered. What is 'out there' is identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals and countless others, who engage in the process of constructing, negotiating and affirming a response to the demand – at times urgent, mostly absent – for a collective image. Even in times of crisis, this is never more than a provisional and fluid image of ourselves as we want to be, limited by the facts of history.

Identity may be a cause or an effect of insecurity. We cannot affirm or deny *a priori* that certain security problems are a consequence of the perceived vulnerability of a community's cohesiveness. Whether it is or not can only be revealed by deconstructing the process of identity-formation at the sub-societal level. The security problem in the Russian Federation, former Yugoslavia, or Northern Ireland, is not there just because people have separate identities; it is just as likely the case that they have separate identities because of the security problem. Identity is not to be taken as an independent variable, *tout court*; it is more often the outcome of a labelling process which reflects a conflict of interests at the political level. This is not to deny that a generalised and vague sense of belonging can exist detached, so to speak, from any underlying conflicts of interests, and that it is therefore rightly considered a component in the definition of society. But it only becomes relevant to security at a much higher level of clarity and exclusiveness which cannot be assumed to be self-generated by its adherents, or to emerge mysteriously from the social fact of society.

The point at issue in the foregoing discussion is to emphasise that group identity is chosen, not given.[12] This does not deny that many people are born into a 'given' identity – Russian Jewish, Afrikaner, Ulster Protestant – which constrains their freedom to choose differently. To refer to such an identity as 'ascribed' is only to draw attention to the historic weight or obduracy of a

social construction; it is not to deny that human choice rather than nature constitutes the source of the group identity whether it is passed by ascription to the individual members or achieved by conscious effort by political leaders or intellectuals. The further point to stress is that this choice is a moral one, arising from the competing interests which give rise to the demand for group identity in the first place. The relevance to the peace process in Northern Ireland should be clear.

Interpreting the Peace Process

With this understanding of the social construction of identity and its relation to security, we can return to the question of the peace process in Northern Ireland, and draw some inferences from the factual evidence earlier outlined.

Three problems of collective identity are entailed in the historic conflict between the British and the Irish which erupted in sustained violence over the past twenty-five years – what it means to be British, to be Irish, and to be unionist. In each case, the roots of identity can be traced to the pursuit of interests and to the dominance of some over others which might have defined the group identity differently.[13] In each case also, the identities which emerged from these struggles acquired over time a primordial character which entered interactively into the definition of interests, inhibiting any attempt to expose their human fabrication and to separate the instrumental interests at stake at any time from the symbolic meaning which they sustained.

In the British and Irish case, there is evidence in the events of the peace process of the emergence of new interests and of the corresponding attempts to articulate a new or revised identity. The constraints of history, which weigh heavier on the Irish and heaviest on the unionists, were never permitted to exercise their burden on the British in their relations with Ireland. From the time of formal partition in 1922 until the beginning of the recent period of violence in 1969, Northern Ireland was a place apart, unlike any region of the mainland in the manner in which Westminster conducted its affairs of state and in which the British people understood their collective identity. However much the people of the province affirmed their cultural identity as British, their fellow-Britons on the mainland denied it by their ambivalence.

In the Sunningdale Agreement imposed by Westminster in 1973 on an outraged unionist population, we see the first major initiative to resolve this ambivalence from the British point of view, and to begin the process of reconstructing a British identity which would, in time, exclude the people of Northern Ireland. Strategic, economic, and political considerations of longer

gestation had come together with a critical security problem to expose the fragile basis of Northern Ireland's Britishness.

Had domestic British problems not intervened to bring down the Edward Heath Government and the Sunningdale Agreement with it, this initiative was critically flawed in another respect. It contained no provision for transforming the self-image of unionists as a pre-condition for transforming their behaviour and their relations with nationalists. It was as guileless an instrument of security as the military force which preceded it, but its lessons endured for unionists in their suspicion of Westminster and for the British Government itself in their approach to any new initiative in the future. Major's Downing Street Declaration makes clear what the British people always knew and what the unionists denied: whatever else they are, they are different from the British, and the British Government intends to deal with them in future as a people apart.

The 1983 New Ireland Forum provides the example of an explicit experiment in identity reconstruction on the part of the Republic of Ireland. Just as the British Government's redefining of Britishness reflected a growing trend in public opinion, so this attempt by the Irish Government to formulate a 'new Ireland' in the context of relations with the North tapped into existing currents in society at large: the process of secularisation and decline of the political authority of Catholicism which has been in rapid progress since the 1960s; a concomitant acceptance of the need for pluralism; widespread revulsion at the violence of the IRA as well as a readiness to compromise in the interests of peace. The ceasefire itself and the dynamics of the peace process have given added significance to the second stage of Irish self-examination, still in progress since the beginning of 1995, in the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation.

At the constitutional level, there still remains the removal of those Articles sacred to the republican tradition which define the territory of the Irish as the whole island. This will cost republicans dear when it is implemented, but it is instructive of republican interpretations of the peace process that the dispute about implementation is so far largely one of timing and tactics, rather than dogma.

If it is easy for the British to redefine their relations with Northern Ireland in the context of independently-changing interests, and for southern Ireland to identify new interests which coincide with existing cultural trends, the problem for unionists is incomparably greater. The major difficulty is that unionists still perceive their interests in line with an historical/theological identity which is fundamentally incompatible with the British and Irish concerns reflected in the peace process. This is not to claim that support for the Union today carries all the metaphysical baggage of post-Reformation

theology, nor is it to deny the cultural pluralism which unites Anglican and Presbyterian, Methodist and even some Catholics in a common cause of unionism. Still less does it mean that unionist interests cannot be redirected in line with the economic and political opportunities envisaged in the peace process. It is to claim, however, that the obduracy of a history defined by a Calvinist understanding of Catholicism and refracted by a form of Irish Catholicism south of the border which, until recently, provided Calvinists with a faithful image of the Other, has made opposition to any involvement in their government by Dublin an overriding interest in its own right. Irish Catholicism represents the antithesis of the core beliefs of the powerful Calvinist voice in unionist politics.[14] When 'Ulster Says No!' it is not just in defiance of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, much of which made economic sense for the unionist business class. It is in opposition to the prospect of government by Rome and to the proven treachery of a Westminster government which might contrive it.

The Framework Document, then, can be seen as the agenda for constructing a new identity for the people of Northern Ireland which will persuade the unionists to consider other interests at stake, and to reconsider their historic choice of an identity defined in opposition to any form of integration with Catholic Ireland.

With the active political, economic and ideological support of London, Dublin, Washington and the European Union, the challenge of this process is to break the link between the unionist/Protestant self-image and the political structure to which it has been historically bound. Not only is the European Union a major funder and active promoter of the peace process, but certain mechanisms of functionalism, borrowed from the European experiment, are being applied to it. Foremost among these is the building of a political spillover effect into the economic support measures designed to persuade the conflicting communities of the benefits of cooperation and, in the process, to provide the legitimacy for the new political structures through the emergence of a communal identity.[15]

Finally, it should be noted that the apparent victory of the republicans in Northern Ireland may carry a sting in the tail. The calculated construction of identity which is the peace process will not be restricted to changing the character of the unionist world-view. It was a condition facilitating the British role in the peace process that the Republic of Ireland also should divest itself of the cultural obstacles to pluralism and tolerance and should refashion its identity to accommodate closer integration with unionists.

The IRA will discover that the Ireland from which they staked their irredentist claims – Gaelic, Catholic, monolithic – is also targeted by the identity-makers of the peace process. What it meant to be Irish when these claims were first

channeled into violence will not be sustainable – and is already evaporating – in the new political culture evolving in the Republic of Ireland.[16]

NOTES

1. 'Report of the New Ireland Forum', Government Publications, Dublin, 1984.
2. See Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden 'The Peace Process in Northern Ireland', *International Affairs* vol.71, no.2, 1995, pp.269-283. For a more recent analysis, see Gerard Delanty 'Negotiating the Peace in Northern Ireland', *Journal of Peace Research* vol.32, no.3, 1995, pp.257-264.
3. IRA Statement, Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, Dublin. Reprinted in *Irish Times*, 8 December 1995. At the time of writing, early in 1996, the British Government appears to have conceded that its demand is unrealistic and, by implication, that its overall strategy was not conditional upon it.
4. It is doubtful if the resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict along nationalist lines plays the significant part in the voting patterns of Irish-Americans which successive Administrations since that of John F. Kennedy have assumed. The question has never been adequately tested, but the belief has powerful resonance for White House strategists.
5. This is the position adopted by the International Body on Arms Decommissioning headed by former US Senator George Mitchell. It can also be inferred from the absence of any allusion to Major's view on decommissioning – 'If they mean peace, let them disarm' – on the part of Clinton during his visit to Belfast and Dublin in early December 1995, and from his coded rejection of that view in the phrase: 'Peace means peace'.
6. See 'The 1992 British Election Study', *ESRC Data Archive*, University of Essex; Gallup Political Index 1979-1994, cited in Bernadette Hayes and Ian McAllister 'British and Irish Public Opinion Towards the Northern Ireland Problem', unpublished paper, International Political Science Association Conference, Drogheda, October 1995.
7. The new leader of the majority unionist party echoed the traditional unionist distrust of Westminster by contrasting the British Government's wholehearted commitment to retaining the union with Scotland with its 'disinterested neutrality' and 'close cooperation with a foreign government' on the question of Northern Ireland. David Trimble, cited in *Irish Times*, 8 December 1995.
8. Delanty, 'Negotiating the Peace in Northern Ireland', p.260.
9. The brief discussion of identity which follows draws on a fuller account in Bill McSweeney 'Security and identity: Buzan and the Copenhagen School', *Review of International Studies* vol.22, no.1, 1996.
10. On the link between security and identity see David Campbell *Writing Security* (Manchester, 1992); further discussion of this topic may be found in Bill McSweeney, The Concept of Security in International Relations Theory (in preparation).
11. Clearly, this is to analyse identity-formation in the abstract. No society exists which would allow us to observe this process from the tabula rasa of a group without an already-existing identity and the consequent pressures of socialisation to adopt and to affirm it.
12. The rejection of primordialist views of identity follows the position taken in Fredrik Barth *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Oslo, 1969) and further developed in Thomas Hylland Eriksen *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (London, 1993).
13. An account of the social construction of British and Celtic identities is given in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds) *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1995) and Linda Colley *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (London, 1992).

14. On the place of religion in the Northern Ireland conflict see John Hickey *Religion and the North of Ireland Problem* (Dublin, 1984); an account of the role of theology is given in Bill McSweeney 'The religious dimension of the troubles in Northern Ireland' in Paul Badham (ed.) *Religion, State and Society in Modern Britain* (London, 1988).
15. It is a wry thought that the European Union may learn the lesson of its own methodology through its involvement in the construction of a new identity for Northern Ireland, which stands in sharp contrast to the lack of attention to identity-construction in the European Union itself.
16. The author wishes to thank Dan Smith, Gerard Delanty, John May, Geraldine Smyth, and Magne Barth, for their very helpful comments. An earlier version of this chapter appeared in *Security Dialogue* vol.27, no.2, 1996.

CONFLICT, ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRATISATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

Simon Bekker

'Ethnicity is one of those forces that is community-building in moderation, community-destroying in excess.'[1]

Introduction

After the emergence in the 1990s of a new international global order, after the disappearance of the old order of Western and Eastern blocs, of capitalist and communist ideologies, of Third World countries as pawns caught up in the Cold War, sub-Saharan Africa has been experiencing strong currents of democratisation. South Africa is directly involved in this trend after a long period during which it was perceived to have been isolated, estranged from its African associates. Today, following identification with this process of democratisation, South Africa is also experiencing rapid institutional restructuring of state, parastatal, and private sector institutions. New social movements are emerging, and new identities are being forged. Internationally, South Africa is seeking ways of realising its comparative advantages in a new and threatening global economy. It is widely perceived to have rejoined the African continent and to be facing challenges similar to its African neighbours.

Contemporary South Africa is a modern plural society in which its different groups have experienced division along lines, *inter alia*, of language (for over 300 years during which various languages changed, merged, were codified, and took root), of territory (before the twentieth century in separate pre-industrial and settler societies, and after, under different state-imposed orders), of race and changing culture, and of changing relationships to the South African state and to the economy of the country.[2]

At least for the whole period since White settlement in South Africa began in 1652, this society has been a particularly conflictful and violent one. There

have been periods of less conflict, periods of widespread and intense conflict, and periods of war. In broad-brush strokes, it is helpful to distinguish three periods during this historical trajectory. Before the beginning of the twentieth century, macro-conflict took place between colonising European powers and their settlers, on the one hand, and a number of pre-industrial, primarily pastoral, African societies and their states, on the other.[3]

The second period involved conflict rooted in a rapidly industrialising society, conflict revolving around attempts at the political incorporation into South African society of the excluded majority of the population, namely those classified by the government of the time as Black, Coloured, and Indian South Africans. The story of conflict during the last decade of this second period - the 1980s - is probably the best-known for it was during this decade that *apartheid* became an international issue, that the white- and Afrikaner-dominated South African state, its security forces, and its policy of total strategy were pitted against the black exile movements, their internal allies, and - at least in diplomatic terms - against governments of most countries in the rest of the world, all subscribing to the universal values of equity and non-racialism.

During the early 1990s, these two major protagonists, represented by the South African government and the Congress Alliance, led by the African National Congress (ANC), continued their struggle through negotiations and civil disobedience rather than by violent conflict. This resulted, in April 1994, in the establishment of South Africa's first democratically elected government. It named itself the Government of National Unity (GNU). What is less well known is that a qualitatively different kind of violent conflict emerged in the late 1980s and escalated during this period of negotiations. As will be shown below, violent conflict during this third period (which continues to the present day) exhibits ethnic features, that is the definition by important actors themselves of conflict issues in ethnic terms. Simultaneously, this violent conflict exhibits other salient features (which may variously be called political or communal or traditionalist/modern). Accordingly, it appears sensible to analyse such conflict in terms of multiple causality, rather than to attempt to categorise it as singly or primarily ethnic. During this same period, moreover, ethnic leaders within South African society are beginning to make claims, some newly-emergent and some of long standing, on behalf of their communities, thereby expressing new or increased communal self-awareness. Developments along these lines in the new Western Cape province of South Africa form an example. The existence of such ethnic claims is not new to South African history.[4] What is at issue here is the emergence of such claims and conflict during the first half of the 1990s. South Africa, together with most African states to the north, is experiencing strong currents of democratisation during the present decade. As a consequence, in search of a unifying mission, the government of national

unity is introducing a claim for a new form of nationhood, albeit nationhood based on territory rather than on cultural coherence. This claim is directed at nation-building; at a government project intended to accomplish 'a collective act of historical imagination'.[5]

Concurrent claims for new or increased communal self-awareness appear to be encouraged by these currents of democratisation. The dialectics created by these potentially divergent trends are the main focus of this chapter. In societies where perceptions of racial difference are pervasive, these dialectics are complicated even further. As a result of its particular history, contemporary South African society is a prime example. This added element of cultural pluralism probably increases the conflict potential in the society.

The rest of this chapter comprises six sections. The first section introduces the notions of ethnicity, race and nationalism as they are employed in comparative literature. The second section traces in broad-brush strokes the main features of violent conflict in South African history during the first and second periods identified above.

The third section addresses the process of negotiations during the early 1990s which culminated in the establishment of the new South African GNU: it is entitled 'The South African Miracle'. The fourth section addresses the new form of violent conflict and communal mobilisation which appeared during the same period: it bears the title 'Shadows Across the Miracle'. The fifth section outlines the development of a brown ('Coloured') identity in the new Western Cape province.

The sixth section brings the chapter to a close, identifying and analysing present strategies being used in South African society to regulate the dialectics created by the potentially divergent trends highlighted in third, fourth and fifth sections.

Ethnicity, Race and Nationalism

It has become standard practice, among many scholars and analysts of modern plural societies, to interpret social and political movements in terms of ethnicity, race and nationalism. As a working definition, ethnicity may be viewed as linked, albeit not strictly, to claimed ties of birth, blood and marriage. For an individual, this identity is usually difficult to change - and accordingly includes some element of ascription - and relates to both individual and to group origins. In short, ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry.

In plural societies, it is seen by an increasing number of scholars to be a primary factor underlying sustained conflict. Consider the following recent reflection by three respected scholars of political conflict. In a paper written for United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation on ethnicity, development and democracy, three scholars declare as follows:

> Of all the factors that influence the social and political systems of Third World countries, none perhaps is more important than ethnicity. The very future of some countries as united sovereign states is in doubt due to ethnic conflicts. In many others, political order is difficult to establish and social and economic developments are bedevilled by ethnic differences. In many parts of the globe, ethnic minorities suffer appalling discrimination and live in fear. Ethnic conflicts frequently spill over across state boundaries and threaten international peace. The correct and creative handling of the tensions and conflicts which arise from ethnic differences has become a supreme test of statesmanship in most countries of the world, particularly in the Third World.[6]

A comprehensive survey of approaches to ethnicity and ethnic conflict will not be attempted here. But it is useful to draw a number of distinctions. Some scholars tend toward a primordial perspective, arguing that the ascriptive nature of ethnic identity is deep and is rooted in groups' claims to common ancestry and to the shared memories and symbols of this ancestry. Others point to the constructed aspects of this identity and the continuing re-invention - for reasons that ought to be sought elsewhere, through materialist and political analysis - of shared history and solidarity. One scholar has written:

> By fixing attention mainly on the great dimensions and 'fault lines' of religion, customs, language, and institutions, we run the risk of treating ethnicity as something primordial and fixed. By concentrating solely on the attitudes and sentiments and political movements of fixed *ethnie* or ethnic fragments, we risk being so caught up in the day-to-day ebb and flow of ethnic phenomena that we see them as wholly dependent 'tools' or 'boundary markers' of other social and economic forces.[7]

Two points about this debate can be made. It does not seem useful to opt exclusively for one of the two approaches, to take sides, as it were. Both persisting historical elements, contemporary situational and constructed factors, as well as their interaction with one another need to be considered. The second point flows from the first: without a historical analysis underpinning explanations given for ethnic conflicts, explanations will tend to be superficial and often faulty. As has been argued elsewhere:

> As a source of conflict, ethnicity takes its coloration from the specific

circumstances of time and society. It is difficult to pin it down as an independent variable in the ordering of social, political and economic life... Ethnicity is (also) highly manipulable: indeed its very existence can be conjured out of vague bonds and symbols of association. There is a dynamic quality to ethnic relations which suggests that more attention should be paid to history than is customary in the study of ethnic relations.[8]

A second distinction is also necessary. The notion of ethnicity is intimately linked to the ideas of nationalism and of race. Nationalism is an ideology which claims that groups (identified as 'nations') have the right to form territorial states. It is immediately apparent that ethnic movements which are based on claims of common ancestry will often develop nationalist claims. What difference, if any, exists between these two phenomena? Equally, if race is defined as a social or cultural construct established through perceived group differences based on physical or morphological characteristics, is a movement based on common racial characteristics different from an ethnic movement based on claims of common ancestry?

With regard to ethnicity and nationalism, it is relevant to note that ethnic movements often do *not* make nationalistic claims.[9] The political programme to set up separate territorial states may be irrelevant or impractical; the purpose may be the reallocation of state resources; and the competition may be with other ethnic fragments in a plural society. While sharing features with nationalist movements, ethnic movements do not necessarily include claims to sovereignty, to full territorial independence for the national community.

Simultaneously, it is also relevant to note that ethnic claims and ethnic programmes will often incorporate strong emergent nationalistic tendencies, tendencies which seek sovereignty for the ethnic community. Such tendencies may lead to changes in these ethnic claims and ethnic programmes - changes which, at the limit, involve claims for control and domination of the state; or for secession, partition, or irredentism. Accordingly, though intimately associated, ethnicity and nationalism need to be distinguished from one another, and subsequently, in each separate case being addressed, related to one another, where appropriate.

The case of race and ethnicity is different. Racial consciousness is a form of ethnic pluralism which is rooted in domination and in stratification and originates in organised systems of labour exploitation. Contemporary South African society is a prime example. Scholars who claim that racial conflict differs from other forms of ethnic conflicts are dealing with ranked ethnic groups in societies which have developed systems of racial categorisation largely coinciding with systems of group stratification. It is as a consequence of the history and circumstances of these societies, not of the racial

constructs and beliefs themselves, that racial conflict appears to be different from other forms of ethnic conflicts.

This argument implies an inclusive notion of ethnicity which comprises perceived group differences identified not only by language, by religion, or by some other (non-physical) characteristics common to the group, but also by colour. Colour ('race') tends to become an important indicator or marker of group difference in societies where class differences and colour differences have come to overlap. The fact that perceived race may arouse intense emotions and is often viewed as indelible and immutable, has led some scholars to distinguish between ethnic and racial groups in principle, but counter-examples[10] as well as the advantage of comparative analysis justify the more inclusive notion of ethnicity.

This short overview raises as many questions as it was intended to address. As a source of conflict, ethnicity does not appear to be amenable to comparative analysis, and its emergence remains elusive. It also appears often to be intertwined with nationalist currents. The most useful conclusion to draw at this stage, accordingly, is to heed the call for specific historical analysis of the case under scrutiny. This is the aim of the next sections of this chapter.

The added element of racial consciousness in South Africa further complicates the search for understanding. The overlap between racial and class differences - the main historical reason for the rise of a racial consciousness - points to the need for an explanation which goes beyond 'ethnicity' on its own, that is for an explanation which also includes socio-economic and political analyses. The most useful conclusion here appears to be the need for an analysis of the multiple - rather than single - causes of contemporary conflict in South Africa.

Finally, what indicators of ethnic tensions and ethnic conflict exist? When ought political claims and conflicts to be classified as 'ethnic'? The most useful response appears to be when important actors themselves define these claims and conflicts in ethnic terms.

Macro-conflict in South Africa

❒ Introduction

The purpose of this broad historical overview is two-fold. First, as was made clear in the preceding section, an adequate understanding of conflict exhibiting ethnic features requires historical analysis. Secondly, such

historical analysis is necessary background for a better understanding of both the South African 'miracle' and the shadows falling across it. The 'miracle' refers to the relatively peaceful establishment in 1994 of a new democratic government in the country, against the backdrop of domestic as well as international expectations that the country would be plunged into an 'inevitable' black-white racial conflict. The shadows refer to continuing communal conflict in certain regions of the country, primarily in KwaZulu-Natal.

The analysis will focus on two periods of South African history. Before the beginning of the twentieth century, macro-conflict took place between colonising European powers and their settlers, on the one hand, and a number of pre-industrial, primarily pastoral, African societies and their states, on the other. The second period involved conflict rooted in a rapidly industrialising society, conflict revolving around attempts at the political incorporation into South African society of the excluded majority of the population.

European colonisation and the destruction of pre-industrial African states

> *'The Cattle-Killing (of 1856) was born partly out of Xhosa frustration at colonial domination and partly out of the hope awakened by the news that the Russians had beaten the English... (The prophetess) Nongqawuse said that she had met with a "new people" from over the sea, who were the ancestors of the living Xhosa. They told her that the dead were preparing to rise again, and wonderful new cattle too, but first the people must kill their cattle and destroy their corn ....'*[11]

During the late eighteen and nineteenth centuries, a number of pre-industrial African states were being established in the country. The Pedi, Swazi, Southern Tswana, Zulu and Xhosa states are examples.[12] Dutch (and subsequently British) migrants settled in the Cape, in the south of the country, thereby alienating land from indigenous Khoi societies. A slave-based agricultural system was established in the eighteenth century. Simultaneously, settlers began to moved north- and eastwards in search of more land for stock-farming, of game to hunt, and of other resources and commodities for their subsistence and for trade with Europe. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the British Government incorporated the southern part of the country into its Empire and, as was happening elsewhere in that empire, the flag followed colonists and trade.

After the discovery of commercial diamond and gold opportunities in the north of the country, towards the end of the nineteenth century, British power incorporated the rest of present-day South Africa into its Empire. This

incorporation required a major imperial war against the Boer republics which had been established during the second half of the century by descendants of the original Dutch (and German) settlers who had trekked into the interior of the country. This violent imperial incident which contributed substantially to the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism in the twentieth century, coincided with the destruction of the pre-industrial African states in the region.

The economies of these African states revolved around cattle-farming and cultivation, especially of maize. In a study of the destruction of the Zulu kingdom in the second half of the nineteenth century, the author describes aspects of such an economy as follows:

> The majority of the Zulu were still held firmly in the different production communities of the kingdom, moving from one type to another as they grew older and their status altered. The boys worked in their fathers' homesteads before establishing homesteads of their own, while the girls worked in their fathers' homesteads before establishing their own production units within their husbands' homesteads. Of course external forces had affected the Zulu increasingly as settler communities became established on the borders of the kingdom. Nevertheless throughout the reigns of the kings, Zulu labour expended within the commoners' homesteads continued to support the bulk of the population, and the surplus which was drawn from them by the king ... created the basis for his material power and authority.[13]

Conflict during this period took on two major forms. In the first place, conflict took place on the 'frontier', zones where intermittent colonisation took place and where little state authority was present. Under conditions of such ambiguity and uncertainty, conflict between colonisers and indigenous people was endemic. Opposing claims to land, disputes over trade and labour arrangements were complicated by divergent cultural and linguistic practices.[14] As the colonists moved north and the frontiers closed, settlers occupied some of the land left behind, and the colonial governments instituted indirect rule in what was left of the African states. In the second place, direct conflict took place between imperial forces and armies of African states. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, major British campaigns were waged in the Eastern Cape against Xhosa armies, in KwaZulu-Natal against Zulu armies, and in the north against the Pedi kingdom. As in the case of frontier conflict, after the destruction of these African states, settlers occupied some of the land left behind, and the colonial government instituted indirect rule in what was left of these African societies. This incorporation of pre-industrial societies was undertaken in the name of British civilising colonialism, a mission aimed at colonising the minds of indigenous South Africans, and in the name of settler colonialism, a mission

designed to dispossess these people of their land and to enable British (and Afrikaner) settlers to put down roots in the country.[15] The presence of the Afrikaners, the Boers, against whom imperial war had to be waged to achieve these two missions, complicated the British project. For Afrikaners, whilst generally favouring the settler colonial policy, questioned incorporation within the British civilising colonial mission.

Black reaction to conquest was more complicated. There were various millenarian movements in the late nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century, separatist Christian churches were established and flourished. African languages which were gradually codified, remained the main medium of communication in rural and most urban communities. In those areas of the country where indirect rule had been instituted, pastoral and agrarian life continued, albeit under the requirement of payment of regular cash taxes. Accordingly, an increasing number of blacks joined the industrial and urban labour force and thereby contributed in a critical manner to South Africa's process of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation during the twentieth century.

Macro-conflict in Urban and Industrial Society

> *'A society which moved from rural Africa to urbanized and industrialized South Africa within three quarters of a century, if not less'.* [16]

During the twentieth century, as part of the British Empire, South Africa rapidly developed a modern economic system. Mineral resources of increasing international importance had been discovered early in this period and major mining projects followed immediately. Together with agricultural commodities, their export launched this development. From the 1920s, the white South African Government promoted domestic manufacturing, a sector which has grown steadily in importance, especially after the Second World War. This process of industrial development was accompanied by a related process of urbanisation. By 1990, one half of all South Africans were urban dwellers, most living in one of the four metropolitan areas of the country.

Black South Africans joined and were drawn into this developing economy in ever increasing numbers. Initially on white-owned commercial farms - land colonised by settlers during the previous century - and in mines, and subsequently in manufacturing, their increasing involvement in the labour market reflected the process sketched above. Their presence in South African cities and towns expanded in parallel.

Three primary political developments took place during this period. First,

the South African Government which had from its inception in 1909 been elected by an overwhelmingly white electorate, formally instituted itself in the early 1950s as a white Government, elected by white South Africans alone. This statutory racist element became one of the two ideological cornerstones of apartheid. Secondly, since a majority of this electorate was Afrikaner, this Government demanded independence from the British Empire and Crown, deciding in 1961 to break all ties and establish a Republic, thereby realising the mission of Afrikaner nationalism whose supporters dominated the government from that point on.

Thirdly, in what was the second ideological apartheid cornerstone, there was the establishment of a series of separate 'homelands' for different black South African communities. Located mainly in areas where the remnants of nineteenth-century African societies persisted, governed and financed by the central state officials, these apartheid homelands were designed to justify the exclusion of black South Africans from participation in the central political system and from permanent residence in South African cities by creating, for them, separate government-defined ethnic states within the country.

Black reaction to these processes of increasing economic incorporation and sharpening political and residential exclusion changed from acquiescence and negotiation to political and economic action, and, finally, from the mid-nineteen-seventies to nineteen-ninety, to resistance and violent confrontation with the South African state, both domestically as well as from exile. The black anti-apartheid movement used two primary justifications for its opposition, resistance and armed struggle against the apartheid government. The first, the democratic project, espoused most clearly and consistently by the ANC, was that of establishing a non-racial democracy in the country. In order to achieve this, against a recalcitrant and powerful state, the means chosen was that of armed struggle, in partnership with the working class, the oppressed urban communities within the country, with foreign support from the Soviet bloc and its allied Communist ideology.

The second, the Africanist project, espoused most clearly and consistently by the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Black Consciousness (BC) Movement, sought political emancipation and individual worth through the common identity of being African. It was through solidarity and mobilisation as Africans that national freedom would be achieved. The BC movement extended the definition of 'African' to 'black', thereby including Coloureds and Indians in the dispossessed group, and emphasised the positive, conscientising identity of being-black. Throughout the period of anti-apartheid struggle leading up to 1994, an uneasy alliance between these movements was maintained, the one broadcasting a non-racial inclusionary political ideal, the other a political ideal in which black renaissance was held to be a precondition for full democratic inclusion.

Though the time leading up to this period of resistance and violent confrontation was not without strife, it is striking how much more political violence took place during the last decade of this period of South African history. To illustrate, during the five year period from 1984 to 1988, it was reported that over 4000 people were killed in incidents of civil unrest, the majority of them black urban residents; approximately 45 000 people were detained without trial; insurgent actions of various kinds by the ANC increased from 44 in 1984 to 209 in 1988; and there was a virtual breakdown of, and rebellion against the system of black education, as well as of township and local government structures.[17]

Macro-conflict during this period was guided by a single theme, a principle which was sweeping the globe during the same period. It was the imperative of democratic inclusion of all societal groups into a single nation-state. Simultaneously, in South Africa, struggle over this principle was refined by two allied, equally universal, sub-themes: the quests for non-racialism and for an inclusive nationalism in a modern plural society.

☐ The South African Miracle

At the close of the 1980s, South Africa appeared poised on the edge of an abyss. Embroiled in a seemingly unwinnable war in Namibia against Angolan and Cuban troops, stretched to its limit in the black townships of its cities and towns, the state security establishment had only succeeded in maintaining order through increasingly brutal means. Civil unrest had turned the country into a series of beleaguered communities and was causing serious damage to the country's open economy. Internationally, apartheid had become a major international problem and few governments were prepared to engage positively with the South African Government.

Black resistance was likewise in turmoil. The ANC-in-exile was married to a Marxist strategy of armed struggle against a militarily-unbeatable opponent. Urban insurrection in the country was taking on increasingly divergent and brutal faces. Continued struggle between the two evenly-matched protagonists increasingly took on the form of a battle of attrition, pointing toward a downward spiral where all in the country would be the losers.

Two events were critical to the breaking of the log-jam. The first was the demise of the Soviet Union and the rapid dissolution of its superpower status, dismantling and dissipating its supportive institutions, resources and ideological underpinnings. The second was a purely domestic matter. The National Party (NP) - the governing party in the country over the past forty years - changed leadership and elected a new leader and State President who had few ties with the state security establishment. These two events acted upon one another. With promises of support from Western governments, the

NP decided in 1990 to launch a process of negotiations with its primary protagonists, the banned black resistance movements and their leaders.

The period of negotiations which led to the establishment in 1994 of the first South African government elected on popular franchise was characterised by a series of violent events reflecting the two sub-themes identified in the previous section: the quests for non-racialism and for an inclusive nationalism in a modern plural society. Attacks on white persons, on predominantly white institutions (such as churches and places of entertainment) were examples of the Africanist consciousness manifesting itself in a period lacking institutionalised forms of popular expression. Equally, incidents of white separatist Afrikaner insurrection were numerous, culminating in acts of sabotage immediately before the general elections.

The main negotiating parties sought compromise, not only among themselves but also with these movements. The compromise was located within the idiom of the major macro-conflict theme of twentieth century South Africa: that of achieving non-racial democratic inclusion at a national level. Thus, major efforts were made to involve parties within both the PAC and BC movements within the negotiating process, and the primary negotiators agreed to continued negotiations with Afrikaner separatists, after the general elections, on possible partition of the country.

These concessions, particularly by the NP regarding the Africanist project, and by the ANC regarding the Afrikaner separatist project, appear to have been successful for neither radical Africanist nor Afrikaner separatist movements have become salient since. Nor has any overt racially-based movement developed. By agreeing to, and establishing, over an initial five-year period, a government of national unity under an interim constitution, the ANC and the NP appear to have facilitated a transition largely devoid of divisive racial or nationalist fissures. In these regards, optimistic international expectations for democratisation in the post-cold war era seem to be on track in South Africa.

❒ Shadows across the 'Miracle'

> *'Why has a seemingly inevitable black-white racial conflict been replaced with much more wide-spread inter-black violence?'*[18]

During the twentieth century, South Africa appears to have passed through a reasonably clearly defined period of change:

- rapid industrialisation and urbanisation;
- increasing economic inclusion of black South Africans in these processes;

- increasing political and residential exclusion of black South Africans from these processes;
- increasing resistance and struggle by the excluded majority against the Afrikaner nationalist government and its apartheid policy; and
- the establishment of a democratically-elected national government, the main mission of which is to institute equity, reconciliation and prosperity in the society.

Macro-conflict, particularly during the 1980s and early 1990s, has generally been interpreted within the context of this type of change:

- struggles over racial and political discrimination;
- struggles over access to economic wealth and security; and
- struggles over capitalist and Communist, Afrikaner nationalist and African nationalist, ideologies.

From the late 1980s, however, a new form of conflict has emerged in South Africa. The overwhelming majority of participants and of victims in this conflict have been urban blacks. Over the past eight years, some 15 000 deaths resulting from this conflict have been recorded. The objectives of the combatants appear to cover a bewildering range of local issues: struggles over local community control, over land, over access to local scarce resources, over allegiance to traditional or to modern leaders and institutions.

In KwaZulu-Natal, where the conflict is mainly found, its cycle peaked during 1990, the year during which the political process of national negotiations was launched, and peaked again in early 1994 immediately prior to the general elections.[19] After these elections, the conflict appears to be persisting. From 1990, moreover, Zulu immigrant communities in Johannesburg and its environs have become involved in a series of related conflicts during which confrontation took place along lines defined in explicit ethnic (Zulu/non Zulu) terms.

One major interpretation of this conflict points to competition for grass-roots Zulu support between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The latter party - based in KwaZulu-Natal - has developed an ideology and policy which amalgamates a liberatory with an ethnically explicit programme of action: democratic values are promoted within the context of respect for traditional Zulu leadership and values. More recently, following the provincial electoral victory by the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal, the new provincial government has been promoting the idea of renaming the province the kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal.

Building on an older Zulu cultural movement, the IFP was launched in the 1970s by Chief Buthelezi, the then Chief Minister of the homeland of KwaZulu. It refined and broadcast its liberatory and cultural programme from within this homeland ambit and soon found itself at loggerheads with the liberation strategies of the ANC-in-exile. By the mid-1980s, this relationship had deteriorated into one of enmity and bitterness. During the negotiation period of the 1990s, the IFP withdrew from national negotiations and was accordingly party neither to the drafting of the interim constitution nor to agreements on the form the government of national unity would take.

The province of KwaZulu-Natal is dominated economically by the city of Durban within which close to one half of its eight million residents live. Over the past two decades large numbers of rural Zulu-speaking families have migrated into the city and most live in shanty towns in its periphery. Simultaneously, the city has developed a large industrial sector in which a substantial black working class has taken root. Outside of Durban, the province comprises large areas of the former homeland of KwaZulu in which Zulu rural families live in poverty, dependent upon family members working in cities and mines elsewhere.

A number of scholars of Zulu history have pointed to the persistence of Zulu cultural symbols and identities which have accompanied this process of industrialisation and urbanisation. J. Guy, for instance, concluded his work on the destruction of the Zulu kingdom with the following words: 'The Zulu nationalist movement today, whose leaders are in many cases the direct descendants of the men who fought the civil war, and who draw consciously on the Zulu past, is a force which will still affect the course of southern African history'.[20] A second example is as follows:

> Chiefs, indunas, sangomas, and shack-lords present (the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal) as a legitimate defence of a traditional order. Their large clientele has little option other than to fall in line....
>
> The call for cultural revival is heeded because the most deprived among the Zulu people search for responses to their humiliation. An escape into a mythical [past] of pride and success in battle provides the dignity that most of the hostel dwellers and unemployed migrants have lacked. In this predicament, tribal loyalty carries with it a badge of honour. Only those with a more secure identity of a different kind consider the tribal collective to be a badge of shame.[21]

Scholars have also pointed to the military metaphors which have often accompanied these symbols. An example is as follows:

> The significance of Zulu ethnic associations and cultural nationalism in

diffusing class-based organisations and fracturing national movements is no new phenomenon....

In 1937, the Zulu Cultural Society was founded by Albert Luthuli, later to become President of the ANC and a winner of the Nobel Prize....

> [This society's] own glorification of a Zulu cultural identity was as much shaped by elements of popular consciousness coming from below as it was a shaping force in the making of that consciousness... The problem for Africans in Zululand and Natal, however, was the ways in which a pre-colonial past provided military metaphors for mobilization.[22]

Inadequate though these remarks may well be to explain the rise of this new form of conflict and violence in contemporary South Africa, they do suggest that these shared and reconstructed memories are powerful indicators of the potential for new forms of ethnic identity and solidarity in a society experiencing strong currents of democratisation, and in a society presently seeking stability by means of nation-building.

☐ The emergence of a Brown identity in the Western Cape

> *'We are the dispersed Khoi*
> *scattered reflections*
> *in the arteries of Africa*
> *We are the tributaries*
> *of many rivers merged*
> *yet still flowing*
> *towards a new destiny.'*[23]

The population of the new Western Cape province is in excess of four million. Most members of this resident population speak Afrikaans as their home language. Most are brown South Africans, and the overwhelming majority are urban residents with close to nine out of ten inhabitants living either in Cape Town or in a provincial town. The panoramic setting, natural harbour, and strategic historical position of this city have led to rapid urbanisation, with its current population of over three million having doubled in the last fifteen years. It is both the economic hub and the centre of the province.[24]

This unusual urban-rural demography of the province as a whole has been brought about by two sets of related factors. First, rural land was and remains held under individual tenure, overwhelmingly in white hands. There has never been a black homeland in the Western Cape and urban-rural migration for brown and white South Africans has been unimpeded by government restrictions throughout this century.

Secondly, migration of black South Africans, directed as it was country-wide by influx control measures, was strictly regulated from the 1950s in the province by the Coloured Labour Preference policy, a policy designed by the erstwhile National Party government to maintain a rigid ceiling on the small proportion of black residents in the Western Cape. This policy was scrapped in the mid-1980s. During the past decade, accordingly, as information regarding the Western Cape's good economic performance and levels of living became generally available, significant migration streams of Xhosa-speakers hailing from the Eastern Cape province were directed toward the province. This large population shift appears to have peaked in the early 1990s. These new Western Cape families - mainly poor households with a rural past - have settled primarily in the Cape Town metropolitan area where their numbers are approaching three-quarters of a million. Accordingly, Cape Town's recent demographic growth reveals more rapid increases among its poorer, black and brown communities than among its better-off communities.

These demographic shifts identify a new cultural challenge for the province. There are more black than white Western Cape residents today. In meetings where most people present have become accustomed to an easy Afrikaans/English form of communication, the use of the Xhosa language is increasingly being requested since Cape Town and the Western Cape are considered by many Xhosa-speakers as part of their hinterland. Most members of majoritarian brown communities voted in the April 1994 general election for the National Party rather than for the African National Congress, and accordingly appear to be developing for themselves a narrower brown (albeit ambiguous) identity rather than a more comprehensive national one. In these brown communities, there are indications that anxiety and suspicion are growing regarding affirmative action strategies and urban residential developments addressing the needs of poor black communities.[25] There has been little contact over the years between brown and black communities, located as they were in separate group areas. In black communities, there are also indications that the consequences of Coloured Labour Preference remain squarely in residents' minds and that some form of redress is expected. White Afrikaans residents who have also had little contact with black South Africans, seem retiring and silent about this cultural challenge, unable to develop a new provincial vision or identity compatible with their Afrikaner culture.

In the 1994 election, the new National Party succeeded in gaining majority control in the provincial government and appears today to be most receptive to its brown and white constituencies. Provincial ANC structures - in contrast to their national counterparts - seem to lack party political capacity and their provincial leaders have enjoyed neither a successful nor a particularly wholesome track record.

The question of a Coloured identity is accordingly salient. Coloured cultural movements are being launched, conferences are being held[26] and national and provincial politicians prbably intend mobilising around the issue. This process adds a significant new factor to South Africa's nation-building project.

Conclusion

'We are both humbled and elevated by the honour and privilege that you, the people of South Africa, have bestowed on us, as the first President of a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa, to lead our country out of the valley of darkness. We understand it still that there is no easy road to freedom.'[27]

Without a democratic culture to direct and regulate it through institutional processes, macro-conflict in South Africa has tended to be violent, suppressed during certain periods by various means, and playing itself out by force during others. Today, drawn as it is into international currents of democratisation, this society's potential for violent conflict remains.

Potential lines of conflict follow the cleavages identified above: ethnic differences, especially where these are perceived to coincide with felt group deprivation; racial differences, especially now that expectations for the rapid removal of racial discrimination and subordination are high; and secessionist claims in a world in which the principle of self-determination has become legitimate. In this new world order, increasingly, representatives of these various groups in South African society, in search of cultural rights, and of equity in access to resources, will no doubt consider mobilisation strategies based upon these felt differences.

How is the GNU addressing this challenge? Racism (and sexism) are constitutionally forbidden. Appointments to its national cabinet display a serious attempt at installing a 'rainbow' leadership. Affirmative action recruitment policies are operative in both the public and private sectors. The charisma and powerful symbolism of the President are consistently used to broadcast non-racial democratic values.

In relation to racist and Afrikaner nationalist cleavages, these techniques have succeeded in the short term. In relation to Zulu ethnic mobilisation, they have been singularly less successful. Faced with a recalcitrant junior partner in the GNU, the IFP, a party which has withdrawn both from post-electoral constitutional negotiations and from local government election planning, the ANC and the President have threatened military and state fiscal

intervention in KwaZulu-Natal to avert further violence. To them, the ethnic challenge appears particularly perverse precisely because it emanates from an historically-oppressed black constituency whose leadership has consistently articulated the values of democratic inclusion, albeit in Zulu cultural context.

The chief manner, however, in which the GNU is addressing the challenge of institutionalising macro-conflict in society is by way of the nation-building project. Built around the scaffolding of the country's emergent constitutionalism - its Bill of Rights, its constitutional court, and its state commitments to equity, to development, and to the eradication of poverty - this government-driven project envisages the rapid growth of a single South African identity and nation which would supplant, at least in the public domain, other identities and forms of incipient group solidarity. Once established, this new national culture would become sovereign, and would justify concerted national action against deviant sub-national ethnopolitical activities.

In such a form this project has little chance of success. The plural nature of South African society defies its viability, particularly under modern democratic conditions. The historical analysis offered here points instead to contemporary racial, ethnic and exclusivist nationalist tendencies with significant historical roots which contest the peaceful emergence of a single national identity and culture. At best, emergent constitutionalism will mitigate the violent consequences of such tendencies. At worst, aggressive government-driven nation-building will exacerbate them.

The alternative path is the nurturing of the constitutionalism which is *presently taking root in the society.* It is possible that these values will take root in a society which continues, possibly more than before, to display changing cultural and ethnic features. Strong sub-national identities are not necessarily incompatible with growing constitutionalism. And growing constitutionalism itself may develop sufficient institutional processes to direct macro-conflict away from its violent past toward a more regulated future.

Nation-building projects in independent Africa have bad track records.[28] As Basil Davidson has put it,

> The fifty or so [African] states of the colonial partition, each formed and governed as though their peoples possessed no history of their own, became fifty or so nation-states formed and governed on European models, chiefly the models of Britain and France. Liberation thus produced its own denial. Liberation led to alienation.[29]

After liberation, South Africa need not follow this path.

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RACISM, XENOPHOBIA AND THE EXTREME RIGHT:

A Five-Country Assessment

Christopher T. Husbands

Introduction

It is of considerable concern that, fifty years after the end of the war against Nazism and fascism, political parties of similar pedigree making deliberate xenophobic and racist appeals to the mass electorate are playing a significant role in the politics of several countries in both western and eastern Europe.[1] It may perhaps seem that the victory thought to have been won against the evils of the earlier Nazi and fascist regimes was not a permanent one, as contemporary racist politics with personal or cultural or ideological links (either direct or implicit) to the right-wing extremisms of the past flourish in a number of countries.[2] Of course, this matter does need perspective; whilst concern about the racist extreme right has increased during the past few years, there were earlier postwar periods of apparent success by extreme right or racist parties which were eventually to prove only temporary (for example, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s or the National Front (NF) in Great Britain in the 1970s). Even so, fifty years after the Second World War, there are still questions to be asked about the racist politics of the current era. General reasons why this resurgence has occurred have already been extensively debated by numerous writers.[3] There are, however, rather more subtle issues about causation, which may have a bearing on the plausibility of some of the more general reasons mentioned in the literature. A further significant question is: to what extent has there been a harmonised 'wave' of extreme right racist politics afflicting western Europe? Second, apart from the question of whether or not any such 'wave' is uniform across a number of different countries, are extreme right racist phenomena a danger or an irritant, considering the political circumstances of the countries concerned? This chapter addresses these separate questions, taking most of its material from the circumstances of five countries.

The first question has to be addressed through examination of levels of, and trends in, mass support for racist political parties in different countries – where relevant in the light of the geographical distribution of such support. This issue may be addressed by inferences from empirical evidence from sources such as regular opinion polls and election returns. The second question may be answered in part by interpretations from the levels and distributional characteristics of support but, as will be argued, it needs the further refinement of examination of the institutional positions of the parties concerned (for example, whether they have a power-broking role, whether they have a well-developed organisational infrastructure, or whether they hold any power at local government level). Specific criteria for assessing the question of danger or irritant are presented.

Much of the analysis and discussion in this chapter focuses on the five west-European countries where, during the 1980s and/or 1990s, there have been unambiguous examples of successful extreme right parties making racism/xenophobia a major, sometimes the major, part of their ideological appeal.[4] It is further intended to concentrate attention on parties that have had a mass appeal sufficient to be captured by opinion-pollsters, although mention will sometimes be made of smaller and (on occasion) more extreme racist parties, as well as of extreme right terrorism, when this derives from or is in some way linked to, mass racist politics.

Particular attention will be devoted to the following cases, which are presented in the order in which the countries concerned saw the emergence of mass racist politics during the 1980s.[5]

- In France: the Front National (FN). This party has had significant support since 1983 and its ratings were being trawled in nation-level opinion-poll data from early 1982.[6]
- In the Netherlands: the Centrumdemocraten (CDs) and, to a lesser degree, the Centrum Partij '86 (CP '86). The Centrum Partij (CP) attracted support in the polls during 1983 and 1984 before a split led to the establishment of the CDs in 1984. The original CP went bankrupt but was re-founded as the CP '86 in 1986.[7] Also intermittently active on the Dutch racist right are the Nederlands Blok (NB), founded by some ex-CD dissidents in 1992, and the Burgerpartij Nederland (BPN).
- In Austria: the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) (which in January 1995 renamed itself merely Die Freiheitlichen (Fs)); this party had a postwar history as a free-market liberal party until its take-over by Jörg Haider in September 1986 marked a turn to xenophobia and a more exclusionist nationalism, which has produced dramatic improvements in its electoral strength.[8]
- In Germany: Die Republikaner (REPs) and, to a lesser degree, the

Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) and the NPD; the REPs have existed since 1983 but emerged as a significant national force after their success in elections for the Berlin House of Deputies in January 1989. After unification the REPs had modest, lesser success in the new regions.[9]

- In Belgium: the Vlaams Blok (VB) in Flanders and, to a lesser degree, the Front National (FN) in Wallonia. The VB was founded in the late 1970s but emerged with particular significance from the indecisive general election of November 1991.[10]

These parties are not all the same, either precisely in ideology or organisation, and at the margin there could be some dispute about whether it is appropriate to label one at least of them (the Fs in Austria) as racist as a principal defining label; however, there is an incontrovertible presence of racist elements in all their programmes. Ethnic hostility operates as a common definitional frame of reference, although there are complications in operationalisation. Actually, most mainstream right-wing political parties (except perhaps their minimalist-state protagonists) favour ethnic exclusionism (even if the ethnic dimension needs decoding). However, all the parties being considered as racist are inclined to be ethnic-expulsionist, favouring policies that *de facto* or *de jure* would reduce the indigenous presence of particular ethnic minorities. This is their *raison d'être* for most of their mass supporters (whose virulent racism in the case of parties like the FN, the REPs or the VB distinguishes them from mainstream right-wing supporters). However, even with this racism criterion, ambiguities persist: supporters of the Austrian FPÖ, for example, are not distinguished attitudinally by their racism from supporters of other Austrian parties.[11] The Dutch CDs are much opposed to the presence of Turks and Moroccans but are less exercised about the Surinamese with legitimately acquired Dutch passports, although a 1970s forerunner of the CDs, the Nederlandse Volksunie, was different in being overtly hostile to Surinamese and Antillianese.

Does extreme right racism come in 'waves'?

There has been much hyperbolic reference during the past few years to a so-called 'wave' of extreme right xenophobic/racist growth across western Europe, almost as though there were an inexorable trend for such movements in each west European country to have similarly expanding growth trajectories. When one examines electoral trends in different countries, however, varied patterns emerge. This is apparent from the data presented in Figure 1 and also from the more refined analyses in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The basic data used in this analysis are the available monthly opinion-poll results collected by respective polling agencies in the five countries concerned.[12]



Figure 1 Percentage quarterly opinion-poll support for racist political parties in five west European countries, 1982-94

In the following analyses two time-unit bases are used: monthly data and quarterly data, calculated as unweighted means from the respective three months' figures of the monthly series. Clearly, monthly data contain some random error that will be reduced in the quarterly series, but the latter still permit inference about short-term and long-term components of each series.[13]

In Figure 1 the available series of each country's quarterly data are presented in order to provide an initial global view of the attractiveness of racist politics between 1982 and 1994. The quarterly series have been used in order to increase clarity; the monthly series offer a similar overall picture, of course, except that it is more cluttered by the threefold plenitude of individual data-points.

It is immediately apparent that the racist/xenophobic right has been conspicuously more successful in certain of the five countries than in others. Second, the trajectories of support in various countries are not necessarily in harmony, an issue which is analysed later using a more sophisticated methodology. In France support for the FN has grown steadily since the mid-1980s, albeit with occasional temporary reverses of fortune. In Austria and Belgium (Flanders) there have been steady growth trajectories since the late-1980s, although it will be shown formally that the two series have not wholly covaried. In the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany the picture has been much more variable.

One preliminary inference to be drawn from Figure 1 is that the factors affecting levels of support for racist parties are often country-specific rather than being a manifestation of a Europe-wide Zeitgeist. Despite contacts between some of these parties' leaderships, mass support tends to ebb and flow according to country-level factors. The only slight exception to this observation is the tendency (though not universal) for right-wing racist parties to do well in European Parliament elections (for example, the REPs in 1989 and the VB in 1989 and 1994), these being 'second-order elections'.[14] There are exceptions, however; for example, the FN's best performances have not necessarily been in European elections; indeed, its 10.5 per cent in June 1994 was rather a setback.

The year 1992 was perhaps the best one for across-the-board performance by racist parties; since then there has been a clear divergence in levels of support so that, in mid-1995, the five countries concerned are clearly to be distinguished as two groups. In Austria, France and Belgium (Flanders) these parties are strongly implanted in their respective political landscapes, whereas in both old and new regions of Germany and in the Netherlands they are increasingly marginal. In Table 1, by way of summary, are presented basic univariate statistics, both for the quarterly series used in Figure 1 and

for the monthly series from which the former was derived. Again, the cases of France, Austria and Belgium (Flanders) clearly distinguish themselves, emphasising especially in the case of Austria just how far the party concerned has come in public appreciation during the past decade – from near-oblivion to being one of the three serious protagonists on the Austrian political stage.

Before exploring further the structure among these data, it will assist understanding if some observations are made about what may underlie the individual trends revealed in each of the five countries.

Table 1 Various univariate statistics of quarterly and monthly opinion-poll percentage support for racist parties in five west-European countries across relevant time-periods[1]

1. Quarterly data

	France	Nether-lands (1)	Nether-lands (2)	Austria	FRG (old regions)	FRG (new regions)	Belgium (Flanders)
Mean	9.4	0.9	2.0	11.9	3.4	2.0	9.0
Standard deviation	3.4	0.6	1.4	5.1	2.3	1.3	2.9
Maximum	15.3	1.9	5.0	22.0	7.5	4.0	13.0
Minimum	3.0	0.1	0.5	2.1	1.0	0.5	4.4
Time-period	82.2-95.2	83.1-86.4	90.1-95.1	86.1-95.1	89.1-94.3	90.4-94.3	90.1-94.4

2. Monthly data

	France	Nether-lands) (1)	Nether-lands (2)	Austria	FRG (old regions) (1)	FRG (old regions (2)	FRG (new regions)	Belgium Flanders
Mean	9.3	0.9	2.0	12.0	3.1	4.4	2.8	9.0
Standard deviation	3.4	0.6	1.4	5.2	2.5	2.1	1.2	3.0
Maximum	17.0	2.0	5.6	23.0	10.0	8.0	5.0	13.4
Minimum	3.0	0.0	0.1	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.5
Time-period	82.4 -94.12	83.1 -86.12	90.1 -95.3	86.1 -95.4	89.1 -91.4	92.3 -94.9	92.3 -94.8	89.12 -94.12

Note
The parties concerned are: France, the *Front National*; The Netherlands (1), the *Centrum Partij*; The Netherlands (2), the *Centrumdemocraten*; Austria, the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (since January 1995 *Die Freiheitlichen*); the Federal Republic of Germany, *Die Republikaner*; and Belgium (Flanders),

France

The FN was founded in 1972 but emerged from the political wilderness only in 1983 with some moderate successes in the municipal elections in March (for example, in Paris' 20th arrondissement) and later in by-elections in several places, including Dreux (west of Paris). Even in 1982, however, it was apparently supported by around 3 per cent of the French electorate and, after its 1984 European Parliament election success, support grew steadily as it consolidated a core of loyal voters. In the mid-1980s its standing was rather below 10 per cent, falling away a little for a short time after 1988, when its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, failed to be seen as a king-maker after his undoubted first-ballot success in the 1988 Presidential contest and after the FN was all but removed from the National Assembly when new legislative elections were called in 1988. However, by the early 1990s its support was regularly in excess of 10 per cent, one significant dip being associated with Le Pen's ill-considered support for Saddam Hussein around the time of the Gulf War in late 1990/early 1991. During 1992 and into 1993 there was also some falling-away, despite the buoyant support for racist parties elsewhere. However, during 1994 the trend was upward and, as the April 1995 Presidential first-ballot contest showed, the FN (or rather its leader) can mobilise 15 per cent of the electorate when circumstances are propitious.

The Netherlands

Despite some recent concern in the Netherlands about the importance of the CDs, Dutch extreme right racism is one of the less significant examples of the phenomenon. There had been a flurry of support in the early 1980s for the CP, which preceded even the take-off by the FN in France and reflected the use of the immigration theme as an electoral mobiliser, following the example of the NF in Great Britain in the 1970s. The CP fell apart in acrimony but the CDs re-emerged on the electoral scene in 1989. The data of the Nederlandse Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie en het Marktonderzoek show support rising steadily to 5 per cent of reported votes in late 1993, fuelled by moral panics about illegal immigration and asylum-seekers and by the notorious Minderhedendebat in Dutch politics in 1991 and 1992.[15] However, even this modest success has been followed by decline. By the European Parliament elections of June 1994 the CDs were in serious disarray for a number of reasons. One was as a consequence of a television programme called Deadline broadcast on 29 April 1994 in which one of the party's Amsterdam councillors had revealed, in an interview with an undercover freelance reporter who was using a concealed recorder, that he had carried out arson attacks in 1977 and 1979 against premises used for ethnic minorities; another reason was an increasing disenchantment among activists at the uncompromisingly authoritarian style of the party's leader, Hans Janmaat. The CDs, and to a lesser degree CP '86, did have some

temporary successes in municipal elections in March 1994. For example, the CDs won 10.2 per cent of votes cast in Rotterdam (with a further 3.5 per cent for CP '86), especially impressive since the electorate in Dutch municipal elections includes non-Dutch residents who are unlikely to have voted CD or CP '86. Also, because the CDs' support is territorially concentrated within the larger cities especially of North and South Holland, there are some neighbourhoods (for example, Feijenoord in Rotterdam) in which well over a quarter of the Dutch resident population must have voted CD or CP '86. Thus, in some inner-city areas, support for the CDs (reflecting associated hostility against Turks and Moroccans) has reached considerable levels – equal to what the British NF was able to obtain in certain local areas in 1976-77.

❒ *Austria*

In both electoral and institutional terms, the FPÖ (now the Fs) is western Europe's most successful extreme right racist party. Founded initially in 1955-56 from the earlier Verband der Unabhängigen, it became a small representative in Austrian politics of free-market liberalism, albeit always having a more self-consciously nationalist wing. Jörg Haider, drawing on his Carinthian power-base, won the leadership in September 1986 at the party's Eighteenth Congress; in a general election in November of that year, the FPÖ won 9.7 per cent of the national vote, almost double its support in the previous April 1983 general election. Haider has now largely purged the party of any free-market liberal influence and after a succession of departures and resignations this wing founded a so-called Liberales Forum in early 1993. This grouping has not affected the FPÖ's opinion-poll popularity (despite its managing around 5 per cent of the vote). In the general election on 11 October 1994 the FPÖ won 22.5 per cent of votes cast overall and its subsequent opinion-poll ratings reveal only a positive response to its pivotal role in the Zusammenbruch into which contemporary Austrian politics have fallen.

❒ *The Federal Republic of Germany*

The REPs were founded in 1983 but by the end of the 1980s had had only modest success and had publicly announced at the end of 1988 that they were concentrating their efforts on Bavaria, particularly the Munich municipal elections of March 1990. However, the REPs' adventitious success in Berlin in January 1989 (when the occupation authorities had forbidden the DVU or NPD from standing) gave them an opening from which they were able to profit for about a year, a period including the 1989 European Parliament elections. However, internal party division and the mainstream right's exploitation of the unification issue lost them support, which was revived quite suddenly by the result in the regional parliament election in Baden-Württemberg in April 1992, an election that took place at the height

of dispute and debate about the political-asylum issue. The reflex effect of this lasted into 1994 but by the federal election they were a spent force, winning only 1.9 per cent of the national vote (2.0 per cent in the old regions and 1.3 per cent in the new ones). Despite expectations before unification that the extreme right would make substantial electoral gains in the east, this did not happen and its support in the new regions is invariably less than in the old ones. The REPs' leader in its halcyon era, Franz Schönhuber, has now been replaced, after internal party feuding, by a less glamorous figure and the party has finally been put under official surveillance by the constitution-protection authorities of the Federal Republic.

❒ *Belgium*

Until recently the VB's success in Flanders (especially around Antwerp, though it has now broken out from this bastion) received rather little international coverage, despite a claim to be considered one of the most successful contemporary extreme right racist parties in western Europe (perhaps competing with the FPÖ for the title). Still, only in the later 1980s, after grafting anti-immigration and anti-Islam themes on to its earlier exclusionist Flemish nationalism, did it make serious region-wide gains, after the early local successes in the Antwerp area. Its trajectory of growth strongly reflects increased support in the light of its success in the Belgian general election in November 1991. In the European Parliament election of June 1994 it won 12.6 per cent of the Flanders vote, though it failed to build on this in the general election of May 1995, despite increasing its total vote compared with November 1991. It won 12.3 per cent of votes cast in the simultaneous vote for the Flemish Council but did pick up 27 per cent in Antwerp. It has been suggested that perhaps the VB has now reached a plateau of support, although predictions of this sort in the past have often proved premature. The FN in Wallonia was established in the mid-1980s in part imitation of its French namesake but only belatedly has it made any impact, winning 7.9 per cent of the Wallonia vote in the Euro-election and, in May 1995, 5.2 per cent in the contest for the Regional Walloon Council. In Brussels, however, the FN's support rose to 7.5 per cent. Unfortunately, its opinion-poll ratings are not published separately, preventing a comparable analysis for Wallonia.

It is now necessary to move to Table 2, in which are time-series correlation coefficients between the available data in each series, for quarterly and monthly figures; the latter, probably because they contain both more random error and also genuine short-term effects, present a slightly more complicated picture than do the quarterly series. Even so, the pattern of coefficients ranges from the highly positive (between the trajectories in France and Austria for both quarterly and monthly data, as well as between Flanders and The Netherlands from 1990 to 1994) and, not unsurprisingly, between

Table 2 Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients among levels of quarterly and monthly opinion-poll percentage support for racist parties in pairs of west-European countries across relevant time-periods[1]

1. Quarterly data

	France	Nether-lands (1)[2]	Nether-lands (2)[3]	Austria	FRG (old regions)	FRG (new regions)	Belgium (Flanders)
France	–	0.820	0.432	0.777	0.486	0.355	0.194
Nether-lands (1)	83.1-86.4	–	–	–	–	–	–
Nether-lands (2)	90.1-95.1	–	–	0.065	0.574	0.631	0.716
Austria	86.1-95.1	–	90.1-95.1	–	- 0.270	- 0.140	0.481
FRG (old regions)	89.1-94.3	–	90.1-94.3	89.1-94.3	–	0.957	0.667
FRG (new regions)	90.4-94.3	–	90.4-94.3	90.4-94.3	90.4-94.3	–	0.680
Belgium (Flanders)	90.1-94.4	–	90.1-94.4	90.1-94.4	90.1-94.3	90.4-94.3	–

2. Monthly data

	France	Nether-lands (1)	Nether-lands (2)	Austria	FRG (old regions) (1)	FRG (old regions) (2)	FRG (new regions)	Belgium Flanders
France	–	0.798	0.098	0.701	0.436	0.011	0.075	0.168
Nether-lands (1)	83.1 -86.12	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Nether-lands (2)	90.1 -95.3	–	–	0.030	0.073	0.036	0.131	0.638
Austria	86.1 -94.12	–	90.1 -95.3	–	- 0.473	-0.040	-0.067	0.413
FRG (old regions) (1)	89.1 -91.4	–	90.1 -91.4	89.1 -91.4	–	–	–	0.276
FRG (old regions) (2)	92.3 -94.9	–	92.3 -94.9	92.3 -94.9	–	–	0.688	- 0.028
FRG (new regions)	92.3 -94.8	–	92.3 -94.8	92.3 -94.8	–	92.3 -94.8	–	-0.142
Belgium (Flanders)	89.12 -94.12	–	90.12 -94.1	89.12 -94.12	89.12 -91.4	92.3 -94.9	92.3 -94.8	–

Notes: 1. Values above the top-left/bottom-right diagonal of these matrices are the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. Entries below the diagonals are the respective time-periods for the corresponding coefficients above the diagonals.
2 The entries for Netherlands (1) are for the *Centrum Partij*.
3 The entries for Netherlands (2) are for the *Centrumdemocraten*.

old and new regions of Germany from late 1990 to early 1994) through to the moderately negative (as between Germany and France and between Germany and Austria in both data-series). Between these extremes are a number of low positive or negative relationships. In order further to explore the structure among these findings, Table 3 presents the results of two principal-components analyses conducted upon matrices of selected appropriate coefficients in Table 2.[16] That based on the quarterly-data coefficients produced a single factor loading France and Austria at the opposite location from The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. The second analysis, on the monthly data, produced two rotated factors. The first one placed France and Austria together on the basis of their opinion-poll trajectories over the past ten years, in contrast to both parts of Germany. The second factor loaded heavily on The Netherlands and Belgium (Flanders), showing that, despite very different levels of overall support for their respective racist parties, the trajectories have been rather similar during most of the period since late 1989. Only the recent demise of the Dutch CDs, occurring at a time of continuing relative buoyancy for the Flemish VB, is the real departure from this relationship. Thus, there has been clearly a

Table 3 Loadings from principal-components analyses of relevant correlation coefficients between quarterly and monthly opinion-poll percentage support for racist parties in five west-European countries, as reported in Table 2[1]

1. Quarterly data

	Factor 1
France	*- 0.994* [2]
Netherlands (2)	*0.927*
Austria	*- 0.871*
FRG (old regions)	*0.982*
FRG (new regions)	*0.984*
Belgium (Flanders)	*0.838*
Percentage of variation explained:	87.4

2. Monthly data

	Factor 1	Factor 2
France	*0.721*	- 0.664
Netherlands (2)	- 0.040	*0.962*
Austria	*0.935*	- 0.247
FRG (old regions) (2)	*- 0.858*	- 0.431
FRG (new regions)	*- 0.917*	- 0.322
Belgium (Flanders)	0.325	*0.896*
Percentage of variation explained:	52.5	40.8

Notes
1 Kaiser normalisation was used and, with the monthly data, the extracted factors were rotated with Varimax rotation.
2 Factor loadings of more than 0.7 or less than 0.7 are italicised.

Flemish/Dutch pattern of racist support that may have been a result of mutual influence; the two parts of Germany share some of this pattern, but France and Austria (at least during the periods that share data-points with the former countries) do not.

Mutual propinquity and the same language may seem the clues to the Flemish/Dutch covariation, except that the same factors fail to produce a similar harmony between Germany and Austria. However, partly because of the minority status of the Dutch language, Flanders and The Netherlands are much more a single cultural community than the larger germanophone area. Moreover, why should France and Austria share similar trajectories over such a long period that are not shared with trends in racist support in other west European countries? Unless, of course (as is more likely), these countries' trends are produced by endogenous factors that happen to have approximately coincided.

Attempts to test for inter-country 'contagion effects', say, with one lead-country setting a pattern for racist politics to be followed by others, produced mixed results. If there were to be such effects, one would predict a stronger relationship between negatively lagged data for the supposed lead-country and unlagged data for the follower-country than that obtained with simultaneous data for each country. As an example, however, negatively lagging the French data and correlating them with unlagged Austrian data (on the ground that well-developed racist politics were first in France and able in theory to offer a lead to other countries) produces lower coefficients than when both countries' series are computed unlagged. Only the Flanders/Netherlands relationship is improved, at least for monthly data, by lagging. If Flanders, with its strong emergence on to the stage of racist politics around 1991, is seen as the lead-country, the monthly-level relationship negatively lagged two months with the unlagged Dutch data rises modestly from 0.638 to 0.681. This is perhaps a further indication of a specific but exceptional Flanders/Dutch pattern.

A final observation on the 'wave' hypothesis of racist political sentiment: were this to occur across different countries, one would predict a similar type of equation providing a best fit for the respective data-series. Developing best-fit equations even for same-time-period subsets of data for different countries in Figure 8.1 shows that different forms of equation (for example, some linear, some quadratic, with slopes varying in steepness and direction) are needed.

The racist extreme right: danger or irritant?

Introduction

What is suggested from the contemporary assessment so far presented is that there are countries where extreme right racism is a mere irritant, from the point of view of the stability of the body politic (say, The Netherlands or the Federal Republic of Germany, despite the latter's sometime international reputation to the contrary), and others where it is a serious player, directly or indirectly, on the political stage (say, Austria, Belgium (Flanders), and France, even if the FN is not now a presence in the National Assembly).

What criteria determine the status of being dangerous as opposed to merely irritating? There can be no simple answer, unfortunately; almost every criterion requires a proviso or qualification or in some cases the obverse may be true. However, below are offered a number of factors to be considered in particular circumstances, although none can be seen as a self-sufficient criterion.

The Level of Mass Support

The analysis in the first part of this chapter was predicated upon the then-unstated assumption that a reasonable minimum of mass support is at least an indication of 'danger' status, though as a necessary rather than sufficient condition. However, other matters being equal, the exact threshold minimum would vary according to the nature of the political system concerned. It might be lower in a proportionally-based system (as in The Netherlands or Belgium), unless there were a threshold hurdle, as in the German case. It might be higher in a first-past-the-post or a double-ballot system. Also, in a system electing on a constituency basis, irrespective of the form of the electoral system, a party with a strong regional base (and thus able to secure election from constituencies in the region concerned) is more significant and, from the present perspective, potentially more dangerous than one with the same level of support evenly spread across the country but unable to win outright in constituency-based voting. However, this regional concentration should not be excessive or the party risks becoming merely a regional eccentricity (as were the fates of the Southern-based States' Rights Party of J. Strom Thurmond in the American Presidential election of 1948 and even of George Wallace's American Independent Party in 1968, although the latter did attract substantial minority support in many non-Southern states).

Of course, if a movement, despite its regional base, can export mayhem beyond the area of its indigenous strength, its potential danger is clearly greater, as the examples of the Basque separatists in Spain and the

Provisional Irish Republican Army/Sinn Fein in the United Kingdom both show. Quite small extreme right racist parties, even ones without any particular local strength, may pose a potential threat if they are associated with, or allied to, terroristically- inclined groups, or if even their existence somehow stimulates terrorist activities. However, as developed modern states are usually capable of containing such dangers, the threat is rather to civil peace than to the institutions of liberal democracy.

❒ The Trend in Mass Support

An extreme right racist party is likely to be more dangerous if its level of support, having reached the respective critical minimum appropriate to the political system in which it is operating, is stable or, better still, increasing. All successful extreme right leaders in the recent history of western Europe have seen the virtue of being regarded universally as growing and expanding; leaders such as Le Pen and Haider, for example, have always appreciated the importance of publicity, almost any publicity, in maintaining and increasing the momentum of support for their party. On the other hand, there are parties such as the CP '86 which have reacted to electoral reverse by resorting to increasingly extreme postures and activities. However, the authorities of the state concerned are usually able to contain any resulting criminality.[17]

❒ The Stability of Mass Support

An extreme right racist party with a significant stable core of loyal supporters having appropriate party identification is a more serious danger than one whose mass support exhibits substantial election-on-election turnover. This is why the French FN, for example, is so much more a threat to the French political system than the REPs ever were to the German one, even when in the ascendant. REP voters do not have the same partisan attachment or party identification as does the FN's core support. Thus, even though there are indeed a large number of adventitious or 'fair-weather' FN voters (including those who boosted Le Pen's first-ballot support in April 1995 to 15 per cent), the fact that they are additions to a more solid base of loyalists still distinguishes the French from the German (or Dutch) cases.

Several studies have shown that support for the FN, for example, has an inter-election loyalty at times greater than that for other French political parties.[18] A similar demonstration has been made with respect to the VB, compared with other parties in Flanders.[19]

❒ The Extent of National Representation

Self-evidently, the level of national representation of an extreme right racist party, as for example seen in seats it holds in the national legislature, reflects

in part its level of national electoral support, at least in systems of proportional representation. It must be said, however, that the odd deputy from the racist extreme right in the national legislature (or even three, as now in the Netherlands) is not a disaster, unless in a situation of stalemate when mainstream parties have been unwilling to work in coalition; this latter danger does not happen in the Netherlands. However, once a critical mass of representation has been reached, the extreme right racist party may be potentially more influential and so more dangerous. Ostracism by other parties and the media, usually pursued with reasonable consistency when extreme right representation is small, becomes a less viable policy. On this criterion the Austrian Fs are clearly a threat, as they form the principal opposition against a somewhat uneasy governing coalition and regularly receive major media coverage. Between November 1991 and May 1995 the Belgian VB, though small in terms of total seats in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, partly qualified because of the brittleness of the government formed by other parties; however, the result of the May 1995 general election is seen as having conferred some much-needed legitimacy and respect on the coalition government led by Jean-Luc Dehaene of the Christliche Volkspartij; the VB now has merely eleven of the 150 seats in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies.

The Extent of Sub-national Representation

Local politics, albeit depending in part on their structure and the forms of representation and election being employed, often offer extreme right racism a far more expanded terrain of insinuation and influence than does the national level; the local arena is a much-neglected theatre of activism for assessing such influence. Whilst it may at first appear, for example, that the French national political system has with impunity excluded and marginalised the FN and its supporters without damage to the national political fabric, the influence of a substantial number of elected representatives and appointees at the regional, cantonal and municipal levels mitigates this optimism. Since at least the mid-1980s there has been a persisting fear that the FN would at some time make a successful breakthrough to win control of a city like Nice or Marseille. For the first time, in the municipal elections of 18 June 1995, in the afterglow of Le Pen's first-round Presidential success in April, the FN was able to do that; in three towns in the south, Toulon, Marignane and Orange, the FN won up to 37 per cent of the second-round vote, enabling the party to nominate the mayor. In Nice, Jacques Peyrat, formally independent but ideologically close to the FN and a former member and confidant of Le Pen, won the mayoralty with 44 per cent of the vote. The local successes of the VB in especially Antwerp and elsewhere have had a major impact upon ethnic tensions in these cities. In Austria the Fs are deeply entrenched on the municipal and regional level, often holding or sharing power. In Carinthia, their historic power base, they are the foremost political force.

On the other hand, the potential influence of even a quite high number of local representatives of the racist extreme right may sometimes be neutralised. The policy of ostracism by other political forces in The Netherlands (maintained despite occasional individual demurrals from within one of the mainstream right-wing parties) has denied it any broker role in mediating deadlocks between other parties. Even in Antwerp the other parties have so far managed to exclude the VB from actual office, although the size of the latter's representation and electoral strength makes this a difficult strategy to maintain. However, in other countries experiences are less salutary. During the past ten years some French Regional Councils have involved FN representatives in the passing of budgets; of course, concessions have been demanded in return. In some Bavarian cities (for example, Augsburg) in the early 1990s the Christlich-Soziale Union was grateful for surreptitious city-council support from REPs deputies in order to stay in power.

❒ The Degree of Influence in Political Agenda-setting

Even when quite insignificant in electoral terms, extreme right racist parties may affect the profile of party space and the distribution of issue preferences, thereby setting political agendas of which mainstream parties must take account. The issues of immigration, political asylum, nationality, naturalisation and the definition of citizenship are all particularly relevant examples. On the other hand, many such attributions of influence may be *ex post facto* accounts of events that would have happened anyway because of jockeying for position between mainstream parties. Immigration, for example, was an issue in British politics before the emergence of the NF, since the Conservative Party had already appropriated it. The political-asylum debate in the Federal Republic of Germany was in full swing before the rise of the REPs and a good case may be made that eventually Article 16, Paragraph 2, of the Basic Law would have been amended anyway. The Dutch *Minderhedendebat* was set in motion by the leader of the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD), Frits Bolkestein, not by the CDs. On the other hand, few can deny the plausibility of the thesis that a search for FN votes was the reason for some of the more outrageous outbursts by mainstream French politicians (such as Jacques Chirac and Valéry Giscard d'Éstaing). This may also explain the various recent anti-Islam initiatives by the former French Minister of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, although some might argue that he would in any case have indulged in such actions, irrespective of perceived pressure from the extreme right.

❒ The Strength of 'Anti-system' Attitudes

Giovanni Sartori labelled parties unwilling to accept the rules of parliamentarism as 'anti-system parties' and Gordon Smith referred to them

as 'non-democratic variants'.[20] Most extreme right racist parties would qualify under the first, if not both, of these designations. The VB, for example, wants to establish a unitary Flemish state with Brussels as its capital. The CDs and CP '86 are repeatedly scathing about the legitimacy of the political system. So is the FN, all but excluded from the National Assembly by the alteration of the electoral system specifically for that purpose. The DVU, the NPD and belatedly the REPs are officially regarded as opposed to the democratic state and hence anti-constitutional (as well as inciting racial hatred). However, other parties are less easy to classify as 'anti-system', despite some of their rhetoric; the Fs are only ambiguously anti-system on these criteria, despite their recent change of direction.

In any case, rejection of the political system as being illegitimate and as requiring overthrow tends to be the reaction of extreme right parties excluded by ostracism or by the operation of electoral laws. Success tends to moderate or attenuate such a tendency to rejectionism, as the Austrian case shows. Even so, one can still debate whether such parties, were they to achieve nation-wide power in their own right, would respect the democratic 'rules of the game' (such as regular elections, acceptance of opposition parties, independence of the judiciary, due process, and respect for human rights). Perhaps they might be excused a little tinkering with the electoral system in their own favour, since mainstream parties have often done this without becoming seriously accused of being anti-democratic (as, for example, in the French case).

It is instructive to raise the question whether it is possible for an anti-system party to metamorphose into a system party. Before resorting to metaphors about leopards and spots, the answer is probably a quite emphatic 'yes'. There are numerous examples of this, although mostly on the Left rather than the right. The various Communist parties (both the larger ones like the Partito Comunista Italiano, the Parti Communiste Français, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei (after the collapse of the GDR) and also the rather smaller ones like the Communistische Partij Nederland and the Swiss Partei der Arbeit) have metamorphosed, sometimes through amalgamations, into system parties. On the right, the Flemish Volksunie (VU) changed between the 1950s and the 1970s from an anti-system party into a pro-system one. The Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) offers, perhaps controversially, a further, if recent, example.

However, it is a historical fact that most examples of such metamorphoses are reactions to persistent failure, not to growth and success. This is often a repackaging strategy designed to increase mass appeal after loss of support; the Communist parties are especially good examples. The change in status of the VU was taken in part for other reasons (in particular, a wish to participate in power after years of marginality) but may itself have

contributed to further decline because of suspicions of a sell-out, in fact contributing to the success of the VB as the anti-system party on its right. Electorally buoyant anti-system parties do not usually need to repackage, even to secure acceptance by the mainstream; like the FN, they exult in their pariah status, using this to demonstrate their incorruptibility by the system.

In any case, whether an extreme right anti-system party would be willing to change or to behave as a system party if it were in full-blown power may not be the proper criterion if, entirely properly according to the democratic procedures, it used its power to implement all the less savoury aspects of its programme (for example, expulsion of foreigners or other forms of ethnic hostility), irrespective of the social and economic costs or of informed opinion to the contrary. Parties like the Fs, for example, make little attempt to hide their deep hostility to those whom they do not want or regard as their enemies (as shown in Haider's recent attacks on left-wing artists and intellectuals).[21] Given the salience, indeed centrality, of such issues (especially immigration) in the programmes of extreme right racist parties, one is drawn to the conclusion that they would indeed use democratically-obtained power for this purpose, even within the 'rules of the game'. After all, it is on these issues that they have built their appeals and their reputations. There may still be some sort of gradient between the organised horror of Dachau or Bergen-Belsen and the expulsion of foreigners or of particular ethnic minorities (a practice of which the past and present offer depressingly numerous examples – from Spain and the Jews to contemporary Bosnian Serbia and the Muslims). However, the writer, without wanting to make dramatic but unsubstantiated associations, would contend that India after partition, contemporary Ruanda and the former Yugoslavia all provide ghastly reminders of what determined 'ethnic cleansing' can sometimes mean and that such practices invariably entail brutality and bloodshed.[22]

It may also be relevant to point out, in partial counterpoint to what has been argued so far in this section, that, if there do exist extensive racist and xenophobic attitudes among the electors of a polity, it may in some circumstances actually favour the stability of the political system if these are represented in a discrete political party, even an anti-system one. The alternative might be their articulation as a 'wing' or faction within a mainstream right-wing party. Separate, the party itself may be ostracised, or marginalised, or even accommodated by the others but, whatever its treatment, its discrete status means that in the last analysis it is a competitor for votes, which usually makes other parties circumspect in their dealings with it, especially in a non-proportional voting system where vote competition between parties approaches zero-sum conditions. Where racism and xenophobia are not separately organised in a political party, their presence in right-wing mainstream parties may significantly affect the character of those parties, as the influence of Enoch Powell's popularity ethically

compromised the British Conservative Party in the 1960s and early 1970s, even if giving it an electoral boost.[23] Without the extreme right option Le Pen, for example, might well have tried again during the 1980s to become active within the mainstream right, where indeed he had spent some of his early career before a two-decade sojourn in the political wilderness.

Conclusion

If the earlier baleful observation about the likelihood of non-moderating effects of political power on the racist extreme right is correct, one is drawn back to the inference that such parties are a danger where, either nationally or even locally, they have made substantial inroads into the political fabric, and the more so if these inroads are on a national level or likely to become so. On that basis the Fs perhaps represent the most significant threat and, notwithstanding their failure to advance in the May 1995 general election, the VB follows in seriousness. Both are assisted by the general crisis of political legitimacy in their respective polities. Thereafter, follows the FN, still a threat but a smaller one because of its lesser penetration at the national level and the fact that the French political system does not face the same depth of crisis as do those of Austria and Belgium.

Certainly, nobody who has seen the obvious professionalism and extensive resources in the national offices of parties like the Fs, the VB and the FN can doubt their potential for major influence or the dedication of those involved. These are not the glue-sniffing skinheads or the Hitler-celebrating losers of British extreme right racism, nor the mavericks of the Dutch far right, nor the Lumpen youths involved in extreme right xenophobic violence in the German Federal Republic; instead, they are young, hard-working, professionally oriented political ideologues with a clear understanding of their goals and also of a strategy for their attainment. It is that distinctive feature which makes them a danger.

NOTES

1. This article is a much-revised and extensively elaborated version of the text of a lecture originally given to the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Amsterdam on 9 May 1995 on the occasion of that University's commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the liberation of the Netherlands on 4 May 1945; the title of the lecture was 'The Extreme Right Today in Western Europe: A Danger or a Nuisance?'.
2. There are innumerable contemporary definitional debates in the political-science literature about the nature of overlap between racist and extreme right politics. For example, see Klaus von Beyme 'Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe', *West*

European Politics vol.11, no.2, April 1988, pp.1–18; and Frank Elbers and Meindert Fennema *Racistische Partijen in West-Europa: tussen nationale traditie en Europese samenwerking* (Leiden, 1993), pp.10–17.

3. Most writers on this subject have given a litany of the possible reasons for the resurgence of racist right-wing extremism during the past decade. See, for example, Christopher T. Husbands 'The Dynamics of Racial Exclusion and Expulsion: Racist Politics in Western Europe', *European Journal of Political Research* vol.16, no.6, November 1988, pp.701–720 (reprinted in Zig Layton-Henry (ed.) *The Politics of Migration* (Aldershot, 1996), and his 'The Other Face of 1992: The Extreme Right Explosion in Western Europe', *Parliamentary Affairs* vol.45, no.3, July 1992, pp.267–284; Paul Hainsworth 'Introduction: The Cutting Edge: The Extreme Right in Post-War Western Europe and the USA,' in Paul Hainsworth (ed.) *The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA* (London, 1992), pp.1–28; and Hans-Georg Betz *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (Basingstoke, 1994), pp.37–106.
4. A major omission from the analysis requiring some justification is the case of Italy. This country has been omitted in part because of disputes about the nature of the former Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) (now metamorphosed into the Alleanza Nazionale). Although self-avowedly extreme right, there has been a significant debate about whether it is an ideologically racist party. The Lega Nord, more uncompromisingly xenophobic, is more problematic to include in this country-based analysis because of the regional nature of its support; this consideration differs from the apparently similar Belgian case because circumstances in Belgium have forced the concession that Flanders and Wallonia are from many perspectives autonomous entities; the Italian regions do not have such a status. The Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties might also be candidates for a more extended analysis.
5. There is now a large literature in several languages on the central features and history of all the parties being discussed; much of the existing material has the form of country-based studies, with occasional attempts at comparative analysis. For examples see Hainsworth (ed.) *The Extreme Right*; Christoph Butterwegge and Siegfried Jäger (eds) *Rassismus in Europa* (Cologne, 1993); Elbers and Fennema *Racistische Partijen*; Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg *Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right* (Boulder, 1993); Piero Ignazi *L'Estrema Destra in Europa* (Bologna, 1994); Betz *Radical Right-Wing Populism*; Wolfgang Kowalsky and Wolfgang Schroeder (eds) *Rechtsextremismus: Einführung und Forschungsbilanz* (Opladen, 1994); and Luciano Cheles, Ronald Ferguson and Michalina Vaughan (eds) *The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe* (Harlow, 1995). Throughout the chapter reference is made merely to some of the more directly relevant country-based material. Some of the arguments of this chapter coincide with observations made by Robert Miles 'A Rise of Racism and Fascism in Contemporary Europe?: Some Skeptical Reflections on Its Nature and Extent', *New Community* vol.20, no. 4, July 1994, pp.547–562.
6. For some further details, see Christopher T. Husbands 'The Support for the Front National: Analyses and Findings', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* vol.14, no.3, July 1991, pp. 381–415; Paul Hainsworth 'The Extreme Right in Post-War France: The Emergence and Success of the Front National', in Hainsworth (ed.) *The Extreme Right*, pp.29–60; William Safran 'The National Front in France: From Lunatic Fringe to Limited Respectability', in Merkl and Weinberg (eds) *Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right*, pp.19–49; Nonna Mayer 'Ethnocentrism and the Front National Vote in the 1988 French Presidential Election', in Alec G. Hargreaves and Jeremy Leaman (eds) *Racism, Ethnicity and Politics in Contemporary Europe* (Aldershot, 1995), pp.96–111.
7. See Christopher T. Husbands 'The Netherlands: Irritants on the Body Politic', in Hainsworth (ed.) *The Extreme Right*, pp.95–125, and Frank J. Buijs and Jaap van Donselaar *Extreem-rechts: aanhang, geweld en onderzoek* (Leiden, 1994).
8. For background see, for example, Kurt Richard Luther 'Die Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs' in Herbert Dachs *et al.* (eds) *Handbuch des Politischen Systems Österreichs* (Vienna, 1991), pp.247–262; Elbers and Fennema *Racistische Partijen*, pp.65–79; Franz Januschek 'Jörg Haider und der Rechtspopulismus in Österreich', in Butterwegge and Jäger (eds) *Rassismus in Europa*, pp.144–160; and Brigitte Bailer and

Wolfgang Neugebauer 'Die FPÖ: vom Liberalismus zum Rechtsextremismus,' in Stiftung Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes (ed.) *Handbuch des Österreichischen Rechtsextremismus* (Vienna, 1993), pp.327–428.

9. The literature on the REPs is now immense. Standard accounts are Claus Leggewie *Die Republikaner: Ein Phantom nimmt Gestalt an* (Berlin, 1990 edn); and Richard Stöss *Die Republikaner: Woher sie kommen; was sie wollen; wer sie wählt; was zu tun ist* (Cologne, 1990 edn). See also Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau *Die extreme Rechte in Deutschland: Geschichte – gegenwärtige Gefahren – Ursachen – Gegenmaßnahmen* (Munich, 1993); and Jürgen W. Falter *Wer wählt rechts?: Die Wähler und Anhänger rechtsextremistischer Parteien im vereinigten Deutschland* (Munich, 1994).
10. For further details see Christopher T. Husbands 'Belgium: Flemish Legions on the March', in Hainsworth (ed.) *The Extreme Right*, pp.126–150; Elbers and Fennema *Racistische Partijen*, pp.80–96; Hugo Gijsels *Het Vlaams Blok* (Leuven, 1992); and Marc Swyngedouw 'De Opkomst en Doorbraak van Agalev en Vlaams Blok in de Jaren Tachtig en Negentig', *Acta Politica* vol.29, no.4, October 1994, pp.453–476. It would have been desirable to focus separately on trends in support for the FN but this is frustrated by the fact that Dimarso, the principal polling agency in Belgium and since 1994 an affiliate of the French polling institute, SOFRES, includes both the FN and Agir (another right-wing grouping) among the 'Others' in its polling conducted in Wallonia.
11. Gilles Ivaldi 'Cognitive Structures of Xenophobic Attitudes among Supporters of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe', paper presented to a workshop on 'Racist Parties in Europe', 23rd European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Bordeaux, 27 April–2 May 1995.
12. The French data are percentage support for the Front National; I am grateful to Romain Pache of Brulé Ville Associés for supplying the complete run of his organisation's historic monthly polling series since 1982. The Dutch data are percentage support for the Centrum Partij (1983-86) and for the Centrumdemocraten (1990 to date); I am grateful to René Bos of the Nederlandse Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie en het Marktonderzoek (NIPO) for his organisation's weekly results since 1983; the figures for respective months are unweighted means. The Austrian data are percentage support for the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs; I am grateful to Imma Palme of the Institut für empirische Sozialforschung for supplying this historic series. Data for the Federal Republic of Germany are percentage support for Die Republikaner, separately reported for old and new regions since late-1990; I am grateful to Forschungsgruppe Wahlen for supplying the whole available series. Data for Belgium (Flanders) are percentage support for the Vlaams Blok collected by Dimarso. The data until the end of 1992 have been taken from the 1990, 1991 and 1992 Political Yearbooks of Belgium, published by the Belgian journal of political science, *Res Publica*, and those since the beginning of 1993 have been taken from the files of the newspaper, *De Morgen* (Brussels); I am grateful to Walter Pauli for facilitating access to these data. Occasional monthly omissions from some series (August or December, for example, are for some organisations no-poll months) have been handled by interpolation to ensure maximum continuity of each series.
13. Time-series data may be submitted to a number of types of analysis. One basic approach to this seeks to separate out longer-term trends from short-term effects by such norming procedures as moving averages or mean- and median-smoothing. Such norming has not been done in the analysis of this chapter because it would reduce the visibility of short-term effects in individual series. However, it is fair to point out that, where there is a long-term tendency for two series to vary together, measurements of this covariation upon the original data would be less than had they been calculated upon the normed data. For discussions of the analysis of time-series data, see, for example, Murray R. Spiegel *Theory and Problems of Statistics* (New York, 1961), pp.283–312; J.J. Thomas *An Introduction to Statistical Analysis for Economists* (London, 1973), pp.193–219; Frederick Mosteller and John W. Tukey *Data Analysis and Regression: A Second Course in Statistics* (Reading, Massachusetts, 1977), pp.43–77; and Catherine Marsh *Exploring Data: An Introduction to Data Analysis for Social Scientists* (Cambridge, 1988), pp.157–179.

14. The concept of 'second-order elections', meaning elections whose most important characteristic is that they are not taken as seriously by the electorate because less is seen to be at stake, is particularly associated with Karlheinz Reif. For an earlier statement, see Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt 'Nine Second-order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results,' *European Journal of Political Research* vol.8, no.1, March 1980, pp.3–44.
15. See Christopher T. Husbands 'Crises of National Identity as The "New Moral Panics": Political Agenda-setting about Definitions of Nationhood', *New Community* vol.20, no.2, January 1994, pp.191–206.
16. Both correlation matrices contain individual coefficients calculated across different time-periods and hence not from a perfectly rectangular raw-data set. Because of this, both are not positive definite, necessitating the substitution before solution of zeros for negative eigenvalues.
17. Four leaders of CP '86 have recently been convicted of being members of a criminal organisation and the party may well be proscribed; for one report of the outcome of the long-running court case, see *Algemeen Dagblad* (Amsterdam), 3 May 1995. On the other hand, in Austria there have been strong criticisms of the authorities' failure to apprehend extreme right terrorists responsible for a recent spate of letter-bombs. See *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 5 July 1995. However, these are not an electorally-oriented group.
18. See, for example, Husbands 'The Support for the Front National'.
19. See a cumulation of Dimarso opinion-poll data from October 1990 to September 1991 commissioned by De Morgen (Brussels).
20. Giovanni Sartori *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Cambridge, 1976), pp.132-133; and Gordon Smith *Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Aldershot, 1989 edn), pp.154–188.
21. Othmar Pruckner and Christoph Hirschmann 'Jörg Haiders Amoklauf,' *News* 18/95 (4 May 1995), pp.22–28.
22. See Akbar S. Ahmed '"Ethnic Cleansing": A Metaphor for Our Time?', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol.18, no.1, January 1995, pp.1–25.
23. See, for example, Zig Layton-Henry 'The Politics of Immigration: Immigration, "Race" and "Race" Relations', in *Post-war Britain* (Oxford, 1992), pp.79–87.

GENETIC VARIATION WITHIN AND AMONG HUMAN GROUPS

Guido Barbujani

Introduction

Is there any biological basis for the widespread belief that the human species is subdivided into races? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to start by agreeing on a working definition of race. After that, two fundamental studies addressing levels of genetic differentiation, within and among human groups will be described. As we shall see, on average, the genes of two individuals belonging to different races appear to differ only marginally more than the genes of two individuals belonging to the same community. The third section will deal with the patterns of genetic diversity among humans. It will be stressed that genetic differences, albeit small, are not distributed at random between populations, and that both geography and history have left a mark on the genetic structure of our species. In conclusion, the author will attempt to summarise some aspects of human evolution, with an eye to the origins and maintenance of genetic diversity.

What is a race?

The 1985 copy of *The Oxford Dictionary of Current English* lists four definitions of race:

- 'each of the major divisions of mankind with distinct physical characteristics';
- 'fact or concept of division into races';
- 'group of persons or animals or plants connected by common descent'; and
- 'genus or species or breed or variety of animals or plants'.

Some of these definitions are unsatisfactory. A race, for instance, is indisputably a subunit of a species (which in turn, along with other related species, belongs to a genus), and it may include several breeds. But whatever idea of a race one may have, it is a fact that our species has been traditionally regarded as composed of distinct groups, that the physical differences among these groups have often been perceived as obvious, and that such groups are commonly termed races. This is in agreement with the first definition. The existence of individuals, and even of entire populations, who cannot easily be classified into any such major divisions has always been a bit of a problem, but here the third definition seems to settle the issue. If members of each race are descended from a different group of common ancestors, the individuals of intermediate characteristics come from comparatively recent inter-racial marriage or mixing, and their existence does not contradict the existence of separate groups. In this way, one may wish implicitly to assume that the human species passed through a stage during which it was deeply subdivided, when everybody belonged to a 'pure' race. According to this assumption, it was only later that inter-racial mixing brought forth intermediate types.

Many, or most, educated people, I believe, would agree upon this definition of race. Be it right or wrong, I do not find it suitable to address the question of whether human races are really distinct biological entities. This definition claims that pure races existed sometime in the past, a claim difficult to demonstrate for we know something about the genetic build-up of present populations, but very little about our ancestors' genes. Traditionally, this shortcoming has been bypassed by identifying racial types from bones, and especially from skulls. Fossil bones of our ancestors abound and their size and shape can be compared with ours. Studies of biological similarities through time are therefore possible, and have actually repeatedly been attempted. Their results, however, are inconclusive, particularly with regard to racial classification.

First, even within small human communities, skulls have frustratingly different shapes, and can hardly be regarded as all belonging to a single type. Secondly, as R. R. Sokal and H. Uytterschaut have shown in Europe[1], the bones of past populations tend to resemble each other more than they resemble those of current populations living in the same areas. In addition, S. Jones[2] has reported how cranial measures of children born to recent immigrants in the United States quickly began to differ from those of their parents, to approximate the values typical of people who had immigrated earlier on. Explanations for these and similar findings are probably based on the observation that body measures, including height and weight, do not only depend on genes alone, but also on environmental factors, such as climate and diet. Even in the absence of genetic changes, in fact, the shapes of skulls in populations will rapidly change, if these populations move to a



Figure 1. Four snakes of the species Elaphe guttata (corn snake).

The colour pattern is genetically determined; two genes are involved, for presence/absence of the black and of the orange pigments, respectively, and no intermediate shade of colour is present in nature (From Griffiths, A.J.F., Miller, J.H., Suzuki D.T., Lewontin, R.C., Gelbart, W.M., 1993, An Introduction to Genetic Analysis; New York; W.H. Freeman; reproduced with permission).

different habitat, or if the pool of available resources changes. The idea of being able to develop a stable classification of human groups by using cranial measures is being abandoned by the scientific community.

All in all, therefore, a different approach is called for. Let us consider the corn snakes of Figure 1. Their colours are genetically determined. An individual is orange, or black, or both, or neither, depending only on its genes, and regardless of the environment in which it has grown up (where 'environment' comprises all non-genetic factors one may wish to consider). Intermediate shades are not present in nature. All the differences we perceive in this case reflect genetic differences and each member of this species may unambiguously be assigned to one of the four groups defined by the skin colour. Suppose now that the four groups are also located in different regions of the world, say, the Eastern, Central, and Western United States, and Mexico, respectively (which, by the way, is not the case). In that case, it would be legitimate – the author believes – to speak of different races, that is, of clearly recognisable groups within the same species.

In this way, we are getting close to what could be a sensible working definition of race: one of some reproductively-separated groups of individuals within which genetic differences are small compared to differences between them. The emphasis on reproductive separation derives from the fact that, according to the rules of Mendelian genetics, one generation of random mating will blur all existing differences. No assumptions are made about the past history of the species, as is the case in the commonsensical definition given earlier. It is worth noting that this latter definition is similar to that given by the *Cambridge Encyclopaedia*: a race is 'a biologically distinctive major division of a species, in which the differences between races exceed the variation within them'. Our question accordingly becomes whether such major divisions exist in our species as well.

Let us try to imagine two extreme scenarios in which a species is, or is not, respectively, subdivided into races (Figure 2). In a deeply subdivided species (2A), the various groups do not overlap much, and form easy-to-distinguish entities. The fraction of individuals who could belong to two groups is very small. As a rule, each individual's characteristics are such that she/he necessarily falls within a single group. Another way to envisage the same situation is in 2B, where a physical trait is represented in the abscissa of the diagram. Each group shows a different distribution of that trait, and only for few values of the X variable (where two curves partly overlap) do individuals of two groups share the same characteristics. At the other extreme of the range, we have a case in which groups do not differ much (2C), so that the value of the X variable does not tell us which group one individual belongs to (2D). Theoretically, every real species will be somewhere between these two extreme cases. It will be legitimate to speak of biological races among



Figure 2. Schematical representation of biological differences within species in which racial groups do (A, B), or do not (C, D) exist, respectively.

The left part of the figure represents different groups as sets of objects, which may be clearly differentiated (A), or largely overlap (C). In the right part of the figure, the same situation is represented on a graph in which a measurable variable (body height, weight, skin reflectance values) is plotted on the X-axis, and the ordinate represents the frequency of that variable. A species is subdivided in races if certain physical characters are discontinuously distributed in the different groups (A, B), whereas the groups cannot be called races if the variable of interest shows similar distributions among them (C, D). Two components of variance, between and within groups, are indicated in (E).

humans accordingly if our genes appear to be distributed in a way resembling the case outlined in Figure 2B.

For the sake of clarity, let us focus for a moment on a comparison only between two groups (Figure2E). Here, we are to identify two components of variation. There is variation between groups which corresponds to the difference between the two averages, *m1* and *m2*, defined as variance between groups; and there is variation within each group, which is proportional to the breadth of the curves and can be called variance within groups. This partition of variance can be extended to any number of hierarchical subdivisions. What is important is that the two scenarios outlined above can now be defined in a more rigorous, quantitative, manner. We may speak of races whenever the variance between groups exceeds the variance within them. We should avoid the term, race whenever most variation is accounted for by the variance within groups. This is not a strict definition since one cannot distinguish sharply between these two cases. Nonetheless, it is useful in addressing more rigorously the issue of genetic variation in humans.

Genetic variances between and within human races

Thousands of different genes are known in humans, and for dozens of them, a large amount of information is available, in the form of frequencies of the various gene variants (or alleles) in different populations. In the late sixties, R. Lewontin began to collect all available allele frequencies for nine blood group systems and eight serum proteins and blood cell enzymes: 17 genes overall. The number of populations screened varied among systems, from a few to several hundred, and that caused some statistical drawbacks. However, the main problem was how to subdivide the data for analysis. A considerable level of disagreement emerged, even among supporters of racial classification, when the nature and number of human races was addressed. Opinions on their number ranged from a minimum of three (Whites, Blacks and Orientals) to much higher figures. Lewontin chose to consider seven races, adding South Asian aborigines, Amerindians, Oceanians and Australians to the aforementioned groups, a classification most anthropologists appeared to agree on, at the time of his study.

The interested reader will find the details of the statistical analysis in Lewontin's article.[3] For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that he estimated three major components of genetic variation: within populations, between populations of the same race, and between races. This is similar to comparing each individual in the samples three separate times: first, with other members of the same population; secondly, with all members of different populations in the same race; and thirdly, with all members of all populations

in the other races. These calculations were independently repeated for each of the 17 genes. On average, differences between members of the same population account for 85.4 per cent of the overall variation. As Lewontin explained, there is reason to believe that if such an estimate is imprecise, it is because of a downward bias. The differences between populations and within races account for another 8.3 per cent of the overall genetic variance. Races differ only by the fraction left, 6.3 per cent of the overall genetic variance, or less. As expected, different genes do not always yield identical percentages. For specific genes, the genetic variance between races never exceeds 26 per cent (for the Duffy blood group), and is often less than 3 per cent (for Acid Phosphatase, Phosphoglucomutase, and the Lewis, Kell, P, and ABO blood groups). Lewontin interpreted these figures as evidence that our perception of large differences between human races is based on biased preconceptions and does not reflect existing genetic differences. He concluded his article with these words: 'Human racial classification is of no social value, and is positively destructive of social and human relations. Since such racial classification is now seen to be of virtually no genetic or taxonomic significance either, no justification can be offered for its continuance.'

After the publication of these results, however, the idea that races exist in our species was not abandoned . This is partly because the issue has not only biological, but also social and emotional implications. Doubts regarding the statistical method used, and whether the data were sufficient to justify such strong conclusions, were also raised. Accordingly, more data has been accumulated and the problem has been addressed again. In 1980, B.D.H. Latter[4] analysed a wider data set of allele frequencies and used three different statistical methods. All of them had been specifically designed to evaluate in a reliable way the amount of genetic diversity, within and between major human groups. In this paper, the groups under comparison were no longer (anthropologically-defined) races, but six geographical clusters, corresponding to Europe, Africa, the Near East and India, East Asia, the Americas, and Oceania. Latter justified this choice on the grounds that it was impossible to agree upon objective criteria for racial classification. Despite this difference in group delineation, he found that 84 per cent of genetic diversity fell within populations, a figure remarkably close to that of Lewontin. Under the three different statistical approaches, the differences between the six major geographical groups accounted for a fraction equal to 10.4 per cent, 7.5 per cent, and 9.6 per cent, respectively, of overall human genetic diversity. Once again, differences between groups, whether termed races or otherwise, appear only as a modest extension of differences found between members of the same population. These results confirm that most human genetic variation occurs within populations.

What Lewontin's and Latter's studies imply is summarised in Figure 3. Let us arbitrarily set equal to 100 the average genetic difference between two



Figure 3. Expected genetic diversity between pairs of individuals

Based on the results of Lewontin's (1972) and Latter's (1980) studies. The figures above the arrows represent levels of genetic differentiation, on an arbitrary scale whose maximum is set at 100.

persons who are at opposite extremes of the range of variation of our species. Consider a Korean and a French person, for example. We all believe we can discriminate with 100 per cent accuracy between the French and Koreans, on the basis of their physical aspect, and we may well be right. Yet, at the genetic level, the difference between each of them and another member of the same population will not be 10, as one would then predict from the way they look. Rather, it will be close to 85, which implies that each human population contains probably more than four-fifths of the genetic patrimony of our entire species. The difference between members of different populations of the same race, like a Korean and a Filipino, or a French person and a Pakistani, will be roughly equal to 94. If we accept Latter's slightly higher estimates of the differences between geographical groups, this figure will drop to 92 per cent or 90 per cent, but by no less than that.[5]

The idea that humanity is divided into neatly distinct groups, each with its own genes and physical characters that mirror them, is therefore wrong. Differences exist, of course, and some of them are inherited. Nonetheless, the idea that skin colour reflects a fundamental subdivision of our species is, at best, an oversimplification. If we use as a criterion of classification blood groups and other proteins, we find completely different patterns of similarity. Some Italians (those from Naples) would be very close to Hawaii islands natives, with frequencies of the ABO-O allele around 65 per cent, whereas others (from Sassari, Sardinia) would be almost identical to the American Apache and the African Tutsi, with 77 per cent of the same allele. From the standpoint of genetics, accordingly, human races do not exist. This does not mean that human races cannot exist. As is the case with all other organisms, with dogs or with corn, humans are able, in principle, to develop into genetically different races. We are able to but we do not appear to have done so.

Geography and history as causes of genetic diversity

In the light of this evidence, it may be tempting to think we are all alike but that would not be a very good idea. It is true that many other species, from some invertebrates to our closest living relatives, show much higher levels of genetic heterogeneity than we do. In one well-studied region of the genome, the mitochondrial DNA, for instance, the common and the pygmy chimpanzees who live only a few hundred kilometres apart in Central Africa, differ ten times as much as any two humans we may care to compare.[6] But differences between human populations, small though they may be, do exist, and it is possible to recognise a pattern in these differences. Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of one allele of the histocompatibility system (HLA) in Europe. This is one of the genes that, among other functions, determines whether tissues of different individuals can fit together, and hence directly affects the success of tissue transplants. As is evident from the figure, the frequencies of the HLA-A9 allele are neither uniform, nor randomly distributed. Starting from areas of high frequency in the North and around the Eastern Mediterranean, they decrease as one moves towards Central Europe, and reach a minimum around the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. It is legitimate to describe such a pattern as the combination of two large-scale gradients converging in central Europe. This is not to claim that all genes show equally simple distributions. The rule, however, is that populations in neighbouring localities are genetically similar to each other, and in distant localities are not. This is a consequence of a well-established genetic principle: levels of genetic relatedness depend largely upon the exchange of genes between populations, upon what is known as gene flow. The main factor determining gene flow is the movement of people, in a word, migration.



Figure 4. Distributions of the frequencies of the allele A9 of the HLA system in Europe.

Five shades of grey represent increasing allele-frequency values, from lighter to darker shades. The figures 1-5 indicate sampling localities. The original values have been interpolated to yield a map without gaps (from Sokal et al., 1989; reproduced with permission).

Now, in most areas of the world, the rates of migration tend to be inversely proportional to the distance separating localities. It is evident that, as a first choice, people who need to migrate do not want to go very far. As a consequence, contiguous populations tend to exchange more migrants than far-flung ones and their genetic characteristics will tend to converge. Simultaneously, the movement of people will be constrained by obstacles, by mountain ranges, deserts, seas, and perhaps also by other, more elusive, barriers, as we shall see later. Such obstacles will normally reduce gene flow, and populations separated by them will evolve independently. The predictable result of independent evolution is the random accumulation of genetic differences. Accordingly, there are two major geographical factors affecting patterns of genetic variation, namely distance and the presence or absence of barriers.

There are also historical factors. Individuals sharing parents or grandparents are genetically closer than unrelated individuals. Intuitively, the same is true of populations descended from the same ancestral population. In many cases, however, the importance of history in determining population similarity cannot be tested directly. Descriptions – many of them inaccurate – are available for only some major events which occurred in the last millennia and we know very little, if indeed, anything at all, about the history of our population. We turn then to indirect sources of historical information, in particular to language. Let us consider how languages may be able to tell us something about human genes.



Figure 5. Hypothetical sequences of a short fragment of DNA in three individuals (X, Y and Z) and a genealogical tree summarizing their differences, and suggesting how such differences came about. A, C, G, T represent the four bases constituting the DNA sequence, and a dotted line emphasises the differences.

The state-of-the-art approach to quantifying genetic variation is now the direct study of DNA, rather than the inference of DNA variation based on blood groups or similar traits. When the same DNA fragment is analysed and compared in different individuals, most of the bases constituting the DNA sequence appear identical, as we may expect given the well-known homogeneity of our species. However, certain DNA sites show variation (Figure 5, top). This variation is the product of mutation. Small changes are introduced in the DNA, as it is passed from one generation to another (and, on condition that such changes are not detrimental for the individuals who carry them, they accumulate through time). As a consequence, individuals who differ at a few DNA sites, or who are identical, are considered to derive their DNA from a common ancestor who lived in the not-too-remote past.

Conversely, if several differences between two individuals are observed, their most recent common ancestor is considered to have lived way back in time. Under certain simplifying assumptions (the so-called molecular clock hypothesis[7]), it is possible to associate a time-frame to the count of genetic differences, and thus to estimate the time at which any two individuals had a presumptive common ancestor. (Note the assumption that there is always a common ancestor who transmitted to any two of us a certain DNA fragment, unless we believe, with the 19th century's advocates of multiple human origins, that whites and blacks belong to different species[8]).

Genealogical trees constructed using this kind of approach (Figure 5, bottom) have become a widespread and useful tool in the study of evolution. Once a genealogy has been constructed, however, the problem is how to interpret it. Which are the factors that were important in generating the observed amount of genetic diversity? As we argued above, a simple hypothesis is that genetic similarity reflects geographic proximity. This has proved to be true in many but not all studies. Consider the group depicted in Figure 6. The people in the figure come from Northern and Southern Europe, Southern Africa, and Australia. Suppose a drop of blood has been taken from each of them, and that the same piece of DNA, perhaps one of the well-known regions of mitochondrial DNA, has been sequenced. A genealogy is then constructed. A simple way to understand it is to compare it with other representations of the relationships between individuals. An obvious one is the tree summarising geographical distances between birthplaces of individuals (Figure 7, top). In tree form, Northern and Southern Europe are connected by a shallow branch because they are close to each other, whereas Oceania and Africa are connected to the former by deeper branches, reflecting the greater distances between these geographic areas. Although these specific people have not been the subjects of this kind of investigation, it seems likely that there would be no or little correlation – their genealogies would not resemble the geographical tree. In such a case, one would have to conclude that spatial distance is not a major factor explaining why some of these

Figure 6. A heterogeneous group of people. Members of this group come from Australia, Botswana, Great Britain, and Italy.

Figure 7. Two trees summarizing the geographic (top) and linguistic (bottom) relationships between the people of Figure 6.



individuals are genetically close and others not. Suppose, on the other hand, that we take into account the tree summarising linguistic relationships (Figure 7, bottom). There are three major branches in that tree, corresponding to two Indo-European languages (English and Italian, the former perhaps divided into two different dialects), and one Bantu language, Setswana. It is much more likely that this linguistic tree will be similar to the genealogical tree.

Some may say that this comes as no great surprise. After all, everybody knows that most ancestors of present-day Australians came from the British Isles during the past three centuries. Accordingly, it is only in the linguistic tree (and not in the geographic one) that subjects are located close to such ancestors. But that is exactly the point. The geographical tree represents a state of affairs as they were at the time these subjects were born, whereas the linguistic tree takes into account historical links of longer duration. By choosing the latter strategy, we have been able to assemble evidence of a migration event by using other historical sources.

But what of migrations that have not been recorded? During (at least) the past 150,000 years of human evolution, only a number of population movements taking place during the last thirty or forty centuries have been documented, and history and myth are intertwined in most of these accounts. Linguistic affiliations then act as clues for past population relationships. Whenever people speaking similar languages in different parts of the world appear genetically related, it is reasonable to suppose they are descendants of a single ancestral population. A common language signifies a common origin, and a related language indicates a common origin further back in time.[9] The argument, clearly, displays a number of problems. To mention just one, we know that languages can be transmitted between members of the same generation, whilst genes cannot. Nonetheless, a relationship between genetic and linguistic differences between populations has been shown to exist in many studies[10], a result which suggests that this assumption is reasonable.

Figure 8 illustrates this argument in its converse sense: how genetic boundaries are often accompanied by linguistic boundaries. The map of Europe in the figure contains lines indicating zones of sharpest genetic change, or genetic boundaries, as evaluated from the analysis of 19 genes.[11] Many genetic boundaries correspond to geographical barriers, and most probable result from restricted gene flow. That is the case for major mountain ranges, like the Alps, and bodies of water, such as those separating Britain from Iceland, Ireland, Norway and France, Finland from the Aland islands, Albania from Italy, Italy from Malta, and so on. Other zones of sharp genetic change surround two islands, Corsica and Sardinia. Many of these geographic barriers are also linguistic boundaries, and it is reasonable to imagine that geographic isolation promoted both genetic and linguistic



Figure 8. A map of Europe (political boundaries as of 1990), where regions of sharp genetic change, or genetic boundaries, are indicated by solid or dashed lines. Boundaries number 3 (in Northern Finland), 19 (between Austria and Hungary), 20 (within Romania), and 21 (within Spain), do not correspond to physical barriers, but only to linguistic boundaries, respectively between Lapps and Swedish-speakers (3), German- and Magyar-speakers (19), Romanian- and Magyar-speakers (20), and Basques and Spanish-speakers (21); boundary 21 extends beyond the line separating Basques and non-Basques.

heterogeneity. A few lines on the map, however, require closer scrutiny. There is no obvious physical barrier between Lapps and Swedes in Northern Sweden, between Austria and Hungary, within Romania, and in Northern Spain. In all these cases, the genetic boundaries marked on the map correspond to boundaries between a Indo-European and a non-Indo-European language. These and similar findings strongly suggest that the presence of a cultural barrier may be sufficient to isolate populations, thus determining or maintaining genetic differences between them. In fact, many cultural factors may influence our reproductive behaviour and thereby the distribution of our genes – language is simply one of the easiest to identify.

Let us summarise two of the points made so far. First, genetic differences between human groups are small, and do not account for more than a few per cent of the overall diversity of our species. Secondly, these limited genetic differences are not randomly distributed in space. In general, they reflect varying patterns of gene flow. Areas where populations intermixed tend to show gradual genetic variation, whereas barriers to migration, both

geographical and cultural, tend to determine comparatively sharp genetic differences.

Although limited in extent, such genetic differences may have practical importance. A good example is given by modern techniques of DNA-based personal identification. It has become possible to extract DNA from extremely small amounts of cells, such as those left by a smoker on a cigarette filter. In this way, it is now common practice to compare the DNA found in the place of a crime with that of a suspect. The test is carried out by comparing several different DNA fragments, thus reconstructing the so-called profiles of the suspect and of the culprit.[12] There are two possible outcomes: either the two profiles do not match and the suspect is not the culprit; or the two DNA profiles are equal. In the latter case, there are again two possibilities: either the suspect is the person who committed the crime or the two DNAs are the same by chance. The probability of the latter is called match probability. In practice, it is the margin of error if the suspect is convicted based on DNA evidence. To evaluate it, one has to consider the fact that alternative types of DNA fragments are present in the population at different frequencies. By combining the population frequencies of all fragment types shown by one person, one can estimate the probability that another person will share the same DNA profile. The crucial point is that the frequencies of fragment types vary among populations – all types are common in certain groups and rare in others. This will deeply affect the estimate of the match probability. If a suspect's profile is tested against the frequencies of his or her fragments in a population other than his or hers, the match probability will be underestimated, with potential disastrous consequences.[13]

To better understand this, imagine a witness describing a person as 'light-haired, blue-eyed, tall'. This description may be sufficient to identify the person in a crowd in India (where only a few people will correspond to that description), but not in Norway (where many individuals will be like that person). The same is true of DNA profiles. If the profile of a person is compared with inappropriate frequencies, that is, those estimated in a group other than his or hers, some of the person's fragment types will appear very rare, and the match probability will decrease accordingly, suggesting strongly that the person is the one who left a trace in the place of the crime. That is, under certain circumstances, why even small genetic differences may matter. In British courts, for instance, it is now customary to ask the suspect to declare which ethnic group he belongs to, not in order to discriminate against him, but to identify the appropriate reference population.

A brief overview of human evolution

How did genetic diversity accumulate? Estimates of the age of our species based on DNA data and on comparisons with our closest living relatives, the big apes, suggest our ancestors were a small (but not tiny) population living around 150,000 years ago, or a bit later. Based on the levels of genetic polymorphism now present, and on the time necessary for mutation to generate it, we can place the size of the initial population at around a few thousand individuals.[14] We are all their descendants. Paleontological studies clearly suggest that our place of origin is Africa, and the genetic data are fully compatible with that view. Among others, C.B. Stringer and P. Andrews[15] review the paleontological and genetic evidence, and A.R. Templeton[16] discusses the assumptions underlying recent genetic studies. The adverse hypothesis that modern humans originated simultaneously all over Eurasia and Africa (the so-called multiregional hypothesis[17]) has three drawbacks. First, it implies unlikely, high levels of migration in the Pleistocene era. Secondly, it does not accord to available genetic data[18] and thirdly, it appears to be contradicted by measures of cranial diversity at various moments in the past[19]

The first fossil evidence, discovered in Palestine, of modern human presence outside Africa can be dated to around 90,000 years ago. Colonisation of other continents can be established from fossil evidence.[20] We would not be too far wrong if we were to say that humans arrived in Australia (which was not an island, at that time) about 50,000 years ago, had colonised much of Europe more than 30,000 years ago, and had reached America (by way of a now-non-existent land bridge between Siberia and Alaska) later, sometimes between 30,000 and 15,000 years ago. Colonisation of the Pacific came even later, with New Zealand only being reached in the last millennium. If we accept that our species is about 150,000 years old, this means that a large share of our evolution took place in Africa, and then in Asia, with fairly recent expansions to other continents.

Genetic studies reveal a reasonable measure of agreement with the time-pattern given above. Current levels of mitochondrial DNA differentiation are highest in Africa. Most non-African populations, to the contrary, show a subset of the African genes, plus some recent variants.[21] Europeans, in particular, may therefore be descended from an early admixture of populations ancestral to present-day African and Asians.[22] Current levels and patterns of genetic diversity are difficult to explain unless we assume that some time before 33,000 years ago, human population expanded quickly. It is also necessary to assume that, before this expansion, this population was subdivided into relatively isolated groups.[23] Whether or not each such group was ancestral to a distinct human race is open to doubt, and may be impossible to establish. There is no evidence, however, of historical

continuity between early human groups and populations or races as they are now recognised. In any case, most of these previously isolated groups seem to have expanded more or less simultaneously. This may have happened because climates improved following the retreat of the glaciers. During that and successive phases, demographic increase led human populations to split and form new regional groups. Simultaneously, these newly established populations continued to be in contact with each other. These population splits probably played an important role in determining genetic divergence, but they also appear to have been accompanied by ongoing processes of gene flow.[24]

In particular, significant contacts between populations occurred in the Neolithic era, when a second major population boom has been archaeologically documented. Its main cause was the discovery and rapid spread of agriculture, starting in several areas of Asia, and later in America and Africa. Archaeological, linguistic and genetic data jointly support the emergence of a major population diffusion, starting approximately 10,000 years ago in the Near East. At that time, early farmers began to migrate in search of new suitable land, and thereby propagated their subsistence technologies, their genes, and their languages across much of the Old World.[25] During these comparatively recent demographic expansions, some new gene variants were generated, but the bulk of current genetic diversity was present during earlier times, and was probably redistributed among populations. Though simplistic and subject to exceptions among a number of local populations, the views expressed here have been confirmed repeatedly by field studies and statistical tests. Returning then to the question of the origin of genetic variation between groups, of that 6 or 10 per cent of human diversity, there is reason to believe that it results from the unstable balance between the two opposite pressures mentioned above. Populations tend to diverge genetically in isolation, as a consequence of natural selection or simply by chance, but exchange of individuals brings about increasing genetic homogeneity. Throughout much of our history, isolated human groups have continued to diversify when isolated, and under other circumstances to mix or merge. Tentative though the observation well may be, it would seem that the massive migrations of this century will result in a further reduction of population differences at the genetic level. On the other hand, as indicated above, some barriers to gene flow appear invisible and have been shown to affect human migratory behaviour in important and measurable ways. Their role may also become more important in the future.

Sometimes one realises that an issue initially deemed highly relevant is in fact less so. This brief description of the patterns of genetic diversity in our species aimed to clarify a number of basic biological facts so as to establish a context within which an analysis of ethnic conflict could be located. The data and theories reviewed here may not have met this aim. Suppose, for

instance, that sometime in the future, through new genetic research, extensive genetic diversity be shown to exist between races. Could that result be used to condone racial discrimination? If our answer is no, the implications are by no means trivial for it would imply that a choice between a racist or a tolerant attitude does not depend upon the degree of genetic differences among groups. It implies that it is our perceptions of such differences that matters, whether these differences be small or large. Genetics has very little to tell us about that.

At any rate, the demonstrated absence of large differences among the genes of human groups demolishes at least one myth upon which racial discrimination is based. Unless new data emerge, we shall have to find a better excuse to hate someone than the nature of his genes. This may help in conceptualising ethnic conflicts as clashes between cultures, which they are. Though limited, this advantage is not negligible. For culture, after all, is something that changes, albeit with difficulty, whereas we are condemned to carry the genes we inherited throughout our lives. A clearer understanding of biological variation may result, accordingly, in the realisation that ethnic conflicts are not inevitable. Simultaneously, decisions on how to deal with others seem to depend on our willingness to understand one other rather than on how much genetics we understand. The crucial issues appear to be psychological with social and political, rather than biological, bases.

NOTES

1. See, for instance, the work of R.R. Sokal and H. Uytterschaut 'Cranial variation in European populations: A spatial autocorrelation study at three time periods', *American Journal of Physical Anthropology* vol.74, 1987, pp.21-38.
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5. Recent data from direct studies of DNA essentially confirm this view. See J.L. Mountain and L.L. Cavalli-Sforza 'Inference of human evolution through cladistic analysis of nuclear DNA restriction polymorphisms', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA* vol.91, 1994, pp.6515-6519.
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7. M. Kimura *The Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution* (Cambridge, 1983).
8. See S.J. Gould *The Mismeasure of Man* (New York, 1981) for a review.
9. R.R. Sokal 'Genetic, geographic, and linguistic distances in Europe', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA* vol.85, 1988, pp.1722-1726.
10. See G. Barbujani 'What do languages tell us about human microevolution?', *Trends in Ecology and Evolution* vol.6, 1991, pp.151-156.

11. G. Barbujani and R.R. Sokal 'Zones of sharp genetic change in Europe are also linguistic boundaries', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA* vol. 87, 1990, pp.1816-1819. The absence of lines in Eastern Europe is probably due to the scarce amount of data available for those populations.
12. We shall leave aside questions related to the possibility that some DNA collected belong neither to the culprit nor to the victim.
13. See D.J. Balding and R.A. Nichols 'DNA profile match probability calculation: How to allow for population stratification, relatedness, database selection and single bands', *Forensic Science International* vol.64, 1994, pp.125-140.
14. N. Takahata 'Allelic genealogy and human evolution', *Molecular Biology and Evolution* vol.10, 1993, pp.2-22.
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16. A.R. Templeton 'The "Eve" hypothesis: A genetic critique, and reanalysis', *American Anthropologist* vol.95, 1993, pp.51-72.
17. M.H. Wolpoff 'Multiregional evolution: The fossil alternative to Eden', in P. Mellars and C.B. Stringer (eds) *The Human Revolution* (Princeton, 1989), pp.62-108.
18. Takahata, *op.cit.*
19. D.M. Waddle 'Matrix correlation tests support a single origin for modern humans', *Nature* vol.368, 1994, pp.452-454.
20. See L.L. Cavalli-Sforza, P. Menozzi and A. Piazza, *The History and Geography of Human Genes* (Princeton, 1994) in which a detailed description of the human expansions may be found.
21. L. Vigilant, M. Stoneking, H. Harpending, K. Hawkes and A.C. Wilson 'African populations and the evolution of human mitochondrial DNA', *Science* vol.253, 1991, pp.1503-1507.
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THE OLD AND THE NEW CONCEPT OF RACE

Guido Modiano

A Premise

The only scientifically valid way of discussing the concept of race is to do it *as if racism never existed*: by completely ignoring the possible implications and ideological exploitation of the objective facts. Prejudice is the worst enemy of truth, not only if it is a racial prejudice but also if it is born of an anti-racist attitude, or, as is often the case, when it is caused by an opportunistic desire to comply with a conformistic and widespread belief. In this field, prejudice often exceeds its usual limits because besides not requiring answers to prickly issues to be demonstrated, it resists the very act of raising these questions (possibly for fear of unwanted answers). This is a typical example of a more or less conscious removal of a problem too disquieting to face.

However, the price to be paid for avoiding uncomfortable questions is high indeed. Besides placing a severe limit on one's freedom of thought it means being contented with preconceived and dogmatic answers rather than searching for those that are rational and convincing.

The moral rights and wrongs of any behaviour cannot be scientifically demonstrated because science and ethics belong to different philosophical categories ('good' and 'bad' are not concerns of science; its concerns are 'true' and 'false'). Thus, on the specific issue of race, science cannot demonstrate, for example, that from a moral point of view, it is a 'good' option to be anti-racist. To be racist or anti-racist is a moral (not a scientific) decision. For example, if one takes on moral grounds the decision to be anti-racist, this will mean that the decision to reject racism will not be conditioned by the scientific results whatever they turn out to be. However, this also means that scientific results must not be affected by ideology: they should be the same irrespective of whether the scientist is a fanatical racist or a strongly persuaded anti-racist.

This does not imply that the layman should ignore positive facts discovered through scientific procedures, or not be aware of the many relevant questions not answered by science. On the contrary, this knowledge should be spread as much as possible in order to prevent the usage of non-proven (or even disproved) facts as arguments in favour or against racism. Inappropriate scientific support is often used by both sides. For example, it is used by racists when they claim it is scientifically proven that blacks are genetically inferior in intelligence quotient or IQ (a vague, arbitrary and culturally biased characteristic referring to an ill-defined portion of the overall psychological make-up of an individual). But it is also used by anti-racists when they claim it has been conclusively excluded by science that inter-race variations in psychological characteristics may have a genetic component besides the cultural one, which, on the basis of indirect (but convincing) evidence, appears to be the predominant one. These statements are so obvious as to seem trivial. Yet it is worth asserting them explicitly because many severe misunderstandings in this field continue to arise simply because many people, consciously or unconsciously, do not accept the obvious. In a way, these people behave as the physicist who, while working out the mathematical relationship between matter and energy, takes into account the risks of a nuclear war.

The most extreme example of the influence that extra-scientific considerations exerted on scientific attitudes in this field was the radical change which took place after the Holocaust. Before the Second World War most geneticists were convinced that the possible consequences of massive inter-racial crossings were a major problem for the future of mankind. After the Holocaust this 'major' anxiety was dismissed even though this tragic event did not provide any new data scientifically relevant for this issue (it having been instead informative for evaluating the level of civilisation achieved in this century by some of the 'civilised' countries). Obviously, the only scientifically valid approach to settle this question would be to see what the offspring of inter-racial crossings turned out to be. Fortunately, tens of millions all over the world performed 'spontaneous experiments' and showed, beyond any doubt, that these crossings do not cause any major consequences, thus confirming what common sense, if it were not so heavily conditioned by racial prejudice and fear, should have suggested from the beginning.

Ideally, one should deal with the concept of race in humans in exactly the way we do in other animal species where there is no risk of being led astray by ideological bias. However, this is only partially feasible because only in our species is a cultural subdivision superimposed which strongly interacts with its biological subdivision. Biology, or more precisely genetics, should have an important role for the problems connected with racism. This role should consist of defining an *indisputable set of facts* in which discussions

concerning this issue *must* be framed: everybody should then be free to adopt any ideology but not to support it with statements contradicting the ascertained facts: liberty of opinion but not of mystification.

Inter-group differential inherited characteristics

The definitions of race – even those commonly used vague and arbitrary ones – demand a preliminary clarification of six fundamental concepts because they are essential components of any definitions. They are:

(1) 'quantitative' v 'alternative' characteristics (see Figure 1)
(2) 'anthropological markers'
(3) 'gene frequencies'
(4) 'intra' v 'inter' (group) variations
(5) 'independent' characteristics v characteristics whose variabilities are due to similar (or even identical) causes
(6) 'concordant' v 'non-concordant' characteristics

They are the tools through which humans can first be subdivided into discrete groups and then these groups can be compared with each other.

1. 'Quantitative' v 'Alternative' variable characteristics

Quantitative characteristics are characteristics displayed to some extent by everybody. Thus their variation concerns only this extent (examples: stature, body weight, blood pressure). Their distribution is usually represented by plotting the various observed values in a graph with respect to the abscissa, while their respective frequencies are referred to the ordinates. If – as usually happens – the distribution of a quantitative characteristic is compatible with the normal 'bell-shaped' distribution, then two variables, its mean (m) and its standard deviation (s) are sufficient to describe it adequately. *Alternative* characteristics may be present or absent in any given individual (or allele) – for example Rh positive and Rh negative individuals; Rh and rh alleles.

If, as is usually the case, the alternative characteristic under study is a unigenic characteristic (that is a phenotypic variation depending on the variation of a single gene so that the variation is due to the existence of two or more alternative forms, or alleles, of that gene) the best way of expressing the variation of that unigenic characteristic is given by the frequencies (p, q etc) of its alleles. These frequencies may also be graphically represented by sub-columns with a height proportional to their respective frequencies and with the total height equal to 1.

2. Anthropological markers

Since the subdivision of a species (in this case, Man) into groups (usually called 'races') and their successive characterisation is based on the differential distribution of 'anthropological markers' in the various groups, a definition of 'race' calls for a preliminary definition of an 'anthropological marker'. An 'anthropological marker' is a variable (quantitative or alternative) characteristic which exhibits hereditarily transmitted distributions differing between human groups (Table 1).

Table 1 - The three prerequisites a characteristic must fulfill to become potentially useful to subdivide Man into groups.

The prerequisite	**No 'anthropologically meaningful' subdivision can be based.....**
1. VARIABILITY	.....on an *invariable* characteristic as, for example, the number of eyes per individual
2. DIFFERENTIAL DISTRIBUTION in the various groups	....on a characteristic, even if it is a variable one, if it is *distributed in the same way in the various groups*
3. HERITABILITY (genetical and/or cultural)	....on a characteristic, even if it is a variable one and it is differently distributed in the various groups, if it is *not hereditarily transmitted*, because only this property implies a reasonable duration of the subdivision. (For example, no one would propose to subdivide mankind into a group of people affected by flu and another not affected by this disease, even though this would be a variable characteristic with a clear-cut differential distribution in the two groups).

3. The concept of 'gene frequency'

Let us consider a gene A with two common alleles A^1 and A^2 in a population of n individuals. Since each of these n individuals was formed through the fusion of 2 gametes (a spermatozoon and an oocyte) and each gamete carried either the A^1 or the A^2 allele, that population was generated by 2n gametes, n_{A1} of which carried A^1 while the remaining n_{A2} (= 2n - n_{A1}) carried A^2. If, for

example, a population of 500 individuals is made up of 180 individuals who received from both their parents a gamete with the A^1 allele (A^1A^1 individuals), of 240 individuals who received an A^1 allele from one parent and an A^2 allele from the other (A^1A^2 individuals), and of 80 A^2A^2 individuals, that is

$$\underset{180}{A^1A^1} + \underset{240}{A^1A^2} + \underset{80}{A^2A^2} = n = 500$$

then the frequency p of the A^1 allele is

$$\frac{n_{A1}}{2n} = \frac{(2 \times 180) + (1 \times 240) + (0 \times 80)}{(2 \times 500)} = \frac{600}{1000} = 0.6$$

because 0.6 is the ratio between the number n_{A1} of gametes carrying A^1 and the total number 2n of the gametes under study and the frequency q of the A^2 allele is

$$\frac{n_{A2}}{2n} = \frac{(0 \times 180) + (1 \times 240) + (2 \times 80)}{(2 \times 500)} = \frac{400}{1000} = 0.4$$

Obviously, if there are only two alleles, as in the present example, the sum of their frequencies is necessarily 1 (in this case [0.6 + 0.4]).

4. Intra vs inter-group variability

Variable characteristics, namely characteristics exhibiting a variation within a species, may present an intra-group variation (be variable among individuals of the *same* group), an inter-group variation (variability between individuals of one group with respect to those of *other* groups) or both these variations together. Clearly, the extent to which a given variable characteristic can contribute to the distinction between groups depends on the ratio between the two types of variability: the larger its inter-group variability with respect to its intra-group variability, the more efficient the inter-group distinction based on that characteristic. A simple scheme may be useful to illustrate the various possibilities [Figure 1and section (a) of Table 2].

In its very essence, the possible quantitative relationship between the intra and inter-group variation of a given characteristic consists of the extent by which the average difference between two random individuals extracted from different groups exceeds the average difference between two random individuals of the same group. In addition to two extreme and opposite possibilities one can envisage infinite intermediate possibilities.

FIGURE 1 - The four possible situations one may come across when a variable characteristic is differently distributed in two groups of individuals.



(1) Also called 'qualitative' characteristics

(2) An *'inter-group discontinuous'* characteristic is a characteristic that allows one to assign *unambiguously* any *single* individual to his/her *group on the basis of that characteristic only*. Among the discontinuous characteristics, which might in principle (but only in principle) be utilized to subdivide our species into *discrete* groups, only those which were also *self-evident* were actually utilized for this purpose thus becoming the so called 'major *anthropological markers*' or really classificatory characteristics.

The 'major anthropological markers' may be *physical* (as those of 'classical' Physical Anthropology. For example: 'Blacks' and 'Whites', etc.), *geographical* (Europeans, Africans, Asiatics, Amerindians, etc.) or *cultural* [religious (Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, etc.), linguistic (English-speaking, French-speaking, etc.)] or *political* (Germans, French, Peruvians, etc.. A polytical assignment alone is usually considered insufficient owing to the frequent and strong anthropological heterogeneity of political groups. Thus, in most cases, a second classificatory characteristic accompanies a political denomination (USA 'Whites'; Brazil Amerindians; etc.)].

It is noteworthy that the physical 'major anthropological *markers' all* belong to box 3 (and, more precisely to a subgroup of it, namely to those characteristics which, besides being

quantitative and discontinuous, are also self-evident) because the rare alternative characteristics with a discontinuous inter-group variation (box 4) are never self-evident. For this reason class 3 is highlighted by a bold-face frame.

When dealing with the *continuity-discontinuity* of the variable characteristics one has to adopt *different criteria for intra- and inter-group* variabilities. This is because this definition depends on whether the characteristic varies in a continuous or in a discontinuous fashion among individuals of the same group in the case of the intra-group variability, or among groups in the case of inter-group variability.

On this premise one may identify the following four classes of characteristics as depicted in the four boxes of the figure (see also (2) in the previous section):

a) 'Continuous' intra-group characteristics displaying only a partially discontinuous inter-group variation. Example: stature in Sicilians and in Swedes.

b) 'Discontinuous' intra-group characteristics displaying only a partially discontinuous inter-group variation. Example: the frequencies of Rh- and Rh+ alleles among Basques (a high frequency of the Rh- allele and a complementarily low frequency of the Rh+ allele) and among other Europeans (the Rh+ allele frequency is higher than that of the Rh- allele) where Basques and the other Europeans as well have both Rh alleles, although with very different frequencies.

c) 'Continuous' intra-group characteristics displaying a discontinuous inter-group variation. Examples: the height of Pygmies and of other populations; the intensity of skin pigmentation among 'Whites' and among 'Blacks'. Both these 'inter-group discontinuous' characteristics can be used as 'classificatory' characteristics, namely as 'Major anthropological markers', since they are also self-evident.

d) 'Discontinuous' intra-group characteristics which display a discontinuous inter-group variation. Example: the fy allele (of the Duffy blood group system) whose frequency is 100% in some West African populations while it is virtually absent in the other parts of the world (in spite of its inter-group discontinuity this characteristic has never been utilized for classificatory purposes since it is not a self- evident characteristic).

By far the most common variable characteristics belong to classes 1) and 2) of the figure and display both types of variability, the intra- and the inter-group variability. Simple statistical methods to evaluate the relative contributions of these two components to the total variability (apportionement of the overall variance: see the conference by Barbujani) are available.

One extreme possibility is when the *whole* variation is made up by its *intra*-group component. For example, in all groups 90 percent of the individuals are Rh positive and 10 percent are Rh negative, so that to take the two individuals of each pair from the same group has the same effect as to take them from different groups.

The opposite extreme (the *whole* variation being of the *inter*-group type) occurs if each group is perfectly homogeneous but the various groups differ from each other. For example, *all* individuals of a group are white and *all* individuals of the other group are black so that *all* pairs with the two individuals coming from the same group consist of individuals with the same skin pigmentation, whereas *all* couples where one individual derives from

one group and the other derives from the other group consist of individuals with different skin pigmentation.

The intermediate possibilities are those where the intra and the inter-group components of the total variation coexist, even though in proportions which may vary from case to case: within each group there are at least two classes of individuals (for example, Rh positives and Rh negatives) and, *in addition* to this intra-group variation, there is an inter-group variation as well because the relative frequencies of the different classes within the single groups vary from one group to the other. For example, the Rh negatives are 3 percent in one group and 20 percent in the other, and consequently the Rh positives are respectively 97 percent and 80 percent. It is easy to see that in this case the probability that two individuals extracted at random (both from the same group) happen to be different is (2 x 0.03 x 0.97) = 0.058 and (2 x 0.2 x 0.8) = 0.32 respectively for the first or the second group, whereas if the two individuals are extracted one from one group and one from the other such probability is (0.97 x 0.2) + (0.03 x 0.8) + (0.8 x 0.03) + (0.2 x 0.97) = 0.436, a value higher than both those expressing the intra-group variability of the two groups, namely 0.058 and 0.32.

Up to this point the various characteristics have been considered *one at a time* to ascertain for each one of them whether and to what extent they can be utilised singularly as a criterion of subdivision of mankind into different groups, namely for classificatory purposes. It has been concluded that *each of the known inherited characteristics with a self-evident inter-group discontinuous variation* can form the basis for an unambiguous and meaningful subdivision. Thus, one may envisage a number of classifications, each based on a single characteristic, and therefore equal to the number of such 'classificatory' characteristics.

5. & 6. of the list of concepts relevant for the definition of race

The goal of the next, and fundamental, step consists of working out classifications based on *more than one* 'classificatory' characteristic: the greater the number of 'classificatory' characteristics combined to produce a given classification the more significant that classification becomes. Thus one of the goals of anthropology has been that of proposing classifications based on as many different 'classificatory' characteristics as possible.

In order to decide whether or not to combine two (or more) classifications each based on a single 'classificatory' characteristic, one must first verify that the *causes* of the variation of these characteristics are to a large extent *different* and *independent* from those of the others (otherwise one would combine a classification with itself). If it turns out that this is the case the

Table 2 - Possible subdivisions of the VARIABLE INHERITED characteristics based on some relevant properties of SINGLE characteristics [section (a)] or of GROUPS of characteristics [section (b)].

SECTION (a)
Properties referring to **SINGLE** characteristics (= considered one at the time)

The property	The resulting denomination of the characteristics
1) The type of intra-group variation	QUANTITATIVE c. (body weight, stature etc.) *vs* ALTERNATIVE c. (gene frequencies)
2) The type of inter-group variation	ONLY PARTIALLY DISCONTINUOUS characteristics (stature, skull shape, *most* gene frequencies, etc.) *vs* DISCONTINUOUS c. (skin pigmentation, the fy gene frequency in West Africa)
3) Self-evidence	NOT MANIFEST (= not self-evident) c. (gene frequencies) *vs* SELF-EVIDENT c. (some MORPHOLOGICAL characteristics, such as pigmentation and stature in Pygmies) plus cultural c. and geographical area

SECTION (b)
Properties referring to **GROUPS** of characteristics (each c. compared with the others)

The property	The resulting denomination of the characteristics
1) CAUSATION (= causes and mechanisms)	characteristics depending on the SAME (or similar) CAUSES and MECHANISMS (skin, eyes and hair pigmentation; stature and body weight) vs INDEPENDENTLY DETERMINED c. (pigmentation and stature)
2) CONCORDANCE among INDEPENDENT characteristics	NOT (or only loosely) CONCORDANT characteristics (pigmentation and stature)[1] vs STRONGLY CONCORDANT characteristics (stature and pigmentation when comparing Caucasoids with Pygmies; language and 'classical' morphological c.)[2]

(1) *as a rule, pigmentation and stature are not correlated: one finds the whole spectrum of human stature variability within African Blacks and almost the whole spectrum within Caucasoids (a conspicuous exception concerns Pygmies who are black and short (besides living all in a limited area of equatorial Africa)].*
(2) *for example, Caucasoid speak indo-european languages, whereas the languages spoken by the other two major races (Africans and Asiatics) have different origins.*

independent classifications can then be combined if they are substantially *concordant* with each other [section (b) of Table 2].

In summary, whether or not a given variable characteristic is suitable for classificatory purposes or only as an 'accessory' characteristic, depends on *that characteristic only* (Figure 1). On the contrary, the possibility of utilising simultaneously two or more characteristics to obtain a combined classification and/or to better compare the groups with each other must instead consider these characteristics *each with respect to the others*. Table 2 presents in a schematic form the properties relevant for the characteristics considered *one at the time* [(1), (2) and (3) of the list of concepts concerning the 'tools of anthropology'] and those concerning characteristics each considered with respect to the others [(5) and (6) of the same list].

A definition of (human) races

'Reasonably large' groups of individuals which differ from each other (from group to group) for a 'sufficiently large' number of *independent* 'major anthropological markers' (*inter*-groups discontinuous inherited self-evident characteristics) which, in spite of being independently determined, lead to a 'strongly concordant' subdivision. This definition is vague and arbitrary. However, intrinsically vague entities such as races can only be defined in a vague way. Indeed, a precise definition should be rejected on the very grounds of being precise because, by doing so, it would twist the truth.

What should the *minimal size* of a reasonably large group be in order to define it as a 'race' (thousands, millions, tens of millions?); for *how many concordant and independently determined 'major anthropological markers'* must the individuals of a group be unambiguosly distinguishable from all the individuals of the other groups? Even though no sharp answers can be given to these questions (taken only as examples of the vagueness of the definition of race), it is indisputable that a subdivision of our species into major groups (or major races: Caucasoids, Blacks and Orientals) is reasonably justified on a number of criteria, including not only the classical markers of physical anthropology (mainly skin colour), but also the respective geographic distribution and large cultural differences. Beyond this rough classification the successive subclassifications become more and more subjective (see Table 3).

The subdivision of our species into major races – which is still substantially the same as that originally proposed – has been the main result of traditional anthropology.

Table 3 - Examples of groups identified by at least two independent, but concordant, 'classificatory'[1] characteristics.

Adopted 'CLASSIFICATORY' characteristics	IDENTIFIED GROUPS
SKIN PIGMENTATION PHYSICAL STATURE and GEOGRAPHIC	'Black' Africans; 'White' Europeans; Pygmies
CULTURAL + GEOGRAPHIC + (PHYSICAL)	Hungarian Gypsies; Ashkenazi Jews; Amerindians
POLITICAL + PHYSICAL	'White' French; USA 'Blacks'

(1) NONE of them can be provided by POPULATION GENETICS because the gene frequencies are not self-evident.

The limitation of traditional anthropology

The classification of our species into major races was based on *only a few* 'major anthropological markers' [*Inter-group Discontinuous* (that is, with very large inter-group variability and with no, or only negligible, intra-group variability) and *Self-Evident* characteristics]. At the time when this subdivision was first proposed the number of characteristics with an *only partially discontinuous* inter-group variation was not terribly overwhelming with respect to that of the 'major anthropological markers' (as we now know to be the case). The apparently unavoidable extrapolation of this state of affairs was that many of the variable characteristics not yet discovered (not being self-evident) entail conspicuous interracial differences in spite of not being self-evident. In other words, it was commonly believed that the major races and, though to a lesser extent, their subgroups, differed from each other to *an extreme degree for many more characteristics than the few known since the beginning*.

We shall see in the next section that later genetic findings have demonstrated that this, apparently reasonable, implication was *completely wrong*. In spite of this, and of a number of severe shortcomings (listed below), this general classification still provides, as mentioned, the basis for present anthropological studies.

❒ **Shortcomings of the 'Major Anthropological Markers'(hence of the mankind subdivision based on them):**

➟ The 'major anthropological markers' sufficiently concordant to give rise to a self-consistent classification are *very few* (for example, Blacks can only be defined on the basis of their skin pigmentation and geographical origin).

➟ The complete *lack of knowledge about the genetic determination of the major biological markers*: they are certainly genetic, but far too complex to be understood in genetic terms. In fact, for each of these characteristics one does not know which and how many are the genes and the alleles involved. The only available information is that they depend on many genes and alleles (polygenic characteristics), besides being heavily affected by the environment.

This situation is comparable with that of other sciences like geology and meteorology which deal with phenomena too complex to be explained in physico-chemical terms: obviously no one casts doubts about their ultimate physico-chemical origin, yet these processes can only be described in terms of laws encompassing a much higher level of complexity.

➟ These markers *do not provide any clue about the history of human diversification*: for example, they serve to identify the races but not their antiquity.

The reasons for such intrinsic incapacity is that the 'major anthropological markers' are typical examples of selectively advantageous markers [markers that have become fixed in the populations because they conferred a selective advantage with respect to the environment they were exposed to (for example, skin-tanning is advantageous where sun radiation is intense)] so that they have become 'fixed' (that is, they have reached the frequency of 100 percent) within relatively few generations. After they have attained fixation they cannot, by definition, increase their frequency any further and the time elapsed from fixation becomes irrelevant. Thus the historical information provided by these 'selection-dependent' markers *concern only the environment*, namely the selective environmental factors the groups under study were exposed to (for example, the fact that lowland Sardinians, but not highland Sardinians, present at high frequencies alleles as thalassemia conferring resistance to malaria implies only that the former had been exposed to a severe malarial endemia for a long period of time).

On the contrary, the frequency of *'selectively neutral'* markers continues to change even after the selectively advantageous markers have become fixed. Thus, even though their frequency changes very slowly, the extent of the

change continues to increase for a period of time *much longer* than that needed for the selectively advantageous characteristics to become fixed, so that they keep on functioning almost indefinitly as 'time indicators'.

- Last but not least, the old anthropology implied, from a conceptual standpoint, a gross underestimation of intra-race variation. Intra-group variation was in fact looked upon only as background noise, namely as a factor complicating the subdivision of mankind into discrete groups whereas it is *by far the largest of the two components* (intra-race and inter-races variation) *of whole species variability*. This conceptual attitude, partially justified insofar as the *identification* of the major races through classificatory discontinuous characteristics was concerned (all 'Whites' are light-skinned and all 'Blacks' are dark-skinned), could not lead very far when trying to *characterise* the races with respect to each other. As we shall see later, major races differ in a discontinuous fashion only for the very few characteristics that lead to their identification as discrete groups while for all the other, extremely numerous, variable characteristics, intra-group variability is much wider than inter-group variability.

Variability analysis breakthrough: anthropogenetics

The breakthrough into the analysis of mankind variability – anthropogenetics (c) – is produced by the fusion of the 'Traditional Anthropology' (a) with the newly born Population Genetics (b).

(a) **'Traditional' Anthropology** [main concern: inter-group variation of morphological (that is, self-evident) *quantitative* (hence, genetically complex) characteristics]:

As illustrated in the previous section, the 'old' or 'traditional' or 'morphological' anthropology of the 19th and the beginning of this century was based on quantitative morphological (hence self-evident) characteristics (boxes 1 and 3 of Figure 1) because they were the only characteristics that could be studied at that time.

Some of these characteristics, besides being self-evident, displayed a *'discontinuous inter-group'* variation and were therefore used as 'major anthropological markers' (= 'classificatory' characteristics) leading to an unambiguous subdivision of our species into major races (box 3 of Figure 1). Most of the other characteristics displayed only a partially discontinuous inter-group distribution (box 1 of Figure 1) and could only be used as 'accessory' characteristics, where the term 'accessory' indicates that they are

useful to characterise further the groups identified through 'classificatory' characteristics. For example, morphological characteristics such as stature, body weight and skull shape, as a rule, although showing *largely overlapping* distributions in the different groups, exhibit *means which differ* from group to group.

In conclusion, the descriptive part of 'traditional' anthropology largely consisted of two steps:

1 *Identification* of the 'major races' through the few available 'major anthropological markers' (or 'classificatory' characteristics, namely inherited, discontinuous and self-evident characteristics).
2 Their *characterisation* through as many morphological 'accessory' characteristics as possible.

Examples of subdivisions based on combinations of 'classificatory' criteria of different kinds (morphological, geographical and cultural) are presented in Table 3.

(b) **Population Genetics**:

Human population genetics differs from traditional anthropology for three major reasons:

- emphasis is given to intra-group rather than to inter-group variability.
- the variable characteristics it is concerned with are not self-evident, thus they cannot be used as 'classificatory' characteristics, but only as 'accessory' characteristics, even in the few cases when they turned out to exhibit a 'discontinuous inter-group variability'.
- these variable characteristics are unigenic (meaning their genetic transmission and, in most cases, the molecular basis as well, are perfectly clear), instead of polygenic as in the 'old' anthropology.

The science of population genetics deals only with the intra-group variation of alternative (hence genetically simplex) characteristics. The variation of these characteristics is expressed in terms of allelic frequencies p, q, etc of genes which turned out to be polymorphic (a gene is said to be 'polymorphic' when at least two 'common' alleles (frequency in the order of 1 percent or more) of that gene are known to exist in a given population).

The population genetics investigations most pertinent to the subject of this chapter consists, as a rule, of the following two steps:

1) *The search for polymorphic genes:*

This search is performed by examining a number of random genes (or, more generally, of DNA sequences) on a sample of random subjects to identify those which exist in at least two *common* alternative variants (= alleles) in the population under study. This is done, for each of the genes examined, by looking for the *common* variation of that gene among individuals of the *same* group. Clearly, the higher the sensitivity of the method adopted to search for these variations, the greater the proportion of polymorphic genes present in the sample of genes under study which are destined to be identified as 'polymorphic genes'.

The old, pre-molecular genetics held two rooted and universally accepted beliefs: (a) only few genes are polymorphic; but (b) the vast majority of the few genes which are polymorphic are subjected to strong selective forces. The new molecular genetic technology, with its high sensitivity, demonstrated that practically all genes are polymorphic, instead of only few of them, and that they are, as a rule, selectively neutral (or very nearly so). The reason why old genetics had reached those *grossly wrong* conclusions was its very low sensitivity in detecting variation: it was in fact only able to discover the very few polymorphisms with so large phenotypic effects as to almost necessarily entail relevant selective consequences as well. One should then not be surprised that at a time when only few polymorphisms were known and those few caused important selective consequences the belief was that the genes are only exceptionally polymorphic and that these few cases are quite relevant from a selective point of view. On the contrary, molecular genetics, particularly during the last decade, has become able to detect genetic variations at the DNA level, irrespective of whether they cause phenotypic and selectively relevant consequences.

2) *The estimate of the frequencies of common alleles* (identified in the first step) in the populations under study:

Obviously, this is feasible only for polymorphic genes whose common alleles are easily identifiable (because many individuals need to be examined). Clearly, the type of (genetic) variation analysed by the population genetic approach is primarily an intra-group variation which may, or may not, be followed by studies aiming to ascertain whether or not one, or more, genes exhibiting an intra-group variability (polymorphic genes) also exhibit an inter-group variability. A fundamental feature of this approach, when compared with that of traditional anthropology, is that it examines *random* characteristics instead of characteristics selected for the very reason that they showed an **inter**-group variability much higher than the **intra**-group variability. Thus the variable characteristics of population genetics are likely to be bias-free when they evaluate the intra-group and the inter-group

variation singularly *as well as* with respect to each other (by comparing the gene frequencies observed in different groups). On the contrary, those of traditional anthropology are certainly severely biased in the sense that they dramatically overestimate the inter-group variation with respect to the intra-group variation.

(c) **Anthropogenetics** [= 'Traditional' Anthropology (a) + Human Population Genetics (b)] (one of its major concerns: the apportionment of the total variability of the alternative characteristics used as 'accessory' characteristics into its two components, **intra**-group and **inter**-group variability):

Its aim is to compare the gene frequencies of discrete groups unambiguously defined on the basis of one or more 'classificatory' characteristics (Negroids v Caucasoids; Africans v Europeans; Italians v Spaniards; Jews v neighbour non-Jews; etc). The genes under study are polymorphic genes whose alleles are well identified and in most cases perfectly characterised at the molecular level: the very opposite of the morphological characteristics of 'traditional' anthropology. Since these alleles can be counted it becomes possible for each of the polymorphic genes under study to quantify precisely the relative contributions of **intra-** and of **inter**-group variations to the **total** variation. In other words, one can evaluate for each of the genes under study the degree of diversification existing *among* the groups examined with respect to that existing *within* these groups.

Retrenchment of the traditional concept of race

As already illustrated in detail, the anthropogenetic approach provided for the first time a wealth of *random* variable genes which could be used as 'accessory' characteristics to compare quantitatively the average variation existing *within* the single groups (defined by classificatory characteristics) with that existing *between* these groups (their sum is the *total* intra-species variation).

The result of this unbiased comparison, reported in detail by Barbujani in his chapter of this book, was unambiguous: the variation between groups is but a minor portion of the total genetic variation of our species. The impact of this unexpected finding, which caused a full inversion of the old concept of race, is presented schematically in Table 4.

Among the numerous implications of the new data provided by anthropogenetics, two deserve to be discussed because related misunderstandings have considerably affected the layman's attitude towards racial differences and racism.

Table 4 - The two concepts of PHYSICAL races:
the OLD one based on the 'classical' morphological Anthropology
and
the PRESENT one derived from the FUSION of 'classical' Anthropology with Human Population Genetics

	the OLD concept of Race	the PRESENT concept of Race
OBSERVATIONS	Races display so large inter-races variations as to even attain discontinuity for an appreciable portion of the tested characters	Races differ widely from each other for very few adaptive c. (the self-evident morphological c. of 'traditional' Anthropology) and very little for millions neutral c. (the gene frequencies of the 'modern' Human Population Genetics)
EXTRAPOLATIONS	Races differ dramatically from each other for many more c. than the few tested ones. In other words, the morphological c. are representative of the variable c. in general including the non self-evident ones.	the few c. with *extreme inter-racial* differences discovered since the onset of the 'traditional' anthrop. *are the only ones* (or very nearly so) with such extreme differences since they have been (1) the only ones so showy as to become *detectable by selective adaptation* and (2) to cause *deliberate constraints to inter-racial gene flows.*

❒ Do 'biologically superior' races exist?

A *prima facie* answer is that 'superior races' do exist because the classificatory characteristics which led to the identification of the major races are selectively advantageous characteristics; and these characteristics are, by definition, present in one race with a 100 percent frequency and completely absent in the other races. However, when examining this problem more closely, one realises all the selectively advantageous characteristics which are specifically associated with the various races are not advantageous per se since the selective advantage they confer to a race is an advantage with respect only to the specific environment which that race is exposed to: it is in fact an adaptation to a *particular* adverse environmental factor. For example, the dark skin pigmentation of Blacks is a strong selective advantage with respect to intense sun radiation, whereas in a polar habitat such as that of the Eskimos, it would be disadvantageous. The latter, on their side, are 'superior' with respect to their own habitat. In other words, the rule is that every race, thanks to its 'adaptive' alleles, is biologically (and in most cases, also culturally) superior to any other race, but this 'superiority' is strictly

limited to its particular environment (the habitat where it has settled for many generations, namely for a period of time sufficient to induce a genetic adaptation).

One may argue that a race where an 'intrinsically advantageous' allele (an allele conferring a selective advantage in every possible condition = *unconditionally* advantageous allele) has a frequency of 100 percent while it is absent in all other races, would be a 'biologically superior' race. However, alleles of this kind have never been found by comparing not only races (groups of individuals of the same species) but even very distant species: in principle, our human genes are neither better nor worse than bacterial genes. They are better if they have to work in a human (genetic and environmental) context and worse in a bacterial context.

On the whole, then, it appears that common variations consisting in the coexistence of unconditionally advantageous and of unconditionally disadvantageous alleles, do not exist. This conclusion is based on the lack of even a single observed example of such an imaginary situation as compared with thousands of well described examples of selectively neutral or conditionally advantageous genetic variations.

In conclusion, such terms as 'biological superiority and inferiority' of different races appear to be scientifically meaningless in *general* terms and meaningful (perfectly justified) if referred to *specific* selectively stringent *environments*. This notion is admittedly to a large extent obvious *a priori*. Yet, its *direct* verification should be looked upon as a major achievement of anthropogenetics. It is worth pointing out that people who refrain from even asking whether or not superior and inferior races exist (because they consider this to be a taboo question, and thus consider as heretics those who want to think about it with no custom-made preconceived certainties) do not realise that now we are in the position of rejecting such concepts because *observed facts* show them to be false.

❒ Do races exist?

As shown in Table 4, the traditional subdivision of humankind into biological and geographical 'races' was based on very few but large and self-evident differences observed, and on many more differences as large as the previous ones, yet not as manifest, which were only supposed to exist between these groups. After 30 years or so of anthropogenetics, the observed differences are obviously still there whereas the large supposed, but not manifest, differences turned out not to exist at all, rather than not to be manifest. Thus there is no doubt that human groups traditionally named 'races' do exist but, considering that they turned out to differ from each other much less than it was previously believed, one may argue about whether one should continue

to use the same term or switch to a new one such as, for example, variety, stock or the like. It clearly appears that, were it not for the tremendous socio-political impact of the term 'race', such a problem would not have been raised at all: on purely scientific grounds one would keep the old term and simply say that races differ biologically from each other much less than it was believed; though certainly no one would say that the traditional subdivision of human species was pure fiction. Therefore the real question is whether or not the substitution of the term 'race' with a new term may substantially contribute to the fight against racism (a question comparable with that of the true effectiveness of substituting 'Negroes' with 'Blacks' or 'Jews' with 'Israelites').

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Ethnic conflicts, during the era of the Cold War, were widely perceived to be problems of the developing world. With the end of that war, this has changed. Nation-states react defensively as local politics and global politics increasingly articulate demands for human and cultural rights and for equity in access to resources. Such demands are apparent in eastern Europe and other parts of what used to be the Soviet empire, in western Europe and the Middle East, in the former first, second and third worlds. These demands have become universal. Racism and ethnic conflict, accordingly, allied as they are to such demands, have become global problems today. Chapters in Part One of this book discuss these threats by using a number of key ideas: identity, territory, language, nation, and international intervention. Chapters in Part Two of the book discuss three case studies: security and the peace process in Northern Ireland, democratisation and conflict in contemporary South Africa, and the rise of racism in political parties of five western European countries - Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Identities based on racial criteria are common in many societies of the modern world. Theories claiming that these identities are based upon biological and genetic factors are also common. The two chapters in Part Three, written by trained geneticists, address and refute these theories and their inferences.

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